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Chapter 1
Introduction
“IT (...) amplifies brain power in the same way that
the technologies of the industrial revolution amplified
muscle power.”
Brad DeLong, University of California Berkeley
The Economist (September 23, 2000).
In recent decades, there has been a major shift in production away from labor
and capital towards knowledge-based activities.1 While the traditional inputs, labor
and capital, still play a role, knowledge has been gaining steadily in importance as
a factor of production. These changes have been reflected by several broad trends:
There has been a sectoral shift towards service industries. In West Germany, for
example, the share of employees working in the service sector was about 40 percent in
1970 and about 65 percent in 2000. Similarly, the share in value added of the service
sector increased from less than 50 percent in 1970 to about 70 percent in 2000.2
Within the service sector, the increase in employment of business-related services
such as tax and management consultancies, computer services and technical advisors
has been the most pronounced.3 In addition to these sectoral changes, there has been
a major shift away from blue-collar occupations towards white-collar occupations.
Blue-collar workers made up about 40 percent of the West German workforce in the
1970s and less than 30 percent in the late 1990s. The share of white-collar workers
employed, by contrast, increased from 50 percent of the workforce in the 1970s to
more than 60 percent in the late 1990s. Among white-collar occupations, the growth
1See, for example, OECD (1996a, 1996b).
2Statistisches Bundesamt (2001, 1980).
3Kaiser (2002).
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2in the number of managerial, professional, technical and administrative employees
has been particularly marked.4 Simultaneously, there has been a massive diffusion
of information and communication technologies (ICT) such as computers and the
Internet at the workplace. In the late 1970s only about 6 percent of the workforce
used a computer on the job. In the 1980s and 1990s, the spread of computers
increased on average by more than 40 percent per annum. In the late 1990s, more
than 55 percent of employees used computers at the workplace. The adoption of
computer capital has been particularly pronounced among employees with higher
levels of education and in professional, technical, managerial, administrative and
clerical occupations.
The rapid diffusion of ICT in the workplaces has been accompanied by vivid
discussions in public and among economic scholars. There has always been a dis-
cussion on the impact of technological change in economics. The historical debate
focused, however, on the labor-saving features of technological change. Discussions
today acknowledge that labor is a heterogeneous factor and that the effects of tech-
nological change, in particular advances in ICT, may not be equally distributed
among employees. This notion has been spurred by the diverging labor market suc-
cess of employees with different levels of formal education. In West Germany in
the late 1970s, for example, the incidence of unemployment among employees with-
out a vocational training degree was only around 4 percentage points higher than
that of employees with a degree from university. During the 1980s and 1990s the
qualification-specific unemployment rates diverged sharply. The gap peaked in 1997
with a difference of more than 20 percentage points in unemployment rates between
the two groups. It declined thereafter, but it was still around 15 percentage points
in 2003.5
In the U.S. and U.K., by contrast, the discussion has been provoked by the dif-
fering trends in real wages of employees with different educational backgrounds.
Employees with a low level of education have seen their real wages decrease since
the mid-1980s, while the returns to education rose sharply. This development was
particularly astonishing because the supply of employees with higher levels of ed-
ucation has also increased. These stylized facts – diverging qualification-specific
unemployment rates and differing trends in real wages for employees with different
educational backgrounds – brought about the notion that the recent developments
in computer technologies have been skill-biased, shifting labor demand toward em-
4Spitz (2003).
5Reinberg and Schreyer (2003).
3ployees with high levels of education. This feature has often been referred to as the
skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis.
This thesis includes four essays on various aspects of how workplaces have been
changing in recent decades, all being characterized by the shift towards knowledge-
based activities in production and the extensive spread of ICT at the workplace. The
content of Chapter 3 is twofold. It includes a descriptive analysis that establishes
the stylized facts about trends in occupational skill requirements in West Germany
since 1979. It then provides evidence on the role workplace computerization has
had in this development. Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between computer
usage at the workplace and wages. This analysis is extended by the aspect of
organizational changes within companies in Chapter 5. Chapter 6, in contrast to
the previous chapters, focuses on managers as a particular group of employees that
has been gaining steadily in importance in terms of employment in recent decades.
This chapter investigates the incentive effects of managerial ownership. The analyses
in Chapters 3-5 are based on individual-level data, whereas the analysis in Chapter
6 is based on a company-level data set.
One of the implications of the continuing shift towards a knowledge-based econ-
omy for the labor market is that the demand for skills and capabilities changes
steadily. This feature is at the center of the analysis of Chapter 3. It analyzes
how changes in the task composition of occupations have altered occupational skill
requirements in West Germany between 1979 and 1999. The analysis shows that
skill requirements at the workplace have increased in recent decades, owing to a shift
towards analytical and interactive activities and away from cognitive and manual
routine activities. In addition, the analysis in Chapter 3 includes direct evidence
on how workplace computerization has contributed to this development. The lit-
erature so far cites evidence on various aggregation levels supporting the SBTC
hypothesis. However, up to now, direct evidence on how computer technologies
have changed occupational skill requirements in recent decades is scarce. The anal-
ysis presented in Chapter 3 aims at closing this gap. It investigates the mechanisms
that induce ICT to be complementary to employees with high levels of education
and thus opens the “black box” that typically surrounds analyses on SBTC. The
results suggest that ICT substitutes for workers in performing manual and cognitive
routine tasks, whereas it complements workers in performing non-routine cognitive
tasks. The skill-bias in recent technological change then arises because employees
with high levels of education have a comparative advantage in performing analytical
4and interactive activities.
The widening wage structure in most industrialized countries has often been
attributed to the impact of skill-biased technological change. Yet the empirical
evidence with respect to the relationship between the use of ICT and wages on
the individual level is at best mixed, with most studies favoring the argument that
the observed positive correlations are spurious, that is, attributable to unobserved
heterogeneity.
The analysis in Chapter 4 contributes to the discussion on the relationship be-
tween computer use at the workplace and wages. In contrast to previous studies in
this body of literature, computer usage is interpreted as a treatment and methods
of treatment evaluation are applied. The validity of these methods is backed by
the informational richness of the data set. Results are presented for specifications
that assume homogeneous treatment effects and for specifications that allow the
treatment effects to be heterogeneous across individuals. The overall conclusion of
the analysis is that computer users would be worse off had they not started to work
with computers. The associated wage markup amounted to about 8 percent in West
Germany in 1998/99.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of Chapter 4 by the aspect of organizational
changes within companies. It is a strongly revised version of Bertschek and Spitz
(2003b), which has been published in German (Bertschek and Spitz, 2003a).
Over the past few years, there has emerged a growing awareness that in order
to result in efficiency gains, the introduction of ICT in the workplace should be
accompanied by appropriate organizational changes. The quantitative importance of
these organizational changes has been documented in various studies on the company
level. Typical features are: an increased role for teamwork and job rotation, a
reduction in the number of management levels, an emphasis on continuous learning,
a decentralization of responsibility within companies, and a direct involvement of
employees in the decision-making process.
The contribution of this analysis to the literature is that it analyzes both organi-
zational changes and computer usage in a common framework using individual-level
data. The study investigates whether the use of ICT and organizational changes
affect wage outcomes and, hence, whether or not employers share part of the pro-
ductivity gains associated with ICT use and organizational changes with their em-
ployees. The analysis also contributes to the discussion about the complementarity
relationship between ICT usage and organizational changes. The findings show that
employees working in companies that have implemented organizational changes earn
5significantly higher wages. This wage markup accrues to all employees within these
companies, independent of whether they had been directly affected by these changes.
This finding suggests that companies that change their organizational structure pay
efficiency wages or compensating wage differentials. By contrast, it is unlikely that
the wage markup results from the increased productivity of employees owing to the
organizational change.
The analyses of these first three chapters are based on the “Qualification and
Career Survey,” a large, representative survey of employees carried out by the Ger-
man Federal Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung,
BIBB) and the Research Institute of the Federal Employment Service (Institut fu¨r
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). It includes four cross-sections launched
over the period from 1979 to 1999, with each covering around 30,000 individuals.
It is particularly suited for the analyses because it includes a large variety of vari-
ables that characterize the educational background of employees, the activities they
perform at the workplace, the wages they earn and the technologies they use.
The last part of this thesis addresses the question of whether managerial own-
ership has a positive impact on company performance. The analysis thus focuses
on one particular group of employees: managers. Managers are part of the “high-
skilled white-collar” workers who have witnessed a sizeable increase in importance
in terms of employment shares in the labor market during the emergence of the
knowledge-based economy. The contribution of this paper to the literature is that it
investigates this question for small and medium-sized companies with limited liabil-
ity (GmbHs). Previous studies in this research area have predominantly focused on
incentive effects in large, listed companies. GmbHs have always had an important
role in West Germany. However, their overall importance increased steadily in recent
decades, a process that is also related to the shift away from the traditional inputs
in production, labor and capital, and towards knowledge-based activities. Small and
medium-sized companies are at the heart of the emergence of the knowledge-based
economy, which has forced companies to concentrate on their core competencies.6
In addition, the analysis focuses on companies that operate in knowledge-intensive
sectors such as computer services, tax consultancy and management consultancy.
This chapter largely corresponds to the paper “Managerial Ownership and Com-
pany Performance in German Small and Medium-Sized Private Enterprises”, jointly
written with Elisabeth Mu¨ller, which will be published in the German Economic
Review.
6See, for example, Audretsch and Thurik (2001) and Nooteboom (1994).
6The analyses in this chapter are based on a business survey in the German
business-related service sector carried out by the ZEW and Creditreform, Germany’s
largest credit rating agency. The data derived from the survey is merged with com-
pany information from the Creditreform database, which includes detailed informa-
tion on the ownership structure of private companies. The data set is a panel that
includes observations from 1997 to 2000.
Economic theory identifies two opposing effects of managerial ownership – the in-
centive and the entrenchment effect. On the one hand, managerial ownership aligns
the objectives of owners and managers. From this incentive effect, a positive rela-
tionship between managerial ownership and company performance is expected. On
the other hand, managers with large ownership shares have the ability to “entrench”
themselves. Their large ownership share makes them immune to control by outside
owners. If the entrenchment effect is larger than the incentive effect, performance
decreases in managerial ownership.
The findings show that managerial ownership up to around 40 percent has a
positive effect on company performance owing to the incentive effect. However, the
results do not indicate a significant entrenchment effect.
Chapter 2
Einleitung
“IT (...) amplifies brain power in the same way that
the technologies of the industrial revolution amplified
muscle power.”
Brad DeLong, University of California Berkeley
The Economist (September 23, 2000).
In den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten hat sich die Produktionsstruktur in den
Industriela¨ndern stark vera¨ndert. Wissensintensive Ta¨tigkeiten haben im Vergleich
zu den traditionellen Produktionsfaktoren, Kapital und Arbeit, stark an Bedeutung
gewonnen.1 Diese Verschiebung zeigt sich empirisch an verschiedenen Trends: Es
hat ein sektoraler Strukturwandel hin zu einem ho¨heren Dienstleistungsanteil sowohl
an der Bruttowertscho¨pfung als auch an der Bescha¨ftigung stattgefunden. Als Folge
waren 2000 bereits rund 65 Prozent der Arbeitnehmer im Dienstleistungssektor ta¨tig
(1970: rund 40 Prozent) und der Dienstleistungssektor erho¨hte seinen Anteil an der
Bruttowertscho¨pfung von weniger als 50 Prozent in 1970 auf rund 70 Prozent in
2000.2
Diese Zahlen unterscha¨tzen jedoch den wahren Trend hin zur Dienstleistungs-
gesellschaft, da sie die zunehmende Bedeutung von Dienstleistungsta¨tigkeiten in-
nerhalb des verarbeitenden Gewerbes vernachla¨ssigen. Dienstleistende Ta¨tigkeiten
gehen nicht nur jedem Produktionsprozess voraus, sondern sie sind auch zentraler
Bestandteil von Produktion und Absatz. Daru¨ber hinaus spiegeln diese Zahlen
nicht wider, dass sich die Struktur der Dienstleistungsberufe ebenfalls vera¨ndert hat.
Werden Dienstleistungsberufe traditionell mit Berufen gleichgesetzt, die ein relativ
1Siehe zum Beispiel OECD (1996a, 1996b).
2Statistisches Bundesamt (1980 and 2001).
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8geringes Qualifikationsniveau der Bescha¨ftigten verlangen, und die mit einer rela-
tiv geringen Entlohnung verbunden sind (Verkaufspersonal, Gaststa¨ttenpersonal,
Friso¨re usw.), za¨hlen heute sogenannte wissensintensive Berufsgruppen (Unterneh-
mensberater, Steuerberater, Werbefachleute usw.) zu den wichtigsten Segmenten.
Der unternehmensnahe Dienstleistungssektor (Unternehmensberatung, Marktfor-
schung, EDV-Dienstleistung usw.) als einer der am schnellsten wachsenden Sektoren
in Deutschland untermauert diese Entwicklung.
Im selben Zeitraum verbreiteten sich Informations- und Kommunikationstech-
nologien (IKT) am Arbeitsplatz. Wa¨hrend Ende der 70er Jahre nur rund 6 Prozent
der Bescha¨ftigten mit Computern arbeiteten, waren es Ende der 90er Jahre be-
reits mehr als 55 Prozent. Die Verbreitung von IKT war besonders rasant unter
hochqualifizierten Bescha¨ftigten und in bestimmten Berufsgruppen. So war die Ver-
breitung von Computern bei Angestellten deutlich sta¨rker als bei Arbeitern. In-
nerhalb der Gruppe der Angestellten sind es die Bu¨roangestellten, Manager und
Verwaltungsangestellten, die den ho¨chsten Verbreitungsgrad aufweisen.
Unter Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern und in der Bevo¨lkerung wurde die rasante
Verbreitung von IKT lebhaft diskutiert. Der Einfluss von technologischem Wan-
del wurde in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften schon immer thematisiert, wobei his-
torisch die Auswirkungen eines arbeitssparenden technologischen Fortschritts im
Mittelpunkt stand. Heute wird vielmehr die Heterogenita¨t des Faktors Arbeit
beru¨cksichtigt und betont, dass der Einfluss von technologischen Vera¨nderungen,
insbesondere in IKT, nicht gleichma¨ßig auf die verschiedenen Gruppen der Arbeit-
nehmer verteilt ist. Hintergrund dieser Verschiebung des Schwerpunkts der Diskus-
sion bildet der unterschiedliche Erfolg, den Bescha¨ftigte unterschiedlicher Quali-
fikationsgruppen in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten am Arbeitsmarkt hatten.
In Westdeutschland hatten beispielsweise Ende der 70er Jahre Erwerbspersonen
ohne abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung eine nur um 4 Prozentpunkte ho¨here Arbeits-
losigkeit als Erwerbspersonen mit Universita¨tsabschluss. Im Lauf der 80er und
90er Jahre hat sich diese qualifikationsspezifische Arbeitslosenquote stark auseinan-
der entwickelt. Am deutlichsten war der Unterschied 1997, als Erwerbspersonen
ohne formalen Berufsabschluss eine um 20 Prozentpunkte ho¨here Arbeitslosenquote
aufwiesen als Erwerbspersonen mit Universita¨tsabschluss. Diese große Diskrepanz
verringerte sich danach zwar wieder, 2003 lag sie aber trotzdem noch bei rund 15
Prozentpunkten.3
In den USA und in Großbritannien wurde die Diskussion dadurch aufgeworfen,
3Reinberg and Schreyer (2003).
9dass sich die realen Lo¨hne der Geringqualifizierten seit Mitte der 80er Jahre ver-
ringerten, wohingegen die Ertra¨ge auf Bildungsinvestitionen stark stiegen. Diese
Entwicklung war auch deshalb u¨berraschend, da im gleichen Zeitraum das Ange-
bot an Hochqualifizierten stark zunahm. Diese stilisierten Fakten – Divergenz der
qualifikationsspezifischen Arbeitslosenquoten und der realen Lo¨hne – fu¨hrten zur Hy-
pothese, dass die Verbreitung von IKT am Arbeitsplatz in den vergangenen Jahren
qualifikationsverzerrend war, das heißt, dass sich die Nachfrage nach Arbeit ver-
schoben hat zugunsten von hochqualifizierten Bescha¨ftigten. Diese Besonderheit
wird in der Literatur als qualifikationsverzerrter technologischer Fortschritt (engl.:
skill-biased technological change, SBTC) diskutiert.
Diese Dissertation entha¨lt vier Studien u¨ber die tiefgreifenden Vera¨nderungen,
die in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten am Arbeitsplatz stattgefunden haben. Sie
stehen alle im Zusammenhang mit der zunehmenden Bedeutung wissensintensiver
Ta¨tigkeiten und der Diffusion von IKT am Arbeitsplatz. Der Inhalt des dritten
Kapitels ist zweigeteilt: Der erste Teil zeigt deskriptiv, wie sich seit 1979 die Quali-
fikationsanforderungen am Arbeitsplatz in Westdeutschland vera¨ndert haben. Der
zweite Teil untersucht o¨konometrisch die Bedeutung, die die Verbreitung von Com-
putern am Arbeitsplatz an dieser Entwicklung hat. Kapitel 4 untersucht den Zusam-
menhang zwischen Computernutzung und der Lohnho¨he der Bescha¨ftigten. Diese
Analyse wird im Kapitel 5 um den Aspekt der organisatorischen Vera¨nderungen
erweitert. In Kapitel 6 wird die Analyse auf die Berufsgruppe der Manager einge-
grenzt. Manager sind eine Berufsgruppe, in der in den vergangenen Jahren die
Bescha¨ftigung stark gestiegen ist. In diesem Kapitel wird untersucht, welche An-
reizwirkungen davon ausgehen, dass Manager Unternehmensanteile halten. Die
Analysen in Kapitel 3-5 werden mit Hilfe eines Individualdatensatzes durchgefu¨hrt,
in Kapitel 6 werden Unternehmensdaten genutzt.
Eine der Implikationen der Verschiebung der o¨konomischen Aktivita¨ten hin zu
wissensintensiven Ta¨tigkeiten fu¨r den Arbeitsmarkt ist, dass sich die Anforderung-
en an die Fertigkeiten und Fa¨higkeiten der Bescha¨ftigten stetig vera¨ndern. Dieses
Merkmal der modernen Arbeitswelt liegt im Zentrum der Analyse des Kapitels 3.
Zuna¨chst wird untersucht, wie sich durch die Vera¨nderung der Ta¨tigkeitszusammen-
setzung der Arbeitspla¨tze die Qualifikationsanforderungen an die Bescha¨ftigten in
Westdeutschland zwischen 1979 und 1999 ausgewirkt hat. Die Untersuchung zeigt,
dass die Qualifikationsanforderungen in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten gestiegen
sind. Analytische und interaktive Fa¨higkeiten haben an Bedeutung gewonnen,
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wohingegen manuelle und kognitive Routineta¨tigkeiten an Bedeutung verloren haben.
Daru¨ber hinaus wird analysiert, welche Rolle Computertechnologien bei diesen Ver-
a¨nderungen spielen. Im Unterschied zu bisherigen Studien zum SBTC, die indi-
rekte Evidenz zum Zusammenhang zwischen Computertechnologien und der Nach-
frage nach Arbeit liefern, wird in diesem Kapitel direkt untersucht, wie Compu-
tertechnologien die Qualifikationsanforderungen am Arbeitsplatz vera¨ndern. Es
werden die Mechanismen aufgezeigt, die dazu fu¨hren, dass Computertechnologien
zu Bescha¨ftigten mit ho¨heren Bildungsabschlu¨ssen komplementa¨r sind. Die Anal-
yse o¨ffnet somit die “black box”, die Studien in dieser Literatur typischerweise un-
beru¨cksichtigt lassen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Computertechnologien Bescha¨ftigte
in der Ausu¨bung manueller und kognitiver Routineta¨tigkeiten substituieren, wohinge-
gen sie komplementa¨r sind zu analytischen und interaktiven Ta¨tigkeiten. Die quali-
fikationsverzerrende Eigenschaft des technologischen Fortschritts ist somit darauf
zuru¨ckzufu¨hren, dass er die relative Bedeutung analytischer und interaktiver Ta¨tig-
keiten erho¨ht, bei deren Ausu¨bung Bescha¨ftigte mit ho¨heren Bildungsabschlu¨ssen
einen komparativen Vorteil haben.
Die zunehmende Spreizung der Lohnverteilung in den meisten industrialisierten
La¨ndern wird ha¨ufig dem qualifikationsverzerrten technologischen Fortschritt zuge-
schrieben. Die empirischen Ergebnisse hierzu sind jedoch sehr unterschiedlich. Viele
Studien kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass die beobachtete positive Korrelation zwi-
schen der Computernutzung und den Lo¨hnen unbeobachtbarer Heterogenita¨t zuzu-
schreiben sei.
Die Analyse in Kapitel 4 tra¨gt zur Diskussion u¨ber die Lohneffekte der Computer-
nutzung bei. Im Unterschied zu vorhergehenden Studien wird die Computernutzung
als “treatment” interpretiert. Dieses Vorgehen erlaubt die Scha¨tzung von Teilnah-
meeffekten. Die Vielzahl an Variablen im Datensatz begru¨ndet die Angemessenheit
dieser Methode in der vorliegenden Analyse. Es werden Ergebnisse fu¨r Spezifika-
tionen ausgewiesen, die sowohl homogene als auch heterogene Teilnahmeeffekte zu-
lassen. Insgesamt zeigt sich, dass Computernutzer sich in Bezug auf die Lohnho¨he
besser stellen im Vergleich zur Situation, wenn sie nicht mit Computern arbeiten
wu¨rden. Der Lohnaufschlag betra¨gt 1998/99 etwa 8 Prozent in Westdeutschland.
Das fu¨nfte Kapitel erweitert die Untersuchung in Kapitel 4 um den Aspekt der
organisatorischen Vera¨nderungen. Dieses Kapitel ist eine stark u¨berarbeitete Version
von Bertschek and Spitz (2003b), das in einer deutschen Version vero¨ffentlicht wurde
(Bertschek and Spitz, 2003a).
In den vergangenen Jahren wurde deutlich, dass die Implementierung von Com-
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putertechnologien am Arbeitsplatz Hand in Hand mit entsprechenden organisato-
rischen Vera¨nderungen gehen soll. Nur so ko¨nnen Effizienzgewinne erzielt wer-
den. Zahlreiche Untersuchungen auf Unternehmensebene dokumentieren die Be-
deutung, die organisatorische Vera¨nderungen heute im Unternehmen haben. Fol-
gende Maßnahmen werden dabei typischerweise aufgeza¨hlt: eine zunehmende Rolle
von Gruppenarbeit und Job Rotation, eine Abflachung der Hierarchieebene im Un-
ternehmen, die zunehmende Bedeutung des lebenslangen Lernens, eine Dezentra-
lisierung der Verantwortlichkeiten im Unternehmen und eine direkte Beteiligung der
Bescha¨ftigten am Entscheidungsprozess.
Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Unternehmen, die organisatorische A¨nde-
rungen durchgefu¨hrt haben, Effizienzlo¨hne oder kompensatorische Lohndifferenziale
bezahlen. Hingegen deutet wenig darauf hin, dass die Bescha¨ftigten deshalb besser
entlohnt werden, weil ihre Produktivita¨t durch die organisatorischen Vera¨nderungen
gestiegen ist.
Datengrundlage der Untersuchungen in diesen ersten drei Kapiteln bildet die
Befragung des Bundesinstituts fu¨r berufliche Bildung (BIBB) und des Instituts
fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB). Der Datensatz besteht aus vier un-
abha¨ngigen Querschnitten, die zwischen 1979 und 1999 erhoben wurden. Jeder
Querschnitt entha¨lt Beobachtungen u¨ber rund 30.000 Individuen. Der Datensatz
eignet sich besonders zur Analyse der Fragestellungen, da er Informationen zum
Bildungshintergrund der Bescha¨ftigten, den Ta¨tigkeiten am Arbeitsplatz, Lo¨hnen,
Nutzung von IKT und Informationen zum Arbeitgeber entha¨lt.
Das letzte Kapitel der Dissertation untersucht, ob sich die Ho¨he des Eigentu-
manteils eines Managers positiv auf den Unternehmenserfolg auswirkt. Im Mit-
telpunkt dieser Analyse steht somit eine bestimmte Berufsgruppe: Manager. Man-
ager geho¨ren zur Gruppe der “hochqualifizierten Angestellten”, die sich im Zuge der
Verschiebung zur wissensintensiven O¨konomie durch besonders hohe Bescha¨ftigungs-
zuwa¨chse ausgezeichnet haben. Der Beitrag dieses Kapitels zur Literatur ist, dass
es die Fragestellung fu¨r kleine und mittlere Unternehmen in der Rechtsform der
GmbH analysiert. Bisherige Studien haben hauptsa¨chlich Anreizeffekte in großen
Unternehmen, die am Aktienmarkt gelistet sind, analysiert. GmbHs haben in
Deutschland aber immer eine große Rolle gespielt. Ihre Bedeutung hat in den
vergangenen Jahren durch die Verschiebung hin zu wissensintensiven Aktivita¨ten
jedoch nochmals stark zugenommen. Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen stehen im
Zentrum der wissensintensiven O¨konomie, die die Unternehmen zwingt, sich auf ihre
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Kernkompetenzen zu konzentrieren.4 Daru¨ber hinaus fokusiert die Analyse auf wis-
sensintensive Sektoren wie zum Beispiel Steuerberater und Unternehmensberater.
Dieses Kapitel entspricht zu weiten Teilen der gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Elisabeth
Mu¨ller, “Managerial Ownership and Company Performance in German Small and
Medium-Sized Private Enterprises”, die demna¨chst im German Economic Review
vero¨ffentlicht wird.
Die Datengrundlage bildet eine Umfrage bei unternehmensnahen Dienstleistern,
die das ZEW in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Verband der Vereine Creditreform durch-
fu¨hrt. Die Umfragedaten werden mit Informationen der Creditreform-Datenbank
erweitert. Diese Datenbank entha¨lt umfangreiche Informationen u¨ber die Eigen-
tumsstruktur der Unternehmen. Der Datensatz ist als Panel aufgebaut und umfaßt
die Jahre 1997 bis 2000.
Aus theoretischer Sicht ist das Halten von Eigentumsanteilen durch das Man-
agement mit zwei gegenla¨ufigen Effekten verbunden: einem Anreizeffekt und einem
Entrenchmenteffekt. Auf der einen Seite bringt der Eigentumsanteil des Managers
seine Interessen na¨her an die Interessen der anderen Anteilseigner, weshalb man
einen positiven Zusammenhang erwarten ko¨nnte. Auf der anderen Seite fu¨hrt ein
hoher Eigentumsanteil des Managers dazu, dass er sich “verschanzen” kann und
nur schlecht kontrolliert werden kann, was auf einen negativen Zusammenhang hin-
deutet. Falls der Entrenchmenteffekt den Anreizeffekt u¨berwiegt, sinkt der Un-
ternehmenserfolg mit steigendem Eigentumsanteil des Managers.
Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass es einen positiven Zusammenhang bis
zu einem Eigentumsanteil von 40 Prozent gibt. Es la¨sst sich aber keine empirische
Evidenz fu¨r das Vorliegen eines Entrenchmenteffekts finden.
4Siehe, zum Beispiel, Audretsch and Thurik (2001) und Nooteboom (1994).
Chapter 3
Computer Use, Job Content and
Educational Attainment
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades industrialized countries have witnessed both a major increase in the
supply of more educated workers and rising returns to education. This development
supports the argument that technological change has been skill-biased, shifting labor
demand towards employees with high levels of education.1 A conclusion, however,
that is based on indirect evidence.2 Up to now, there is little direct evidence on how
skill requirements in the workplace have changed in recent decades.
A conclusive judgement of whether occupational skill requirements have changed
in recent decades is only possible if measures of skill requirements in the workplace
are available. Skill requirements in the workplace are difficult to measure. Most
studies rely on measures of formal education or wages. Education, however, is an
input factor. It is very likely that people with equal investment in their formal
education attain different levels of skills. Each education group is therefore best
characterized by a distribution of skills.3 In addition, skills that people bring to
1See, for example, Acemoglu (1998), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Berndt, Morrison
and Rosenblum (1994), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998).
Comprehensive reviews of this literature can be found in Katz and Autor (1999) and Chennells
and van Reenen (2002).
2See Card and DiNardo (2002) for a critique of the skill-biased technological change hypothesis.
3The evidence presented by Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992) and Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce (1993) points to the importance of distinguishing between formal education
and skills in the context of wage inequality. Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) present evidence
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jobs in the sense of individual attributes - such as knowledge, abilities or capacities
- do not necessarily coincide with the skills that are required to perform certain
tasks at the workplace.4 Wages, on the other hand, may not reflect the “true” skill
level of individuals either. This is a very likely scenario in countries with centralized
wage bargaining institutions such as West Germany and France. It may likewise be
the case in other countries owing, for example, to discrimination or segregation in
the labor market.
The present study uses direct measures of occupational skill requirements based
on the task-composition of occupations to assess whether there has been a skill
upgrading in the workplace in recent decades. Labor market institutions or other
factors that may distort the relationship between skills and wages (or formal educa-
tion) are less likely to have an equally strong influence on the task-composition of
occupations.
The empirical analysis is based on occupations at the 2-digit-level. The groups
are synthesized by aggregating individual-level data for West Germany. The data
set contains four waves, launched in 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92 and in 1998/99 with
26,000 individuals on average. The data set is unique in the sense that it draws a
clear picture of the task-composition of occupations, that is, employees who partici-
pated in the survey indicated what they actually do in their jobs. The occupational
classifications are constant over time, so that detailed analyses of the changing skill
requirement patterns within occupations can be carried out on the basis of the task
descriptions.
The main findings are that occupational skill requirements have increased in
recent decades, even in occupations that were the least demanding in 1979. This skill
upgrading has also occurred within detailed education and age groups. A numerical
assessment shows that changing occupational skill requirements account for nearly
50 percent of the educational upgrading in recent decades. Given that the analysis
focuses solely on the within-occupational changes in task inputs neglecting the large
shifts in the occupational distribution in employment towards more skill demanding
occupations such as professionals and managers, this figure is large. In addition,
the paper includes direct evidence on the role workplace computerization has had
in this development. The results suggest that computer technology substitutes for
workers in performing manual and cognitive routine tasks, whereas it complements
of the growing importance of cognitive skills. The diversity of skills within demographic categories
is also emphasized by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).
4See Spenner (1983, 1990).
15
workers in performing non-routine cognitive tasks. This relationship is found within
occupations, within occupation-education groups and within occupation-age groups.
The chapter is organized in 8 sections. The next section discusses the related lit-
erature and introduces the task framework used in this study. Section 3.3 describes
the data set and the variables. Section 3.4 presents stylized facts on occupational
skill requirements as well as educational and technological trends in West Germany
since 1979. Section 3.5 econometrically investigates the relationship between com-
puter use, occupational skill requirements and educational attainment on the basis
of synthetic occupation groups. Section 3.6 tests the robustness of results to changes
in the task measure. Section 3.7 includes a note on wage developments. Section 3.8
presents the conclusions.
3.2 Occupational Skill Requirements and Rising
Educational Supplies
The effect of technological change on labor demand has always been a major concern
of economic research. A central theme in this discussion is whether the restructuring
and reorganization of workplaces owing to technological developments leads to skill
upgrading or skill downgrading.5 The discussion has intensified with the spread of
computer technology at workplaces in recent decades. Based on the observed shifts
in the earnings distribution in the U.S. in recent decades, non-neutral technological
change, increasing the productivity of highly skilled employees more than that of less
skilled workers, has been given particular attention. In addition, the “polarization”
of the labor force has been discussed.6
Empirical research has provided evidence of robust correlations between computer-
based technologies and the use of highly skilled employees on various aggregation
levels, strengthening the hypothesis that recent technological change has been skill-
biased. These studies emphasize the higher skills now required at the workplace
owing to computerization. In addition, the stylized fact of rising returns to educa-
tion in spite of the fact that the supply of more educated workers increased supports
5A classical study is Braverman (1974), others are Spenner (1983) and Diprete (1988). Goldin
and Katz (1996, 1998) provide a historical perspective on the relationship between technology and
skill demand.
6See, for example, Levy and Murnane (1992) and Goos and Manning (2003).
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the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis.7 Katz and Autor (1999),
Acemoglu (2002) and Chennells and van Reenen (2002) give comprehensive reviews
of the literature on SBTC, covering the major studies in this field of research. Em-
pirical studies by Machin and van Reenen (1998), Falk (2001), Falk and Koebel
(2001), Fitzenberger (1999) and Kaiser (2000) investigate SBTC in West Germany.
The picture they present is consistent with the view that recent technological change
in West Germany has also been skill-biased.
The oppositional view has been taken by the over-education literature that states
that skill requirements did not change considerably in recent decades and that the
increased deployment of highly-educated employees resulted in them holding oc-
cupations that were previously performed by employees with lower education lev-
els. Empirical studies are, for example, Rumberger (1987), Duncan and Hoffman
(1981), Sicherman (1991), Alba-Ramirez (1993), Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) and
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000). The empirical studies have been crit-
icized for the way they operationalize over-education (see, among others, Halaby,
1994, Smith, 1986). In addition, results of recent studies that take unobserved
heterogeneity into account or use instrumental variable techniques question the pos-
itive wage effects of over-education found in cross-section analyses (see, for example,
Bauer, 2002). These results convincingly demonstrate that part of what is referred
to over-education simply reflects the heterogeneity of individual abilities and skills
within particular educational qualifications. In addition, the simultaneous increase
in the returns to education and in the supply of more educated workers question that
over-education could be a large scale phenomenon. Why should employers pay more
to educated workers for jobs that have previously been performed by employees with
lower levels of education? In the light of these arguments, over-education, similarly
to polarization, will be discussed only marginally in the analysis that follows.
Most studies in the SBTC literature use “traditional” skill measures to assess
the skill level of employees, such as production workers/non-production workers or
blue-collar/white-collar workers.8 These classifications use divisions according to
7The analysis in the present study focuses on technological change (as opposed to de-
industrialization and globalization as alternative explanations for the skill upgrading in recent
decades), measured by workplace computerization, because it is the only explanation that gener-
ates predictions about within-occupational task changes. De-industrialization and globalization,
on the other hand, emphasize between-industry or between-occupation developments. In addition,
SBTC is the only factor that explains why the large increase in the supply of more educated workers
has not been accompanied by a decrease in the education premium in recent decades.
8For example Berman, Bound and Griliches, (1994), Berndt, Morrison and Rosenblum, (1994).
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occupational groups that are of limited usability in determining skill requirements.
They document, for example, the structural shift towards increased deployment of
white-collar work in all major sectors of industrialized countries.
The recent study by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), however, now offers a
framework that makes it possible to analyze occupational skill requirements di-
rectly.9 The major feature of their framework is that they conceptualize work as a
series of tasks, and therefore, the changing task composition of occupations in recent
decades can be analyzed.
Following this framework, I use direct measures of occupational skill requirements
that are based on the activities people perform on the job. These activities are clas-
sified in five skill categories: non-routine analytical tasks such as research, planning
or evaluation activities; non-routine interactive tasks such as the coordination and
delegation of work; routine cognitive tasks such as double-entry bookkeeping and
calculating; routine manual tasks such as machine feeding or running a machine and
non-routine manual tasks such as housekeeping or restoring houses.
The terms routine and non-routine characterize the relationship between the re-
spective task measure and IT.10 Both manual and cognitive routine tasks are well-
defined in the sense that they are expressible in rules, which makes them easily pro-
grammable, therefore computers can perform them at economically feasible costs
(Levy and Murnane, 1996). Hence, routine tasks are subject to substitution by
computer capital.11 Non-routine tasks are not well-defined and programmable, of-
ten because they require optical recognition so that they are not expressible in rules.
Therefore, at present, they cannot be accomplished by computers. However, com-
puter capital is complementary to non-routine cognitive tasks, both analytical and
interactive, in the sense that computer technology increases the productivity of em-
ployees performing those tasks. The term analytical refers to the ability of workers
to think, reason and solve problems encountered at the workplace. The term inter-
9This framework sheds light on the “black box” that typically encloses studies on SBTC, as
was, for example, expressed by Bresnahan (1999, p. 340): “...(skill-biased technological change)
also tends to be something of a residual concept, whose operational meaning is often labor demand
shift with invisible cause”.
10Following Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), the occupational production function is assumed
to have a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas form: Q = (LR + C)1−βL
β
N , β ∈ (0, 1), where
LR and LN are routine and non-routine task inputs and C is computer capital, all measured in
efficiency units. The exogenously declining price of computer capital is the causal force in this
model.
11See Rule and Attewell (1989) for a description about the role of computing in organizations.
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active refers not only to communication skills - that is, the ability to communicate
effectively with others through speech and writing - but also to the ability to work
with others, including co-workers and customers.12
The scope for substitution is thus limited to certain tasks. This limited substi-
tution relationship (Bresnahan, 1999) between IT and occupational tasks shifts the
demand for labor towards employees with higher levels of educational attainment
who are presumed to have a comparative advantage in performing non-routine cog-
nitive tasks.13 Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) present a general equilibrium model
that is the foundation of this informal reasoning showing how computerization (ow-
ing to the exogenous declining price of computer capital) alters the allocation of
labor across different task inputs.
Although the empirical evidence suggests that technological change in West Ger-
many has also been skill-biased in recent decades, wage trends are often considered
different from developments in other countries.14 Fitzenberger (1999) and Fitzen-
berger et al. (2001), however, provide evidence that the wage structure in West
Germany is less stable than commonly believed, even though the changes are small
by international standards. Wages of employees with a medium level of education
deteriorated after 1980 relative to both employees with high and low levels of edu-
cation, and the relative wage position of the bottom part of the wage distribution of
employees with high levels of education has slightly deteriorated over time. In ad-
dition, the wage dispersion among medium- and high-educated employees increased
over time. The main difference to developments in other countries is in the group of
employees with low levels of education. In contrast to the wage decreases in most
other countries, their wages slightly increased and the wage dispersion within this
group of workers remained stable over time. However, this group of workers experi-
enced a sharp increase in unemployment since the 1980s. The lack of adjustment of
wages of employees with low levels of education is often explained by union wages
that are binding floors for low-wage earners.15
12Case studies identified analytical and interactive skills as the “key” skills required by modern
workplaces in industrialized countries (for example, Hirschhorn, 1984, Stasz, 1997, 2001).
13Maurin and Thesmar (2004) follow the same line of arguments.
14The most comprehensive analyses of wage trends exists for the U.S., for example by Bound
and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992) and Juhn, Murphy and
Pierce (1993). Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) provide an international comparison of earnings
and income developments since the early 1980s.
15The European unemployment problem and the U.S. inequality problem are often referred to
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The present study is most closely related to the study by Autor, Levy and Mur-
nane (2003), which provides the theoretical and conceptional framework for this
analysis. It extends their work by focusing on within-occupational task changes.
In addition, the data set used in the present study has several advantages over the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the data set used by Autor, Levy and Murnane
(2003). I provide evidence on SBTC in West Germany where previous findings are
less clear than in other countries. The findings in both analyses support the ar-
gument that IT increases the demand for highly educated labor through shifting
the task composition towards analytical and interactive activities for which these
employees have comparative advantages.
3.3 Data Set and Definition of Variables
The analysis is based on the “Qualification and Career Survey” which is a survey
of employees carried out by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training
(Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Research Institute of the Fed-
eral Employment Service (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). It
includes four cross-sections launched in 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99 each
covering around 30,000 individuals (men and women).16
The level of analysis is defined by the occupational affiliation of employees. The
employees are classified according to their occupation. The classification of occupa-
tional titles corresponds to that of the German Federal Employment Bureau, 1988.
In the present study the 2-digit level of classification is used, which includes around
80 different occupations.17 Based on the 2-digit level occupations, the micro level
as two sides of the same coin (Krugman, 1994, Freeman, 1995). Criticism of this hypothesis can be
found, for example, in Nickell and Bell (1996) and Krueger and Pischke (1997). Card, Kramarz and
Lemieux (1999) provide evidence for France (often considered to be similar to West Germany with
respect to its labor market institutions) that is inconsistent with the “two-sides-of-the-same-coin”
hypothesis.
16The target population is not uniform within the four waves. Due to this changing sample design
the sample used in the present study had to be restricted to West-German residents with German
nationality, in other words East-German residents and non-German employees are excluded from
the sample since these groups of employees were not interviewed in every wave. Moreover, the
sample does not include self-employed and unemployed persons, employees with agricultural oc-
cupations and employees working in the agricultural sector. In addition, persons younger than 18
and older than 65 are excluded from the sample.
17The 2-digit level of occupational classification is used rather than the 3rd or 4th level, since it
is well known that in survey data occupational affiliations are subject to measurement error issues.
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data of the 4 cross-sections are aggregated into occupation cells and the group means
are used for the analysis. The firms employing these employees cover a wide range
of industries, both services and manufacturing. Table A in the appendix lists the
42 industries considered.
The data set is particularly suited to analyze changes in within occupational skill
requirements since occupations in all four waves are categorized according to the
1988 classification. The constant occupational titles thus provide the reference point
for the analysis. In addition, survey respondents indicated what kind of activities
they perform on the job. It is very unlikely that this causes an underestimation of
true changes in job content as in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), the
description of occupations often used by researchers in the U.S. for questions related
to skills.18 The credibility of the analysis in the present study would be impaired if
the answers of survey participants with high levels of education were systematically
biased towards analytical and interactive activities. I do not think, however, that
this is particularly likely because survey participants only indicate whether they
perform certain activities or not. They do not assign scores to the different measures.
In addition, most of the analysis is performed in “first-differences”. The reporting
bias therefore would only pose a problem if it changed over time. As will be presented
later on, the empirical results even hold within-occupation-education groups.
The most important variables for the present analysis are the measures of occu-
pational skill requirements, the measure of technology, and the level of employees’
formal education. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics.
Occupational Skill Requirements: Occupational skill requirements are measured
by the workers’ job duties, depicted in the survey by the activities that employ-
ees have to perform at the workplace.19 In light of the hypotheses, the variety of
activities asked for in the survey questionnaire are pooled to five task categories.
These tasks categories are: analytical tasks (such as mathematical, logical reasoning
and problem-solving tasks), interactive tasks (such as interpersonal, organizational
and managerial tasks), routine cognitive tasks (such as bookkeeping, time-sheet ac-
The potential measurement error, however, decreases the higher the level of aggregation.
18In the DOT, experts assign scores to different indicators characterizing the occupations. It is
well known that this process encourages analysts to underestimate the true changes in job content.
Moreover, occupational titles in the DOT are not consistent over time (for detailed criticism see
Spenner, 1983, and references cited there).
19I use the terms “skill requirements” and “skill/task inputs” interchangeably throughout the
paper, although the term “skill/task inputs” is strictly speaking only correct. In order to being
able to speak of “skill requirements”, I would need information about task prices.
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counting and inventory control tasks), routine manual tasks and non-routine manual
tasks. Table 3.1 illustrates the assignment of activities to the five categories. On
the individual level i, the task measures (Taskijt) are defined as:
Taskijt =
number of activities in category j performed by i in cross-section t
total number of activities in category j at time t
∗ 100
(3.1)
where
t = 1979, 1984/85, 1991/92 and 1998/99, and
j =

1 : non-routine analytic tasks
2 : non-routine interactive tasks
3 : routine cognitive tasks
4 : routine manual tasks
5 : non-routine manual tasks.
For example, if the analytical task category includes 4 activities and employee i
indicates that she performs 2 of them, her analytical task measure is 50.
The data set does not include information about the time spent on different
activities. The most important drawback of the data set is, however, that questions
concerning the activities that employees perform at the workplace changed over
time. I dealt with this difficulty by reducing the activities in each category j to
those that are comparable over time.
Computer use: The data set includes detailed information on the tools and ma-
chines used by employees at the workplace. The focus in the present study is on
the use of computers, terminals and electronic data processing machines. Based on
these variables a dummy variable for computer use is generated indicating whether
or not the employee uses one of the above devices on-the-job.
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Table 3.1: Assignment of Activities
Classification Tasks
non-routine analytic researching, evaluating and planning,
making plans, constructing, designing, sketching
working out rules/regulations
using and interpreting rules
non-routine interactive negotiating, lobbying, coordinating, organizing
teaching or training
selling, buying, advising customers, advertising
entertaining or presenting
employing or managing personnel
routine cognitive calculating, bookkeeping
correcting of texts/data
measuring of length/weight/temperature
routine manual operating or controlling machines
setting up machines
non-routine manual repairing or renovation houses/apartments/machines/vehicles
restoring art/monuments
serving or accomodating
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on the Occupation Level (weighted by
the number of individuals within occupation group)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
average value of...
analytic task measure 9.419 8.416 0.000 50.000
interactive task measure 16.257 13.434 0.000 66.667
routine cognitive task measure 29.317 22.974 0.000 100.000
routine manual task measure 24.542 20.919 0.000 100.000
non-routine manual task measure 19.643 19.176 0.000 100.000
proportion of ...
computer users 28.348 29.921 0.000 100.000
employees with high education 11.126 23.333 0.000 100.000
employees with medium education 70.633 23.595 0.000 100.000
employees with low education 18.242 16.375 0.000 100.000
female employees 38.710 29.417 0.000 100.000
annualized changes in...
analytic task measure 0.425 0.760 -5.556 4.218
interactive task measure 0.980 1.019 -4.167 6.111
routine cognitive task measure -0.849 3.238 -12.245 14.286
routine manual task measure -0.504 3.301 -10.030 10.829
non-routine manual task measure 0.607 2.429 -8.477 11.136
computer use 2.465 1.834 -8.333 12.500
the prop. of empl. w/ high educ. 0.266 1.258 -10.417 16.667
the prop. of empl. w/ medium educ. -0.049 1.409 -11.310 8.333
the prop. of empl. w/ low educ. -0.363 1.326 -11.111 11.012
the prop. of female empl. 0.264 0.725 -11.111 9.028
24
Formal Educational Attainment: The data set contains detailed information on
the vocational attainment of employees. The employees are classified into three
qualification groups according to their vocational education (school qualifications
are not considered):20 People with lower levels of education, that is, people with
no occupational training. People with medium level of education, that is, people
with a vocational qualification who might have either completed an apprenticeship
or graduated from a vocational college. People with high level of education, that is,
people holding a degree from a university or technical college. These variables are
dummy variables, taking on the value 1 if the employee falls within the particular
education level.
Theoretically there should be 332 observations in the stacked data set (83 occu-
pations observed in four waves). It turns out that 94.5 percent of the occupations
are observed in all waves, whereas 1.5 percent of the occupations are observed only
once, 1.2 percent twice and 2.8 percent are observed three times. One might won-
der whether there are occupations that disappear over time and others that are
newly created, in particular, as there were a number of “information technology”
occupations created by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training begin-
ning in 1996. The disappearance of one occupation is most arguably attributable
to structural change, namely the occupation in which workers prepared minerals
(“Mineralaufbereiter”). None of the occupations that appeared over time was one
of the newly-founded “information technology” occupations. Overall, the occupa-
tions that were observed less than 4 times seem to be a random draw. In particular,
the pattern of their appearance is clearly not driven by the question of interest.
3.4 Overall Trends in Educational Supplies, Oc-
cupational Skill Requirements and the Evolu-
tion of IT at the Workplace
As in most industrialized countries, in West Germany the labor force has witnessed
a sizeable relative increase in the proportion of workers with high levels of education
(see Table 3.3).21 The proportion of the workforce holding a university degree or
20Most studies on West Germany use this classification rather than years of schooling because
it is more appropriate to the system of vocational training. See Card (1999) for different measures
of education in different institutional settings.
21The descriptive evidence is based on the individual level data.
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a qualification from a technical college increased from about 8 percent in 1979 to
more than 16 percent in 1999, whereas the proportion of employees without formal
educational attainment experienced a substantial decline. However, workers with
a medium level of education who either completed an apprenticeship or have a
qualification from a vocational college still represent the largest proportion of the
workforce.22
Table 3.3: Proportion of Different Educational Groups in Employment
1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
high level of education 8.18 8.85 13.30 16.48
medium level of education 72.38 68.33 71.28 70.57
low level of education 21.84 22.81 15.42 12.95
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West
Germany and of German nationality.
Contemporaneously to this educational upgrading of the labor force, there was
a considerable change in aggregate skill requirements. Table 3.4 shows the trends
in aggregate skill inputs. The analytical task measure grew on average by 0.5 per-
centage points between 1979 and 1999, and the interactive task measure by 1.3
percentage points. In contrast, the requirements for routine cognitive and routine
manual skills has decreased during that period with an average annual decline of 0.7
percentage points each.
The trend in the requirements for non-routine manual skills was less clear. The
overall period, however, suggests an increase of around 0.6 percentage points an-
nually. This increase in the non-routine manual task measure over time bears the
potential for work polarization as, for example, expressed by Goos and Manning
22Spitz (2003) provides more descriptive details based on this data set. The descriptive findings
are comparable to developments in other industrialized countries. For example, West Germany
witnessed a substantial increase in white-collar occupations and a corresponding reduction in blue-
collar occupations in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The occupational group of
professionals, technical workers, managers and administrators saw the highest increase as a fraction
of the workforce. This group places the highest emphasis on employees with high levels of education.
Formal degrees seem to have become more important in all occupational groups. However, the
descriptive figures also demonstrate that each occupational category includes employees with all
levels of formal education.
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(2003). Non-routine manual activities are typically associated with low paying ser-
vice occupations. By contrast, cognitive and manual routine activities are associated
with middling occupations such as clerical or skilled manual jobs. The argument
then is that the decrease in manual and cognitive routine tasks reduces the employ-
ment opportunities in those “middle class jobs”, typically referring to occupations
with earnings in the “middle” of the earnings distribution, whereas the positive
trend in non-routine manual activities increases employment in occupations with
earnings in the lower tail of the earnings distribution.
The dominant measure of job quality in the “polarization” literature is earnings.
However, an alternative dimension could be the educational level of employees. Go-
ing back to the activities that underly the different task categories (Table 3.1) shows
that routine cognitive tasks such as calculating and bookkeeping are in general per-
formed by employees with a medium level of education. Thus, the negative trend
in this task category reduces the employment opportunities for this group of em-
ployees, conforming to the previous result that classified occupations according to
their earnings level. A difference in conclusion accrues, however, for the manual
task categories. Routine manual tasks such as setting up machines are the kind of
activities typically performed by employees without occupational training, although
these occupations traditionally payed relatively high wages in Germany. By contrast,
non-routine manual activities such as repairing or renovating houses are performed
by employees with a vocational qualification (for example, masons, carpenters or
painters).
Table 3.5 shows the aggregate trends in skill inputs for each education group
separately. For each education group the analytic and interactive task measure
increased over time, whereas the cognitive and manual routine task inputs declined.
Figures 3.1-3.4 illustrate this development by showing the absolute changes in
aggregate skill inputs between 1979 and 1998/99. Figure 3.1 shows the overall
trends, and Figures 3.2-3.4 show the development for each education group. One
difference between groups is that the decline of routine cognitive task inputs and the
increase in interactive and analytical task inputs was more pronounced for employees
with high levels of education than for the other two groups. Employees with medium
levels of education witnessed the greatest decline in routine manual activities.
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Table 3.4: Trends in Aggregate Skill Inputs
non-routine non-routine routine routine non-routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual manual
1979 4.42 8.47 36.86 30.88 14.19
1985/86 9.71 10.47 31.81 26.18 19.90
1991/92 10.98 16.55 26.97 23.48 19.78
1998/99 13.93 33.81 22.11 17.19 26.04
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West
Germany and of German nationality.
Table 3.5: Trends in Aggregate Skill Inputs by Education
non-routine non-routine routine routine non-routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual manual
Employees with High Level of Education
1979 15.45 20.10 42.51 15.59 4.10
1985/86 21.40 18.76 45.74 9.30 4.46
1991/92 26.29 35.23 34.33 8.70 5.75
1998/99 24.62 48.40 11.44 7.77 2.41
Employees with Medium Level of Education
1979 4.16 8.63 39.15 33.40 16.18
1985/86 9.29 10.41 33.31 28.85 24.18
1991/92 9.39 14.99 28.22 26.27 23.73
1998/99 11.88 28.34 24.08 19.44 26.80
Employees with Low Level of Education
1979 2.78 4.80 27.47 26.50 10.11
1985/86 6.29 7.34 21.58 24.74 13.27
1991/92 4.94 7.47 20.42 23.37 13.73
1998/99 6.92 14.44 14.74 18.19 18.77
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West
Germany and of German nationality.
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This overall pattern does not suggest that, at the late 1990s, high-educated em-
ployees perform more of the tasks that used to be done by medium-educated em-
ployees as postulated by the “over-education” literature. In contrast, the more
pronounced development towards analytic and interactive activities and away from
routine cognitive activities suggests that overall skill requirements were rising faster
for high-educated employees than for the other qualification groups.
The argument could be made that these overall developments reflect cohort ef-
fects, that is, unobserved heterogeneity owing to, say, younger entry cohorts having
better educational opportunities and therefore higher levels of analytical activities.
To evaluate this possibility, Table 3.6 shows the trends in occupational task inputs
for cohorts, defined by year of birth. The first birth cohort are individuals born
before 1940, the second those born between 1940 and 1949, the third those born
between 1950 and 1955 and so on. One follows one birth cohort over time by mov-
ing horizontally within the same row. One follows the same age group by moving
diagonally upwards (employees born between 1956 and 1961 were between 18 and
23 years old in 1979, employees born between 1962 and 1968 were between 18 and
23 years old in 1985/86). Within cohorts, changes in task inputs are attributable
to age and time effects. The age effect describes how the task inputs of a given
cohort changes as the cohort ages. The time effect describes how task inputs for
a given cohort shift due to, for example, macroeconomic shocks. Changes in task
inputs within an age group, on the other hand, are due to cohort or time effects.
Cohort effects describe differences between cohorts that may, for example, be due
to changes in educational opportunities.23
23It is well known that the three components – time, cohort and age effect – are not separately
identifiable without additional prior assumptions. This results from the identity that links birth
year c, age a and calender year t: t = c+ a.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in Aggregate Skill Inputs
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Figure 3.2: Employees with High Levels of Education: Trends in Ag-
gregate Skill Inputs
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Figure 3.3: Employees with Medium Levels of Education: Trends in
Aggregate Skill Inputs
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Figure 3.4: Employees with Low Levels of Education: Trends in Ag-
gregate Skill Inputs
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Table 3.6: Trends in Aggregate Skill Inputs by Birth Cohorts
Analytical Task Inputs
Year of Birth 1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
1975-1981 7.41
1969-1974 7.71 11.54
1962-1968 5.58 10.16 14.63
1956-1961 2.39 9.72 13.35 15.09
1950-1955 5.15 11.16 12.69 13.95
1940-1949 5.49 11.23 11.22 15.32
before 1940 4.23 9.47 8.76 16.56
10 x Average Annualized Changes 1979-1998/99
Within Cohorts: 5.90
Within Age Levels: 4.89
Interactive Task Inputs
Year of Birth 1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
1975-1981 23.17
1969-1974 9.52 30.35
1962-1968 6.25 15.05 33.61
1956-1961 5.72 10.13 18.36 34.37
1950-1955 8.77 11.96 20.14 36.68
1940-1949 9.90 11.95 17.81 37.26
before 1940 8.48 10.65 14.15 36.98
10 x Average Annualized Changes 1979-1998/99
Within Cohorts: 18.33
Within Age Levels: 16.61
Routine Cognitive Task Inputs
Year of Birth 1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
1975-1981 22.44
1969-1974 22.21 21.41
1962-1968 25.06 28.86 24.01
1956-1961 38.04 33.08 29.04 23.54
1950-1955 42.08 35.72 29.69 20.57
1940-1949 39.87 33.99 27.73 19.22
before 1940 32.36 29.43 21.45 23.05
10 x Average Annualized Changes 1979-1998/99
Within Cohorts: -6.11
Within Age Levels: -7.01
<Table continues on next page>
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<Table 3.6 continued>
Routine Manual Task Inputs
Year of Birth 1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
1975-1981 18.97
1969-1974 29.80 17.23
1962-1968 31.51 25.23 19.15
1956-1961 41.53 27.21 24.99 17.68
1950-1955 35.13 26.05 21.80 15.19
1940-1949 30.52 23.91 20.87 14.71
before 1940 25.21 24.80 22.91 17.61
10 x Average Annualized Changes 1979-1998/99
Within Cohorts: -10.47
Within Age Levels: -8.39
Non-Routine Manual Task Inputs
Year of Birth 1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
1975-1981 30.28
1969-1974 25.23 27.78
1962-1968 22.83 22.36 25.94
1956-1961 15.42 20.78 20.18 25.69
1950-1955 14.18 18.05 18.35 25.68
1940-1949 13.39 18.91 17.31 24.45
before 1940 14.25 19.74 19.37 23.30
10 x Average Annualized Changes 1979-1998/99
Within Cohorts: 4.68
Within Age Levels: 6.57
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West
Germany and of German nationality.
As the figures in Table 3.6 show, the trend towards analytical and interactive task
inputs, and away from cognitive and manual routine activities occurred both within
cohorts and within age groups. The overall trends are therefore not only a reflection
of cohort effects. Older cohorts experienced the same trends. For analytical and
interactive as well as routine manual task inputs, changes within cohorts were even
more pronounced than changes within age levels. Within cohorts, analytical task
inputs, for example, increased by around 0.6 percentage points annually on average,
whereas the annual increase within age groups was 0.5 percentage points on average.
These trends in aggregate skill requirements may result from transformations
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along two margins: First, changes in the occupational structure of employment, and
second, changes in skill requirements within occupations.24 As the results of the
shift-share analysis in Table 3.7 shows, most of the aggregate changes in skill require-
ments result from within occupational changes in task measures.25 The last row,
which shows the results for the entire period, clearly illustrates this point. For exam-
ple, between occupational shifts represent around 15 percent of aggregate changes
in the analytical task measure whereas within occupational task changes account
for around 85 percent. In the case of changes in interactive (routine manual) skill
requirements the values are quite similar with around 13 (14) percent attributable to
the between shift and around 87 (86) percent to the within shift. The results for the
routine cognitive task measure are even more pronounced, indicating that between-
occupation shifts account for less than one percent of aggregate changes in routine
cognitive skill requirements. For this task measure, it is also informative to have a
look at the two subperiods 1985/86-1991/92 and 1991/92-1998/99 because between
occupational results there point to slight increases in the requirements for routine
cognitive skills, a pattern that has been counteracted by the within occupational
task shifts. The overall result of this table of predominantly within occupational
task shifts is largely in favor of technological developments rather than changes in
final demand as the potential cause for changing skill requirements.
One important argument in this study is that the changes in the task composition
of occupations towards analytical and interactive activities induced labor demand
shifts towards employees with high levels of education who are viewed as having
comparative advantages in performing non-routine cognitive tasks. Table 3.5 shows
that the analytical and interactive task inputs are the highest for employees with
high levels of education in each wave. Table 3.8 summarizes this result, by showing
task means by education group over time. The descriptive evidence thus confirms
24Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) provide a comprehensive analysis of the first source of vari-
ation for measuring changes in aggregate skill requirements, that is, changes in the occupational
structure of employees.
25The shift-share analysis decomposes the change in aggregate use of task j between time t and
t-1, ∆Tjt = Tjt − Tjt−1, into a term reflecting the reallocation of employees between occupations
and a term reflecting changes in task j within occupation. The mathematical formulation is:
∆Tjt =
∑
c(∆Ectγ¯cj) +
∑
c(∆γcjtE¯c) = ∆T
b
jt + ∆T
w
jt , where c indexes occupations, E denotes
employment and Ect is the share of employment in occupation c in total employment at time t,
γcjt is measure of task j in occupation c at time t. An overstrike denotes an average over time,
that is γ¯cj = (γcjt − γcjt−1)/2 and E¯c = (Ect − Ect−1)/2. ∆T bjt reflects the change in aggregate
employment of task j attributable to changes in the occupational distribution of employment and
∆Twjt reflects the within-occupation task changes.
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Table 3.7: Shift-Share Analysis of Changes in Skill Requirements
10 x Annual Changes in Task Measures
non-routine non-routine routine routine non-routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual manual
Overall
1979-85 8.82 3.35 -8.43 -7.83 9.52
1985-91 2.12 10.12 -8.05 -4.50 -0.21
1991-99 4.21 24.63 -6.94 -8.98 8.94
1979-99 5.01 13.34 -7.76 -7.20 6.23
Between and Within Occupational Decomposition
btwn wthn btwn wthn btwn wthn btwn wthn btwn wthn
1979-85 -0.27 9.10 0.15 3.21 -1.40 -7.03 -1.26 -6.57 0.77 8.75
1985-91 0.44 1.68 0.10 10.02 0.87 -8.92 -0.00 -4.50 0.34 -0.55
1991-99 2.67 1.55 5.24 19.39 0.06 -7.00 -6.04 -2.94 -0.97 9.91
1979-99 0.77 4.24 1.70 11.64 -0.06 -7.70 -0.98 -6.22 0.12 6.11
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West Germany and
of German nationality. Occupations are defined according to the 2-digit level
of the classification of occupational titles.
the view that the higher the educational attainment, the higher the measures in
analytical and interactive tasks. In contrast, the figures indicate that employees
with low levels of education are mainly occupied with routine cognitive, routine
manual and non-routine manual tasks. Employees with medium levels of education
have relatively high measures for all five task categories, but most interestingly, the
value of their task measures for routine manual and routine cognitive activities are
even higher than those for employees with low levels of education.
The educational upgrading and the changes in occupational skill requirements
took place at the same time as information technology began to spread at the
workplace. Whereas at the beginning of the IT revolution mainframe computers
dominated the data-processing units of large firms, personal computers began to
spread to business users from the late 1970s onwards. Owing to the steady fall in
prices, this spread has become more pronounced. Table 3.9 shows the percentage
of computer users at work. The table shows that within twenty years, more than
half of the workforce has come to use computers at work.26 Between 1979 and 1999,
26These figures on computer penetration at the workplace in West Germany are similar to those
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Table 3.8: Distribution of Task Inputs by Education Groups
non-routine non-routine routine routine non-routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual manual
level of education...
...high 22.72 33.98 29.91 9.76 11.13
...medium 8.44 15.51 31.38 27.10 22.57
...low 4.89 7.84 21.86 23.85 13.35
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West
Germany and of German nationality.
the spread of computers increased on average by more than 40 percent per annum.
Table 3.9 also shows that the level of computer usage increased with the educa-
tional attainment of employees. In 1979, more than 10 percent of employees with
high levels of education already used a computer at the workplace compared to less
than 4 percent of employees with low levels of education and around 6 percent of
employees with medium levels of education. This proportion had increased to more
than 80 (30, 55) percent of employees with high (low, medium) levels of education
in 1999. However, it is worth noting that, with an increase of around 45 percent per
annum, the pace of computer diffusion was most pronounced among employees with
low levels of education between 1979 and 1999 (compared to around 42 percent per
annum for employees with medium levels of education and 30 percent for employees
with high levels of education).
As Table 3.10 shows, computer adoption has been quite different for different
occupational groups. It has been particularly pronounced in professional, technical,
managerial, administrative and clerical occupations. The spread of computer capital
has been much broader among clerical occupations than among sales occupations.
This may indicate the division of office work into back and front office functions,
as ,for example, Bresnahan (1999) pointed out, with employees in the back office
(clerks) being occupied with routine cognitive and routine manual tasks such as
data-entry and data-processing, and employees in the front office (sales personnel)
spending most of their time serving customers and clients. In contrast to the wide
spread of computers in most white-collar bureaucracies, operatives and crafts people
witnessed a much slower penetration rate of IT at the workplace.
reported for other countries for example in Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999).
36
Table 3.9: Trends in Aggregate Computer Use* and Within Different
Educational Groups
overall low level medium level high level
of education of education of education
1979 6.06 3.44 6.31 12.22
1985/86 18.11 10.19 20.00 25.58
1991/92 34.52 16.13 33.77 60.73
1998/99 55.38 32.65 56.52 83.15
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West
Germany and of German nationality. *Spread of Computers, Ter-
minals, Laptops, Electronic Data-Processing Devices.
Table 3.10: Spread of Computer Use by Occupational Groups
occupational group 1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
white-collar workers
professionals, technical workers,
managers, administrators 8.53 23.47 47.34 72.25
clerical 12.85 43.87 70.76 91.99
sales 3.65 15.18 23.46 45.12
blue-collar workers
operatives and craft people 1.40 4.18 12.33 27.52
laborers 0.52 1.82 11.17 17.11
personal service workers 3.03 6.79 15.30 40.99
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West Germany
and of German nationality.
The descriptive evidence shows that educational upgrading, increased demand for
analytical and interactive activities and the spread of computer technologies evolved
together in recent decades. This development is consistent with the argument that
IT increases the demand for employees with high levels of education through shifting
the task composition towards analytical and interactive activities.
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3.5 Skill Requirements, Education and Technol-
ogy in the Workplace
3.5.1 Technological Change and Changes in Occupational
Skill Requirements
Based on the model by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) outlined in Section 3.2,
there are two empirically testable hypotheses: (1) that IT substitutes for routine
manual and routine cognitive activities, and (2) that IT is complementary to ana-
lytic and interactive activities. The framework emphasizes that the causal force by
which IT affects skill demand is the declining price of IT. As the price of IT falls
steadily, these two mechanisms have raised relative demand for employees with high
levels of education who are assumed to have a comparative advantage in performing
analytical and interactive activities.
The analysis that follows will investigate this substitution and complementarity
hypothesis. Because there are no hypotheses on the relationship between IT and
changes in non-routine manual task inputs derived from this theoretical model, I do
not analyze this relationship in the following sections.
Table 3.11, Panel A, shows the first-difference relationship between workplace
computerization and changes in occupational skill requirements. Each column repre-
sents a separate OLS regression of the annual changes in occupational task measures
on the annual changes in occupational computer use. Annual changes are estimated
between successive waves, that is between 1979 and 1985/86, between 1985/86 and
1991/92 as well as between 1991/92 and 1998/99. The regressions are based on the
stacked data set. They are performed including time dummies for 1985/86-1991/92
and 1991/92-1998/99 capturing the trend in within occupational tasks changes for
the corresponding time period relative to the base period 1979-1985/86.
The results show that occupations that saw greater increases in computerization
witnessed significantly larger increases in analytical and interactive task require-
ments, whereas they witnessed greater declines in routine manual and routine cog-
nitive task requirements. The coefficients are not only statistically significant but
also economically large. For example, they indicate that 50 percent of changes in
analytical task inputs were accounted for by computerization.27 Similar calcula-
27At the bottom of Table 3.11, the unconditional (weighted) means of the dependent variables
are shown. The figures indicate an average annual increase in the analytical task measure of
0.425 percentage points. Using the coefficient of 0.086 and the mean value of changes of computer
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Table 3.11: OLS Regressions: Technological Change and Changes in
Skill Requirements
Dep. Variables: (Annualized Changes in Task Inputs)
∆ non-routine ∆ non-routine ∆ routine ∆ routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual
Panel A
∆ computer use 0.086∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.105) (0.148)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -6.160∗∗∗ 3.536∗∗ -1.960 -2.462
(1.129) (1.767) (3.098) (7.712)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -7.987∗∗∗ 8.915∗∗∗ 16.394∗∗ -7.436
(1.381) (1.440) (7.726) (7.065)
R2 0.183 0.337 0.079 0.131
no. of observations: 237
Panel B
lagged ∆ computer use -0.022 0.160∗∗∗ -0.796∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.031) (0.202) (0.065)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 1.470 -4.632∗∗∗ -23.444∗∗∗ 6.005∗
(1.350) (1.703) (7.237) (3.637)
R2 0.015 0.195 0.205 0.053
no. of observations: 156
Weighted mean of
dependent variable: 0.425 0.980 -0.849 -0.504
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; regressions are weighted by the
number of individuals within occupation group; ***,**,*-indicate significance
at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
tions show that 47 percent of changes in interactive task inputs are accounted for by
computerization and it explains 90 percent of the decline in routine cognitive skill
requirements. In the case of routine manual task inputs, computerization more than
fully accounts for the observed task changes.
The time dummies show that, conditional on workplace computerization, the
trend change in analytical skill requirements was negative in both periods 1985/86-
utilization of 2.465 percentage points, this implies that around 50 percent of changes in analytical
tasks is accounted for by changes in IT usage.
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1991/92 and 1991/92-1998/99 relative to the base period of 1979-1985/86 indicating
that computerization more than fully accounts for the trend towards analytical task
inputs in these later periods. In contrast, the trend change towards interactive skill
inputs accelerated with time even after conditioning on computerization. In the
routine tasks equations, the coefficients of the time dummies are mostly insignificant,
except for a large positive trend in 1991/92-1998/99 in routine cognitive skills.
Panel B shows the result when lagged annual changes in computer use within
occupation cell is used as regressor instead of contemporaneous changes in work-
place computerization. The results of the lagged specification confirm the previous
findings reported in Panel A, with the exception of the analytical task equation that
now has an insignificant coefficient. The coefficient in the routine cognitive equation
even increases in absolute terms suggesting that there might be a time lag until the
full impact of computerization is reflected in occupational skill requirements. Un-
reported regressions in which the lagged proportion of computer users are included
as an alternative measure confirm these results. These lagged results favor the ar-
gument derived from the theory that workplace computerization, brought about by
the declining prices of IT-equipment, induced task shifts and not vice versa.
Table 3.12, Panel A, shows the result of a richer specification that tests whether
changes in occupational skill requirements are implicitly captured by changes in the
educational structure or changes in the gender structure of occupations. Neither of
the additional regressors alters the qualitative relationship between computerization
and changes in occupational skill requirements found in the bivariate regressions, and
even the size of the coefficients are relatively insensitive to the additional controls.
Only in the analytical task equation, the coefficient drops slightly more than ten
percent. Changes in the proportion of employees with high levels of education turn
out to play a significant role with respect to changes in interactive and analytical
skill requirements, whereas changes in the proportion of employees with medium
levels of education appear to be weak predictors of changes in occupational task
inputs. Changes in the proportion of female employees are even negatively related
to changes in analytical skill requirements, hence they fail to provide an alternative
explanation for increasing analytical skill requirements. However, occupations with
greater increases in the proportion of female employees witnessed relatively larger
declines in routine cognitive skill requirements.28
28I also performed regressions that include changes in work-based learning (average years of work
experience and average years of tenure with current employer) into the analysis. Both measures
of work-based learning were not significantly related to changes in occupational task inputs. The
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Table 3.12: Changes in Skill Requirements and Changes in the Educa-
tional and Gender Distribution
Dep. Variables: Annualized Changes in Task Inputs
∆ non-routine ∆ non-routine ∆ routine ∆ routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual
Panel A
∆ computer use 0.076∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.108) (0.163)
∆ proportion w/ 0.064∗∗ 0.081∗∗ -0.195∗ 0.049
high educ. level (0.033) (0.039) (0.115) (0.178)
∆ proportion w/ 0.006 0.038 -0.177∗ 0.257
medium educ. level (0.025) (0.034) (0.104) (0.184)
∆ proportion -0.119∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.607∗∗∗ -0.068
female employees (0.049) (0.049) (0.191) (0.175)
R2 0.222 0.348 0.112 0.148
no. of observations: 237
Panel B
lagged ∆ computer use -0.009 0.153∗∗∗ -0.752∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.211) (0.072)
lagged ∆ proportion w/ -0.056 0.011 -0.680∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
high educ. level (0.067) (0.048) (0.195) (0.094)
lagged ∆ proportion w/ -0.015 -0.103∗ -0.123 0.145∗∗
medium educ. level (0.036) (0.060) (0.140) (0.066)
lagged ∆ proportion 0.110 0.177∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ 0.045
female employees (0.068) (0.054) (0.268) (0.178)
R2 0.059 0.274 0.275 0.084
no. of observations: 156
Control variables are: time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. Regressions are weighted by the number of individuals within occupation
group. ***,**,*-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
results are not reported because the inclusion of these additional variables did not alter the main
findings reported in Table 3.12.
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Panel B shows the results when lagged annual changes are included as regressors
in the analysis instead of contemporaneous changes. The results for the relationship
between computerization and changes in occupational skill requirements are similar
to those reported in Table 3.11, Panel B. For changes in analytical skill requirements,
contemporaneous changes in all variables seem to pick up more of the relevant
information. Unlike the variable for workplace computerization, a comparison of the
results for education and gender variables with those in Panel A reveals, however,
that they are not insensitive to the change in specification.
Table 3.13 shows the relationship between workplace computerization and changes
in occupational skill requirements for each education group separately. For each
occupation-education group, the results are consistent with the hypotheses of a
complementary relationship between computer technology and analytical and inter-
active activities, and a substitutive relationship between computer technology and
manual and cognitive routine tasks. However, for part of the coefficients, the level
of significance drops considerably. This is particularly pronounced for the group of
employees with a high level of education.29 I see two potential explanations for this
finding. First, that changes in the task composition owing to workplace comput-
erization are less pronounced for employees with high levels of education because
their values of the task measures were already at the extreme of the distribution
in 1979. Second, that for this group of workers the analysis might be particularly
impaired by the fact that the task measures do not include information about the
time spent with the different activities. This time dimension might be more impor-
tant for employees who always had a high number of activities that they perform.
In line with these arguments, the results for employees with a low level of education
are the clearest with respect to the magnitude and significance of the coefficients.
For this group of employees, workplace computerization has had a large effect on
the occupational production function.
The last dimension analyzed in the present study are cohorts. If younger labor
market entry cohort have both higher levels of, for example, analytical abilities and
higher levels of computer use, the above findings may be the result of a spurious
correlation. Table 3.14 shows the results of the above regressions for each birth
cohort separately.30
29Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) report similar findings on the industry level.
30Only cohorts that are observed over the entire period 1979-1998/99 are shown.
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Table 3.13: Technological Change and Changes in Skill Requirements
by Education
Dep. Variables: Annualized Changes in Task Inputs
∆ non-routine ∆ non-routine ∆ routine ∆ routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual
Employees with High Level of Education
∆ computer use 0.027 0.058 -0.253∗∗ -0.052
(0.065) (0.060) (0.120) (0.077)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -0.356 17.304∗∗∗ -10.983 0.393
(4.368) (4.483) (7.911) (7.312)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -9.898∗∗∗ 10.594∗∗∗ -17.912∗∗ 4.761
(3.870) (3.987) (8.395) (6.494)
R2 0.084 0.171 0.084 0.010
no. of observations: 121
Employees with Medium Level of Education
∆ computer use 0.069∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.131 -0.521∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.029) (0.114) (0.171)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -7.465∗∗∗ 2.646∗ -2.880 -3.525
(1.159) (1.628) (3.243) (8.226)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -8.208∗∗∗ 10.095∗∗∗ 18.047∗∗ -9.451
(1.400) (1.481) (8.854) (8.006)
R2 0.186 0.299 0.067 0.113
no. of observations: 234
Employees with Low Level of Education
∆ computer use 0.128∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ -0.196∗ -0.309∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.120) (0.129)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -3.685∗∗∗ 0.230 1.498 -2.267
(1.176) (1.762) (3.814) (7.916)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -5.472∗∗∗ 4.760∗∗∗ 31.453∗∗∗ -11.904∗∗
(1.438) (1.616) (7.780) (6.445)
R2 0.149 0.148 0.161 0.056
no. of observations: 226
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the
number of individuals within occupation group. ***,**,*-indicate significance
at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Table 3.14: Technological Change and Changes in Skill Requirements
by Birth Cohort
Dep. Variables: Annualized Changes in Task Inputs
∆ non-routine ∆ non-routine ∆ routine ∆ routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual
Employees born between 1956 and 1961
∆ computer use 0.113∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ -0.202 -0.647∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.041) (0.130) (0.171)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -5.231∗∗∗ .543 0.378 5.933
(1.561) (2.229) (4.923) (9.799)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -10.853∗∗∗ 5.416∗∗∗ 14.226 -1.759
(1.675) (1.685) (8.869) (9.112)
R2 0.205 0.118 0.036 0.117
no. of observations: 220
Employees born between 1950 and 1955
∆ computer use 0.049 0.216∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.055) (0.111) (0.160)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -4.805∗∗ 6.301∗∗∗ -3.230 -3.639
(1.878) (2.249) (4.407) (8.854)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -8.950∗∗∗ 7.753∗∗∗ 11.791 -10.845
(1.960) (2.062) (8.977) (7.960)
R2 0.092 0.178 0.047 0.087
no. of observations: 211
Employees born between 1940 and 1949
∆ computer use 0.111∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.041) (0.113) (0.130)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -7.972∗∗∗ 2.846 -5.388 -3.357
(1.504) (2.010) (3.765) (8.137)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -7.210∗∗∗ 10.067∗∗∗ 9.019 -8.326
(1.773) (1.755) (7.841) (7.244)
R2 0.170 0.280 0.059 0.071
no. of observations: 224
<Table continues on next page>
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<Table 3.14 continued>
Dep. Variables: Annualized Changes in Task Inputs
∆ non-routine ∆ non-routine ∆ routine ∆ routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual
Employees born before 1940
∆ computer use 0.150∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.450∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.039) (0.106) (0.145)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -9.768∗∗∗ 0.177 -9.521∗∗∗ -5.500
(1.160) (1.902) (3.025) (7.011)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -5.463∗∗∗ 11.077∗∗∗ 13.355∗ -8.665
(1.850) (2.230) (7.305) (6.681)
R2 0.265 0.258 0.145 0.071
no. of observations: 213
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the
number of individuals within occupation group. ***,**,*-indicate significance
at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
The results suggest a complementary relationship between computer technolo-
gies and analytical and interactive activities and a substitutive relationship be-
tween computer technologies and cognitive and manual routine activities within
each occupation-cohort group. Therefore, the previous findings do not seem to be a
mere reflection of cohort effects.
3.5.2 Changes in Skill Requirements and Educational Up-
grading
3.5.2.1 Contribution of Changes in Occupational Skill Requirements to
the Educational Upgrading
In this section, I calculate the potential contribution of shifts in occupation skill
requirements to shifts in employment of labor with high levels of education and
with medium levels of education. This is done by firstly estimating an equation
of educational requirements as a function of task inputs, an exercise that aims to
translate occupational skill requirements into education-equivalents. The regression
equation is:
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EDict = α0it +
4∑
j=1
Sjctαijt + υict (3.2)
t = 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92, 1998/99
j = 1,...,4.
i = high or medium
c = occupation
j =

1 : non-routine analytic task measure
2 : non-routine interactive task measure
3 : routine cognitive task measure
4 : routine manual task measure
where EDict is the proportion of employees with education level i in occupation c at
time t. Sjct is the measure of task j in occupation c at time t. The αijts estimated in
the regression provide an estimate of the demand for employees with high (medium)
level of education as a function of occupation skill requirements. This is what Autor,
Levy and Murnane (2003) call a “fixed coefficient” model because, by assuming the
αijts to be constant over the period, it neglects the impact of task prices on task
demand. If the prices of analytical and interactive task inputs relative to routine
task inputs has risen, for example, this model will lead to an underestimation of
shifts towards analytical and interactive tasks and thus to an underestimation of
the educational upgrading of the workforce.
The estimated coefficients αijt of equation (3.2) are used to predict changes in
the demand for employees with high and medium levels of education.
ˆ∆EDicτ =
4∑
j=1
∆Sjcτ αˆij(t−1) (3.3)
τ = t− (t− 1) with t= 1979, 1985/86, 1991/92, 1998/99.
The results of estimating equation (3.2) separately for employees with high and
medium levels of education and for each wave are shown in Table 3.15. Panel A
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presents the results for the proportion of employees with high levels of eduction.
In each wave, the results indicate a strong (and mostly highly significant) positive
relationship between analytical and interactive task inputs and the proportion of
employees with high education levels. In 1979, for example, a one percentage point
increase in analytical skill requirements results in a 1.3 percentage point increase
in the demand for employees with high level of education. The results for the
routine cognitive and routine manual task measures are also in line with the a priori
expectations, although the coefficients are often insignificant.
Table 3.15: OLS Results: Educational Requirements within Occupation
Group as a Function of Task Inputs
A. Dep. Variable: Proportion of Employees with High Level of Education
1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
non-routine analytic 1.321∗∗∗(0.337) 1.639∗∗∗(0.416) 1.102∗∗∗(0.217) 1.267∗∗∗(0.279)
non-routine interactive 1.322∗∗∗(0.307) 0.129 (0.566) 1.464∗∗∗(0.232) 0.706∗∗∗(0.186)
routine cognitive -0.061 (0.110) -0.301∗ (0.159) -0.576∗∗∗(0.131) -0.039 (0.223)
routine manual -0.206 (0.120) -0.476∗∗∗(0.157) -0.021 (0.077) 0.086 (0.232)
R2 0.468 0.388 0.673 0.583
no. of observations: 83 83 80 80
B. Dep. Variable: Proportion of Employees with Medium Level of Education
1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
non-routine analytic -0.436 (0.466) -1.007∗ (0.534) -0.622∗ (0.328) -1.110∗∗∗(0.364)
non-routine interactive -0.241 (0.424) -0.047 (0.726) -0.980∗∗∗(0.351) -0.087 (0.343)
routine cognitive 0.019 (0.152) 0.631∗∗∗(0.205) 0.642∗∗∗(0.198) 0.290 (0.291)
routine manual 0.209 (0.167) 1.013∗∗∗(0.202) 0.171 (0.116) -0.194 (0.303)
R2 0.065 0.272 0.251 0.249
no. of observations: 83 83 80 80
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes an intercept term.
Regressions are weighted by the number of individuals within occupation group. ***,**,*-
indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
Panel B shows the results for the proportion of employees with medium level
of education. With most of the coefficients being insignificant, the results are less
clear-cut than those for employees with high levels of education. The overall picture
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suggests, however, a positive relationship between routine cognitive and routine
manual task inputs and the proportion of employees with medium levels of education,
whereas the relationship with respect to analytical and interactive task inputs is
negative.
Panel A of Table 3.16 shows the observed annual changes in the proportion of
employees with high and medium level of education for the subperiods 1979-85/86,
1985/86-91/92, 1991/92-98/99 and for 1979-1998/99. The pace of educational up-
grading was relatively stable since the mid-1980s with average annual changes of
0.5 percentage points. Between 1979 and 1998/99 the proportion of employees with
high level of education grew on average by 0.4 percentage points per annum. The
proportion of employees with medium levels of education decreased considerably
between 1979 and 1985/86, increased between 1985/86 and 1991/92 and declined
again in the 1990s. Over the whole period, however, this resulted in an average
annual decrease of 0.1 percentage points.
In what follows, I will largely concentrate the discussion of results on the whole
period 1979-1998/99, although the results for the different subperiods are mostly
comparable. However, macroeconomic shocks might affect the outcomes in these
subperiods such as the recessions that West Germany experienced at the beginning of
the 1980s and around 1992/1993, and also the unification boom just at the beginning
of the 1990s might be important with this respect.
Two different measures of ∆Sjcτ are used to calculate ˆ∆EDicτ of equation (3.3):
first, observed changes in occupation skill requirements and second, predicted changes
in occupation skill requirements implied by computerization. In the calculations that
follow, I will only use the αijs of the year 1979. The relationship between task inputs
and education in 1979 is closest to the pre-computer era. Desktop computing, for
example, only became widespread in the 1980s and 1990s.
Panel B shows the observed changes in occupation skill requirements. Require-
ments for analytical and interactive skills within occupation grew between 1979 and
1998/99, with the pace of increases in interactive inputs accelerating steadily. The
figures show a steady decline in occupation requirements for routine cognitive skills
and also for routine manual skills.
Inserting the observed changes in occupation skill requirements, together with the
αˆs of Table 3.15-first column, into equation (3.3) shows that the observed changes
in occupational skill requirements account for nearly 50 percent of the changes in
the proportion of employees with high level of education between 1979 and 1998/99
(Panel C). With respect to the observed changes in the proportion of employees with
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Table 3.16: Shifts in High-Educated-Equivalent Labor Demand and
Medium-Educated-Equivalent Labor Demand Implied by Changes in
Occupational Task Inputs
1979-1985/86 1985/86-1991/92 1991/92-1998/99 1979-1998/99
A. 10 x Observed Annual Changes in the Proportion of Employees with...
high Level of Education 3.667 5.333 5.167 4.250
medium Level of Education -6.833 5.000 -1.167 -0.947
B. 10 x Observed Annual Changes in Within Occupation Task Inputs
non-routine analytic 9.037 1.716 1.774 4.242
non-routine interactive 3.046 9.981 16.430 10.705
routine cognitive -6.059 -9.054 -10.416 -8.965
routine manual -5.875 -5.216 -4.028 -7.305
C. Predicted Proportion of Changes in the Share of Employees with High/Medium
Level of Education Explained by Observed Changes in Within Occupation Skill Requirements
(in Percent)
high Level of Education 47.934 32.237 49.741 48.997
medium Level of Education 8.815 -8.834 49.463 64.698
D. Predicted Annual Changes in Occupation Task Inputs Implied by Computerization
(10 x Annual Changes)
non-routine analytic 8.901 2.991 0.519 4.129
non-routine interactive 4.243 9.572 15.013 9.664
routine cognitive -5.547 -9.001 6.519 -2.375
routine manual 2.171 -0.134 -4.503 -0.964
E. Predicted Proportion of Changes in the Share of Employees with High/Medium
Level of Education Explained by Predicted Changes in Occupation Task Inputs
Implied by Computerization (in Percent)
high Level of Education 47.184 32.298 47.900 41.736
medium Level of Education 6.669 -7.506 46.546 46.171
medium levels of education, observed changes in the occupational skill requirements
even accounted for around 65 percent of observed changes.
Panel D shows the results of the predicted changes in occupation skill require-
ments that are implied by computerization. These figures are based on the regression
specification shown in Table 3.11, Panel A. The overall picture complies with the
figures in Table 3.16, Panel B. Computerization implies an increase in occupational
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requirements for analytical and interactive tasks and a reduction in routine man-
ual and routine cognitive tasks. The deviation between observed changes in skill
requirements and the predictions implied by computerization is most pronounced
in the nineties, where the predicted figures show a shift towards routine cognitive
tasks.
Panel E shows the proportion of observed changes in the share of employees with
high and medium level of education explained by predicted changes in occupation
skill requirements implied by computerization. Between 1979 and 1998/99, occupa-
tional task changes induced by computerization account for more than 40 percent of
the overall skill upgrading. This figures reaches with 47 (32) percent its height (low)
in the first and last (second) subperiod. With respect to changes in the proportion of
employees with medium levels of education, task shifts induced by computerization
account for nearly 50 percent of the observed pattern of employment.
Given that these changes in skill requirements are only those within occupations,
these figures show the substantial economic impact of changes in the skill require-
ments on the educational upgrading of the workforce. In addition, the analysis
shows the role of workplace computerization in reshaping the occupational produc-
tion process. Changes in occupational skill requirements implied by computerization
account for 85 percent of the proportion of educational upgrading that is explained
by observed task shifts.
3.5.2.2 Changes in Occupational Skill Requirements Using a Scalar In-
dex
The question that has been neglected in the analysis so far is, whether there has been
a polarization of work in recent decades.31 The argument is that the substitution of,
for example, routine cognitive tasks by computer technologies effects occupations
such as bookkeepers and bank employees that are traditionally held by employees
with medium levels of education. Non-routine manual activities, on the other hand,
that, at present, cannot be accomplished by computers, are frequent in occupations
that are often held by employees with low levels of education such as waiters.
In order to further investigate this question, I construct a scalar index of occu-
pational skill requirements. This skill index is the predicted value derived from the
regressions presented in Table 3.15, Panel A, for 1979. Based on the 1979 value of
this skill index, I classify occupations into four groups. Occupations whose value of
31See, for example, Levy and Murnane (1992) and Goos and Manning (2003).
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the skill index in 1979 was in the lowest quartile are the first group, occupations
in the second quartile are the second group and so on. I first analyze how skill
requirements have changed within the four occupation groups, then I examine how
the employment distribution has changed among these groups in order to investigate
the question of “polarization”.
Table 3.17 shows the evolution of the skill index for each occupation group. In
addition, the table also includes the proportion of employees with low, medium and
high educational attainment within this occupation groups. As can be seen, the
value of the skill index increased within each group of occupations. The increase
was particularly pronounced for the group of occupations whose 1979 value was in
the fourth quartile.
Figures 3.5-3.8 show the absolute changes in the skill index (relative to the 1979
values) within each of the four groups. In addition, the absolute changes in the pro-
portion of employees with high, medium and low levels of education are included.
Figure 3.5 shows the developments for occupations that were the least demanding
in terms of the value of the skill index in 1979. For this group of occupations the
skill index has risen by more than 15 percentage points. This development has been
accompanied by an increase in the proportion of employees with high and medium
levels of education, whereas the proportion of low educated employees has declined
over time. Figure 3.6 and 3.7 show the patterns for the group of occupations whose
1979 value of the skill index was in the second and third quartiles. The develop-
ment in these groups of occupations can also be characterized by a shift towards
employees with high and medium levels of education and away from employees with
low education since 1985/86. As Figure 3.8 shows, occupations with the highest
skill index in 1979, have witnessed both a large increase in skill requirements and a
pronounced educational upgrading. For this group of occupations the proportion of
both employees with low and medium levels of education has declined.
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Table 3.17: Trends in Occupational Skill Requirements for Occupa-
tions Grouped by the 1979 Value of the Skill Index (weighted by the
number of individuals within group)
1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
First Quartile
Mean Value of the Skill Index -4.450 3.347 3.811 11.805
Proportion of empl. w/ high education 0.931 0.920 2.475 2.762
Proportion of empl. w/ medium education 67.306 67.561 71.817 73.338
Proportion of empl. w/ low education 32.043 31.519 25.707 23.900
Second Quartile
Mean Value of the Skill Index -2.333 1.458 2.154 8.436
Proportion of empl. w/ high education 0.887 1.388 2.564 4.096
Proportion of empl. w/ medium education 71.057 69.548 73.240 75.623
Proportion of empl. w/ low education 28.449 29.064 24.196 20.281
Third Quartile
Mean Value of the Skill Index 0.056 5.693 8.749 15.451
Proportion of empl. w/ high education 2.127 2.407 3.859 4.671
Proportion of empl. w/ medium education 80.237 76.872 80.698 80.453
Proportion of empl. w/ low education 18.368 20.721 15.443 14.876
Fourth Quartile
Mean Value of the Skill Index 18.653 27.800 40.232 44.675
Proportion of empl. w/ high education 33.147 31.553 45.561 47.885
Proportion of empl. w/ medium education 59.635 49.312 48.256 46.877
Proportion of empl. w/ low education 16.381 19.134 6.184 5.238
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Figure 3.5: Occupations in the First Quartile
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Figure 3.6: Occupations in the Second Quartile
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
Skill Index
empl. w/ high education
empl. w/ medium education
empl. w/ low education
P e
r c
e n
t a
g e
 P
o i
n t
 C
h a
n g
e s
 R
e l
a t
i v
e  
t o
 1
9 7
9  
53
Figure 3.7: Occupations in the Third Quartile
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Figure 3.8: Occupations in the Fourth Quartile
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Based on these tables and figures it is difficult to assess whether the educational
upgrading within each occupation group was “appropriate” giving the evolution of
skill requirements, but the steep increase in occupational skill requirements even in
occupation groups that were the least skill demanding in 1979 suggest that medium
or high educated employees who moved into these groups of occupations are now
performing tasks that are different from those that have been performed by low
educated employees. This finding corroborates the previous evidence that, for each
education group, tasks shifted towards analytical and interactive activities and away
from manual and cognitive routine activities (page 28). The overall pattern does not
indicate that “over-education” has occurred, on average, owing to the large inflow
of employees with high levels of education into the labor market.
The question of whether there has been a “hollowing out” of middle-class occupa-
tions concerns the employment trends across these groups of occupations. Therefore,
I calculated the distribution of employment among the different groups of occupa-
tions over time. Table 3.18 shows the employment shares for each occupation group
over time, Figure 3.10 shows the absolute employment changes. Employment in
occupations of the second group has always been the smallest. However, the de-
cline in their employment share has been less pronounced than for occupations in
the first group. As Figure 3.10 shows, employment in both the first and second
occupation group has declined, whereas occupations in the third and fourth quartile
have experienced a relative increase. These figures thus do not indicate that there
was a “hollowing out” of middle-class occupations, at least not in terms of occupa-
tional skill requirements. They rather suggest a monotone shift towards more skill
intensive occupations.
Table 3.18: Employment Trends for Occupations Grouped by the 1979
Value of the Skill Index
1979 1985/86 1991/92 1998/99
First Quartile 25.64 21.77 21.06 20.09
Second Quartile 17.74 18.55 18.90 15.77
Third Quartile 34.19 36.70 36.94 36.17
Fourth Quartile 22.43 22.98 23.10 27.97
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Figure 3.9: Employment Trends in Occupations Grouped by the 1979
Value of the Skill Index
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3.6 Are the Results Robust to Changes in the
Task Measure?
The individual task measures used so far assumed values between 0 and 100 for each
task category j and time t (see Equation 3.1). Alternatively, one can restrict the
task measures to sum up to 100 for each individual i and time t:
Taskijt =
number of activities in category j performed by i in cross-section t
total number of activities performed by i at time t
∗ 100
(3.4)
as previously
t = 1979, 1984/85, 1991/92 and 1998/99, and
56
j =

1 : non-routine analytic tasks
2 : non-routine interactive tasks
3 : routine cognitive tasks
4 : routine manual tasks
5 : non-routine manual tasks.
The underlying model of this task measure is one in which survey participants
have their working day in mind while answering the questionnaire. It assumes that
the activities asked for in the questionnaire include all activities employees perform
at the workplace and that the denominator encompasses all activities individual i
performs during the working day. A higher number of activities within a particular
category then implicitly means that employees spend more time performing tasks
of this category. But the questionnaire does not include information about time.
I therefore prefer the measure that was introduced first and used throughout the
paper. However, in order to test the robustness of findings I perform additional
analyses using the alternative task measure.
Table 3.19 shows the overall trends using the alternative task measure. The
alternative measure shows a larger absolute increase in analytical task inputs and
larger decreases in the routine cognitive task inputs than in Table 3.4. The trends
in the interactive and routine manual task measures are broadly comparable. Non-
routine manual inputs hardly change in terms of the alternative task measure. The
overall picture suggests that the task measure used throughout this study is a more
conservative measure of changes in task inputs than the alternative measure.
Table 3.20 and 3.21 show some results of specifications using the alternative task
measure. Annualized changes in task measures are regressed on annualized changes
of computer usage. For each panel the equations are estimated simultaneously as
a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) since, by construction, for each
observation the task measures Tj sum up to 100 over all equations. This leads the
∆Tj to sum to zero. Only four out of the five task equations are linearly independent
and for each observation the disturbances across equations must sum to zero. The
system estimation technique allows the consideration of cross-equation constraints.
One procedure is to estimate four out of the five equations simultaneously and to
obtain parameter estimates of the “left–out” equation indirectly by using the above
conditions. From an econometric perspective, the parameter estimates of the above
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Table 3.19: Replication of Table 3.4 Using the Alternative Task Mea-
sure
non-routine non-routine routine routine non-routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual manual
1979 8.70 22.19 28.99 24.29 15.82
1985/86 14.25 26.77 22.08 20.52 16.38
1991/92 15.56 42.53 9.87 17.84 14.19
1998/99 26.05 43.25 5.00 8.62 17.08
The sample includes workers aged 18-65 with residence in West
Germany and of German nationality.
specifications are invariant to the choice of the “left–out” equation.32 However, given
the focus in this analysis, it seems straightforward to drop the non-routine manual
equation. Weighted SUR-estimations are performed, with the number of individuals
within occupation group as weights.
Table 3.20 shows that, except for the analytical task equation, the results are
robust to changes in the way the task measures are constructed. Occupations that
saw greater increases in computerization witnessed significant larger increases in
interactive task requirements, and significantly greater declines in cognitive and
manual routine task requirements. The coefficient in the analytical task equation is
negative. However, it is estimated very imprecisely.
Table 3.21 shows the results for each education group separately. For employees
with high and low levels of education, the results are consistent with the hypotheses
of a complementary relationship between computer technology and analytical and
interactive activities, and a substitutive relationship between computer technology
and cognitive and manual routine activities. For employees with medium levels of
education, the results for interactive, routine cognitive as well as routine manual
activities are consistent with the hypotheses. The results largely correspond to the
findings shown in Table 3.13, although the coefficients shown in Table 3.21 are less
precisely estimated.
Additional results not reported here confirm this picture. My interpretation of
these findings is that the overall conclusions drawn from the analyses in this chapter
are robust to changes in the construction of the task measure.
32See Berndt (1991), p.473 ff., for a discussion of the choice of which equation is deleted.
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Table 3.20: Replication of Table 3.11 (Panel A) Using the Alternative
Task Measure
Dep. Variables: (Annualized Changes in Task Inputs)
∆ non-routine ∆ non-routine ∆ routine ∆ routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual
∆ computer use -0.067 0.242∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.087) (0.067) (0.085)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -6.798∗∗∗ 15.416∗∗∗ -10.000∗∗∗ -0.902
(2.362) (3.917) (3.039) (3.696)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 5.631∗∗∗ -16.417∗∗∗ 3.776 -4.931
(2.327) (3.859) (2.994) (3.642)
Pseudo−R2 0.111 0.237 0.108 0.086
χ2 29.46∗∗∗ 73.25∗∗∗ 28.59∗∗∗ 22.19∗∗∗
no. of observations: 237
The four equations are estimated simultaneously as a system of seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR). Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions
are weighted by the number of individuals within occupation group; ***,**,*-
indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Table 3.21: Replication of Table 3.13 Using the Alternative Task Mea-
sure
Dep. Variables: Annualized Changes in Task Inputs
∆ non-routine ∆ non-routine ∆ routine ∆ routine
analytic interactive cognitive manual
Employees with High Level of Education
∆ computer use 0.053 0.107 -0.279∗∗∗ -0.02
(0.097) (0.149) (0.096) (0.051)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -18.430∗∗∗ 53.735∗∗∗ -33.052∗∗∗ 1.460
(5.341) (8.246) (5.296) (2.837)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 -8.408∗ 5.366 -12.875∗∗∗ 4.913
(4.768) (7.362) (4.727) (2.533)
Pseudo−R2 0.108 0.400 0.401 0.039
χ2 13.06∗∗∗ 75.90∗∗∗ 76.38∗∗∗ 4.67
no. of observations: 121
Employees with Medium Level of Education
∆ computer use -0.034 0.173∗∗ -0.074 -0.407∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.081) (0.069) (0.080)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -6.806 12.105∗∗∗ -9.493∗∗∗ 2.186
(2.361) (3.604) (3.081) (3.540)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 7.033∗∗∗ -18.007∗∗∗ 1.572 -1.822
(2.337) (3.568) (3.050) (3.504)
Pseudo−R2 0.130 0.240 0.240 0.109
χ2 34.57∗∗∗ 73.07∗∗∗ 15.92∗∗∗ 28.49∗∗∗
no. of observations: 234
Employees with Low Level of Education
∆ computer use 0.055 0.225∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.109) (0.074) (0.123)
dummy 1985/86-1991/92 -3.641 7.110 0.193 -16.022∗∗∗
(2.505) (4.909) (3.340) (5.533)
dummy 1991/92-1998/99 12.516∗∗∗ -15.066∗∗∗ 20.905∗∗∗ -31.727∗∗∗
(2.590) (5.077) (3.454) (5.722)
Pseudo−R2 0.146 0.080 0.175 0.165
χ2 37.73∗∗∗ 19.18∗∗∗ 46.55∗∗∗ 43.47∗∗∗
no. of observations: 226
The four equations are estimated simultaneously as a system of seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR). Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions
are weighted by the number of individuals within occupation group. ***,**,*-
indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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3.7 A Note on Wages
So far, the analyses completely neglected task prices. If the prices for analytical
and interactive task inputs relative to routine cognitive and routine manual task
inputs had declined, for example, the overall trend towards analytical and interactive
activities wouldn’t be very surprising. In addition, the model in Section 3.5.2 would
lead to an overestimation of shifts towards analytical and interactive activities and
thus to an overestimation of the educational upgrading of the workforce.
The survey contains information on monthly earnings, according to 18 categories.
In order to calculate hourly wages, a midpoint is assigned for each category. These
midpoints are then divided by the number of hours an individual usually spends at
work.33 In a next step, individuals are classified according to task categories. Indi-
viduals who have the largest task measure in the analytical or interactive categories
are classified as “non-routine” employees. Individuals who have their largest task
measures in the manual or cognitive routine categories are classified as “routine”
employees.
Figure 3.10 shows the evolution of the logarithm of mean hourly (nominal) wages
for “non-routine” and “routine” employees.34 Wages increased for both groups of
employees at a similar pace, which results in the “non-routine/routine wage pre-
mium” to remain stable over time. The stability of relative task prices over time
suggests that the “fixed” coefficient model used in Section 3.5.2 is appropriate, mean-
ing that, on average, it neither leads to an overestimation nor to an underestimation
of task shifts.
Of course, this evidence aggregates various developments on the individual level.
However, the overall picture is in line with earlier studies that find that the German
wage structure remained fairly stable in the 1980s and 1990s, in particular compared
to the vast changes in the wage structure that have been going on in the U.S. during
that time.35
33Comparable procedures are often used in literature, for example, by DiNardo and Pischke
(1997) and by Entorf and Kramarz (1997).
34The results are invariant to the use of the logarithm of mean hourly wages or the use of the
mean of the logarithm of hourly wages.
35See, for example, Abraham and Houseman (1995) and Prasad (2000). Fitzenberger (1999)
and Fitzenberger, Hujer, McCurdy and Schnabel (2001) provide evidence that the wage structure
in West Germany is less stable than commonly believed. However, the changes are still small in
comparison with changes in the wage structure in the U.S. or in the United Kingdom.
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Figure 3.10: Logarithm of average hourly wages for “non-routine” and
“routine” employees as well as the “non-routine/routine wage pre-
mium”
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3.8 Conclusions
Are skill requirements in the workplace rising? The analysis in the present paper
answers this question, first, by investigating whether skill requirements within for-
mally identical occupations have changed between 1979 and 1999, and second, by
exploring the role of workplace computerization in this development.
The results suggest that formally identical occupations today involve greater com-
plexity than two decades ago. In recent decades, occupations have experienced a
shift towards analytical and interactive activities, and away from cognitive and man-
ual routine tasks. This development was ubiquitous in the sense that it occurred
within occupations, within occupation-education groups and within occupation-age
groups. Even those occupations that were the least demanding in 1979 now require
a greater degree of complexity. In addition, the results indicate that the diffusion of
computer technologies in the workplace has intensified these changes in the occupa-
tional production function. This comes from the fact that computers substitutes for
workers in performing manual and cognitive routine tasks, but complement workers
in performing analytical and interactive activities.
These findings indicate that previous studies that analyzed changes in skill de-
mand, which focused on changes in the occupational distribution of employment
and assumed the content of occupations to be constant over time, have largely un-
derestimated the changes that have been going on in recent decades. There has
not only been a shift towards more skill demanding occupations, the changes within
occupations have been at least equally important. In addition, the analyses give
information about the meaning of educational categories, which are often used as
measures of skills. Using the task composition of occupations as output measures
of the educational process, the analyses demonstrate that the skill content of edu-
cational categories have changed considerably in recent decades.
The results emphasize the importance of education and training in order to enable
employees to cope with the challenges brought about by the changing task compo-
sition of occupations. It draws a particularly pessimistic perspective for the labor
market prospects of employees with low levels of education. This group of employees
has experienced the least favorable labor market development in recent decades. It
has experienced either a decrease in wages or has been crowded out of the labor
market in most industrialized countries. As the skill level of employees with low
levels of education no longer meets the minimum occupational skill requirements,
they become increasingly marginalized.
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3.9 Appendix
Table A: Industry Classification
Manufacturing incl. construction and mining
10 Mining
11 Chemical Industry, Rubber and Synthetic Material
12 Stone and Clay, Glass and Ceramics
13 Iron and Steel Production
14 Steel and Light Metal, Tracked Vehicles
15 Machine Construction
16 Car Industry
17 Shipbuilding, Aircraft and Aerospace Industry
18 Office and Data-Processing Machines
19 Electrical Engineering
20 Precision and Optical Instruments
21 Musical Instruments, Toys, and Jewellery
22 Construction
23 Wood Processing
24 Cellulose and Paper Industry
25 Printing
26 Leather and Shoe Industry
27 Textile Industry
28 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
Services
29 Laundry and Dry Cleaning
30 Hairdressing
40 Trade
52 Transport Services (including Carriage,
Travel Agency, Warehouse)
53 Credit Institutions
54 Insurance Companies
55 Catering and Hotels
57 Health and Veterinary
61 Radio, TV, Publishing House, Art, Theater, Museum
62 Other Private Services
Public and Quasi-Public Institutions
50 Postal Services
51 Railway Services
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Chapter 4
Using Methods of Treatment
Evaluation to Estimate the Wage
Effect of IT Usage
4.1 Introduction
The widening wage structure in most industrialized countries in the 1980s has often
been attributed to the impact of skill-biased technological change (SBTC), founded
upon the notion that employer’s demand for more skilled workers has been brought
about by the extensive spread of information technologies (IT) at the workplace.1
The idea is that IT increase productivity, but that only some employees possess the
necessary skills to use them. Employees who use IT at the workplace then receive a
wage payoff for their higher productivity owing to the use of IT.
The empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between the use of IT
and wages on the individual level strongly depends on methodological issues. Cross-
sectional analyses typically find significant positive wage markups for IT users. How-
ever, these rewards are strongly reduced in studies using panel data methods. As a
result, most studies favor the argument that the observed positive correlations are
spurious, that is, attributable to unobserved heterogeneity.
The exercise of estimating the wage effect of IT usage is one of the classical prob-
lems of selection bias, a special case of the more general problem of causal inference
1Comprehensive reviews of this literature can be found in Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu
(2002) and Chennells and van Reenen (2002). For a critical assessment see Card and DiNardo
(2002). Machin (2001) summarizes and discusses the most prominent points of criticism.
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from non-experimental data.2 Employers choose employees to use IT or employees
themselves choose to use IT, hence, the assignment of persons to treatment is non-
random. It is not clear whether differences in measured wages among employees
are due to IT use or due to other factors that result in employees earning different
wages even if there were no causal effect of IT usage. In the absence of genuine
experimental data, some assumptions must be made to account for the problem
of selection bias. The choice of assumptions must be justified in an economically
convincing way depending on the context and the availability of data.
In this study, I primarily use two methods: regression based matching and match-
ing on the propensity score. Both approaches rest upon the assumption that, con-
ditional on a set of covariates, the difference in wages for IT users and IT non-users
is attributable on average to the use of IT.3 The particular feature of the data
set used in this study backs this assumption. It has several advantages over other
individual-level data sets:
1. It includes a large number of control variables that have been identified as
important determinants of IT usage and wages in previous analysis. In con-
trast to other individual-level data sets that are usually limited to information
about employees, it includes information on employers. This information is
important since employers may differ in a way that systematically influences
both individual wages and IT usage. It is, for example, very likely that an IT
user would be employed at another employer in the counterfactual situation.
The data set allows me to take various company characteristics into account,
such as company size, industry affiliation, innovation strategy and company
performance.
2. It is a sample of West German employees that includes both IT non-users,
the potential comparison group, and IT users, the treatment group. They
answered identical questionnaires. Wages and all other characteristics are
therefore measured in the same way for both groups.
3. As the data set includes information on the regional affiliation of employees
and employer characteristics such as company size and company performance,
IT users and IT non-users operating in a common economic environment can
be compared.
2See, for example, Heckman and Robb (1986).
3The measure of technology in this study is computer usage, which serves as a proxy for IT
usage.
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The most interesting parameter is the average treatment effect for the treated
(ATT ), that is, the expected benefit of IT usage on the users themselves, as opposed
to the average treatment effect (ATE), the expected benefit of IT usage on a person
drawn randomly from the work force. It is often argued in literature that the
latter is not a very useful concept in the case of IT usage because computers are
productive only in certain occupations (for example, for financial market analysts
but not for ballet dancers). I additionally argue that it is important to allow for the
possibility that treatment effects differ between individuals. How much IT increases
the productivity of employees crucially depends on the tasks they have to perform,
their qualification and the characteristics of the company. The results of Entorf and
Kramarz (1998), for example, suggest that the increase in productivity is related to
the experience employees have with new technologies.
In spite of the above arguments, I will also estimate the ATE. It provides a
benchmark for assessing how important the arguments actually are. In addition, it
allows me to compare my results with those found in other studies.
As in most cross-section studies, I find a robust positive relationship between
wages and computer usage in West Germany in 1998/99. In addition to the method-
ological issues, this study contributes more recent evidence on the computer wage
differential to literature. I do not interpret the result as causal in the sense that
it suffices to give a computer to randomly drawn people of the working population
for their wages to rise. Instead, I argue that given the extensive and rapid changes
that have occurred in the workplace in recent decades, IT users would be worse off
had they not started to work with computers.4 This interpretation is in the spirit of
Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999), who found that computer users in France are
less vulnerable to job losses.
This paper is organized in 6 sections. In the next section, I introduce the estima-
tion problem at hand in a slightly more formal way following the program evaluation
literature. I also discuss previous empirical results and present the empirical strategy
of this study. After a general introduction, I discuss the regression based matching
approach and matching on the propensity score. Regression based matching aims
at purging the regression specification from potential correlation between unobserv-
ables and IT usage. The purpose of matching, on the other hand, is to re-establish
the condition of an experiment when no such data are available. The differences in
assumptions and interpretation of both methods are also discussed. In Section 4.3, I
4See Spitz (2004) for empirical evidence on how skill requirements in the workplace in West
Germany have changed in recent decades.
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present the data set and the variables of interest. Section 4.4 presents and discusses
the estimation results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
4.2.1 Why Is It So Difficult to Estimate the Returns from
IT Usage?
This study focuses on the problem of estimating the wage impact of IT usage. To
state this more formally, I designate wages Y . Wages are assumed to be determined
by a set of exogenous variables X, and by a dummy variable D, such that Di = 1
indicates that employee i uses IT on the job, and Di = 0 that employee i does not.
Assuming, for the ease of illustration, that the decision to use IT was made in period
s, so that, in each period t,
Yit =
 Xtβ +Diαi + Uit if t > sXtβ + Uit if t ≤ s (4.1)
where αi measures the heterogeneous impact of IT usage on wages. If αi is constant
across individuals, the impact is homogeneous. The set of parameters β defines the
relationship between the observable variables X and the outcome Y , and Uit is an
error term of mean zero and is assumed to be uncorrelated with X.
Most of the discussions on the wage effects of IT usage evolve because the group
of IT users is most probably not random. This situation arises because the decision
of individual i or, more likely, the decision of an employer e to choose individual i
to use IT is based on personal characteristics P , workplace characteristics W and
employer characteristics E that may also affect wages Y . If this is the case, and the
set of observable variables X is only a subset of characteristics P , W or E, then
correlation between the error term U and the IT use variable D is very likely to
exist. Hence, as a consequence of such a non-random assignment, IT usage (Di = 1)
would be correlated with the error term Uit in the wage equation, which results in
the standard econometric approach that regresses Y on X and D, producing biased
results.
The decision rule may be described in a very stylized form as a latent single index
function INe(i), which specifies the gain in profitability of employer e if employee i
(working at e) uses IT. INe(i) thus represents the difference between the productivity
increases of employer e owing to the implementation of IT and the higher wages
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employer e has to pay to employee i for the IT usage. INe(i) is a function of
observable variables X and unobservable variables V : INe(i) = Xγ+V . The entire
set of characteristics I, which are relevant to the decision about IT usage and wages,
are then the combination of variables X and V , I = (X,V ). Employer e decides
that employee i uses IT on the job if INe(i) > 0, in which case (Di = 1) is observed.
A simple behavioral model is one in which employers select employees into IT usage
based on a comparison of the present value of expected profits with and without
employee i using IT: INe(i) = PVe(1) − PVe(0), where PV (1) is the present value
of expected profits if employee i uses IT on the job and PV (0) without IT usage.5
Previous empirical studies have addressed the issue of non-random assignment of
computers in one form or another. All of these studies consider observed differences
between computer users and non-users, though there is a large difference with respect
to the number of available observables. The methods used to account for unobserved
heterogeneity range from including proxies for individual ability into the regression
specification to applying panel data methods.
Krueger (1993), who was the first to address the question of whether workers
who use computers at work are paid more as a result of their computer skills, uses
four empirical strategies to take into account unobserved heterogeneity in cross-
section data. First, he considers computer use at home because computer use at
home may reveal unobserved characteristics on the basis of which employers may
select workers to use computers at work. Including computer usage at home in the
regression specification then captures at least some of the unobserved heterogeneity
that is associated with computer usage at work. Second, he restricts the sample to
narrowly defined occupational groups, for example, secretaries. Third, he includes
test score results and parental education in the specification. These variables are
commonly used as proxies for individual ability. Fourth, he analyzes the relationship
between changes in the proportion of computer users and changes in hourly earnings
on the occupational level. The successive inclusion of additional controls attenuates
the raw logarithmic wage differential for computer use of more than 30 percent to
around 10 percent in the 1980s. However, none of the specifications alters the main
result of a significant positive relationship between computer use and wages.
In subsequent years, various studies have presented empirical evidence suggest-
ing that Krueger’s results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity. DiNardo and
Pischke (1997) make their point by showing that there is also a wage premium for
5For a more comprehensive model of computer assignment see, for example, Borghans and ter
Weel (2004).
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workers using a pencil, calculator or telephone at work or who work while sitting.
Entorf and Kramarz (1997) and Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999) use French data
and estimate fixed-effects models. They do not find a wage premium for computer
usage once they control for time-invariant unobserved individual and company het-
erogeneity, while the corresponding cross-section results lead to a computer-wage
differential of around 16 percent – a common figure in cross-section analyses of the
early 1990s. The results indicate that it is the increased productivity owing to the
experience employees gain with new technologies that leads to the wage premium
rather than the effect of merely using new technologies. Bell (1996), on the other
hand, finds that 60 percent of the cross-sectional computer wage premium still re-
mains in first-difference regressions using UK data.
The panel methods hinge crucially on the assumption of time-invariant unob-
served heterogeneity. In the presence of changing returns on unobserved skills,
differencing the data will not remove the wage effect of unobservables that might be
correlated with computer use. As DiNardo and Pischke (1997) already emphasized,
this factor may be a plausible explanation for the differing results of the two studies
because the wage structure has widened in the UK since the early 1980s but not in
France. In addition, Dolton and Makepeace (2004) criticize the simple panel meth-
ods for not allowing the coefficient to vary between individuals or, in other words,
for ignoring variation in the parameter values. Exploring information on whether
individuals used a computer in 1991 and 2000 (stayers), in 1991 only (leavers) or in
2000 only (enterers), they find, for example, a positive wage effect of 9 percent for
male leavers in panel regressions.
As this short review of research demonstrates, previous results are mixed. To my
knowledge, none of the studies considers explicitly that IT usage may be interpreted
as a treatment. This notion is very attractive for this question of analysis because
the main interest lies on the ATT . By contrast, previous studies focus on estimating
the average wage effect of IT usage.
4.2.2 Estimation Methods
The empirical strategy in this study is to use methods most often applied in the
active labor market program evaluation literature. In the tradition of this literature,
I interpret IT usage as a treatment Di, that is, estimating the coefficient of IT usage
translates into a problem of estimating an average treatment effect (ATE).6 The
6ATE is an average partial effect in the case of a binary variable.
71
ATE is usually estimated using a counterfactual framework (Rubin, 1974), where
each individual i has an outcome with (Di = 1) and without (Di = 0) treatment
(conventionally denoted as Y1i and Y0i respectively). Since both states are never
observed for one person simultaneously, different methods have been developed in
literature to overcome this “omitted variable” problem depending on the specific
circumstances of the question of interest.
The observed outcome may be expressed as:
Yi = Y0i(1−Di) + Y1iDi = Y0i +Di(Y1i − Y0i). (4.2)
This body of literature distinguishes between the average treatment effect (ATE),
E(Y1i − Y0i), that is, the expected effect of treatment on a person drawn ran-
domly from the population, and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT ),
E(Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1), that is, the expected effect of treatment of those who actually
have been treated. Since E(Y1i|Di = 1) is directly identifiable from the sample, the
problem of estimating the ATT is equivalent to the problem of estimating the coun-
terfactual average, E(Y0i|Di = 1). Thus, in order to be able to estimate the average
non-treatment outcome for treated employees based on the outcomes for non-treated,
identifying assumptions are needed. Estimating the ATE, on the other hand, in-
volves estimating both counterfactual averages, E(Y0i|Di = 1) for the non-treated
workers in the sample and E(Y1i|Di = 0) for the treated workers in the sample. In
the case of IT usage, the effect on the subpopulation of treated employees (ATT )
is probably of more interest than the effect on the overall population (ATE). As
already discussed earlier in this paper, one of the reasons is that computers are of
value only in certain jobs, for example, for computer scientists but not for artistic
painters. The overall focus of the analysis will therefore be on the ATT . How-
ever, for ease of comparison with previous analyses and for the purpose of having a
benchmark, I will also estimate the ATE.
The observed difference in outcomes between those treated and those untreated
equals E(Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1) plus a bias term:
E(Y |Di = 1)− E(Y |Di = 0) = E(Y1i|Di = 1)− E(Y0i|Di = 0) (4.3)
= E(Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1) (4.4)
+ [E(Y0i|Di = 1)− E(Y0i|Di = 0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
bias term
.
If IT usage were randomly assigned to employees, that is, if the treatment and
control group had the same distribution of both observed and unobserved charac-
teristics, this would be an easy task: the ATE and ATT would be the difference in
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sample average of those using IT and those not using IT at the workplace.7 However,
this scenario is very unlikely, in particular as recent empirical studies document that
IT users differ systematically from IT non-users, for example, with respect to their
education. Table 4.9 shows the non-randomness of IT usage based on the data set at
hand. The major differences are in the distribution of formal education between IT
users and IT non-users. In contrast to IT being randomly assigned, employers select
employees with specific favorable traits for treatment. The decision about who uses
IT on the job is related to the question of how much an employer’s profitability
increases from IT use and, hence, to the outcomes Y1i and Y0i.
Since data from a social experiment or instrumental variables that allow purg-
ing of the regression from the presence of a possible omitted variable bias are not
available for this research project, my strategy is based on the assumption of “strict
ignorability” of treatment conditional on a set of controls (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983): (Y1i, Y0i) ⊥ Di|X. That is, conditional on X, Di and (Y1i, Y0i) are indepen-
dent, where X denotes a vector of observable covariates, Di denotes the treatment
(in our case Di = 1 : IT usage, Di = 0 : no IT usage) and Y1i is the logarithm
of hourly wages for IT users and Y0i for IT non-users. This assumption implies
that E(Y0i|X,Di) = E(Y0i|X) and E(Y1i|X,Di) = E(Y1i|X), referred to as the con-
ditional mean independence assumption (CIA) in literature. That is, conditional
on X, the non-treatment outcome for the treated and non-treated are comparable
in expectation. For the estimators used in this study it suffices that this weaker
assumption holds.
The intuition behind this assumption is that systematic differences in wages be-
tween IT users and IT non-users with the same values for the covariates X are
attributable to the use of IT. Since the moments of the distribution of Y1i for the
treated can be estimated directly, it suffices for the assumption E(Y0i) ⊥ Di|X to
hold in order to be able to estimate the ATT .
The present data set is particularly suited for this strategy because it contains
a large number of observables that have been identified as important determinants
of the IT use-wage relationship in earlier studies. In spite of this merit, one must
keep in mind that the CIA is a strong assumption and that, stricly speaking, the
7An additional assumption is that there are no general equilibrium effects in the sense that IT
use by one employee does not affect wages of other employees (so-called stable unit treatment value
assumption: SUTVA; see, for example, Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). This is synonymous to
stating that there are no macroeconomic effects. The analysis in this study is based on a random
sample, which implies SUTVA.
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estimation strategy accounts solely for selection on observables. Differences between
IT users and IT non-users in the distribution of unobserved attributes such as ability
are not considered. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998b) decompose the
bias term of equation 4.3 into three components:
bias term = [E(Y0i|Di = 1)− E(Y0i|Di = 0)] = B1 +B2 +B3 (4.5)
The first two components, B1 and B2, arise due to differences in the distribution of
observed characteristics X whereas the last component, B3, refers to the “classical”
selection bias resulting from selection on unobservable attributes. B1 corresponds to
the bias due to differences in the support of regressors between IT users and IT non-
users. B2 corresponds to the bias owing to differences in the shape of distributions
of regressors in the two groups in the region of common support.
I use two methods to overcome the bias due to B2, regression based matching and
matching on the propensity score. The two approaches differ in how they deal with
the bias due to B1, which I will discuss in Section 4.2.3. None of them is able to
resolve problems due to the presence of B3. However, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd
(1997) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998b) find that the selection bias
part, B3, is the smallest of the three components of bias in their application. How
important the different bias components are depends, of course, on the application.
However, the richness of the data set in the present study largely reduces the scope
for a potential bias owing to unobservables.
Both approaches have already been widely discussed in literature (see, for ex-
ample, Heckman and Robb, 1985, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997 and 1998a,
or Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 18). I will review the basic concepts in order to
demonstrate their usefulness for the estimation problem at hand.
4.2.2.1 Regression Based Matching
The aim of regression based matching (RBM) is to purge the outcome equation from
potential correlation between the error term Uit and Di (see equation 4.1). The basic
logic of the RBM is analogous to the proxy solution to the omitted variable problem.8
8The omitted variable bias can be mitigated, or even eliminated, if a proxy variable is available
for an unobserved variable q. The formal requirements for a proxy variable can be found, for
example, in Wooldridge (2002, p.63ff.). The intuition is that, conditional on the proxy variable,
the unobservable variable q is uncorrelated to each of the observable variablesX in the specification.
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To illustrate this approach it is useful to decompose the counterfactual outcomes
for IT user Y1i and IT non-user Y0i into their means and a stochastic part:
9
Y0i = µ0 + U0i E(U0i) = 0 (4.6)
Y1i = µ1 + U1i E(U1i) = 0 (4.7)
where µj = E(Yji), j = 0, 1. As in the previous part of the paper, i refers to
individuals and j to the treatment status. For the case of linear regressions µj =
Xβj. Inserting these into equation (4.2) of observed outcomes gives:
Yi = µ0 + (µ1 − µ0)Di + U0i + (U1i − U0i)Di (4.8)
Under the CIA assumption and assuming the E(U1i|X) = E(U0i|X) it follows
that standard regression methods can be used to estimate ATE. This is because
equation (4.8) may be rewritten as:
E(Yi|Di, X) = µ0 + (µ1 − µ0)Di + E(U0i|X) + E(U1i − U0i|X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Di (4.9)
= µ0 + αDi + g0(X) (4.10)
where α = µ1 − µ0 = E(Y1i − Y0i|X) = ATE = ATT and g0(X) = E(U0i|X). In
addition, E(U0i|X) might be expressed as a function of some vector function h0(X),
such as E(U0i|X) = η0 + h0(X)β0. Then, equation (4.9) translates into
E(Yi|Di, X) = γ0 + αDi + h0(x)β0 (4.11)
where γ0 = µ0 + η0. h0(X)β0 is an example of a control function and its purpose is
to provide an approximation for E(U0i|X). When inserted into equation (4.9) and
therefore implicitly subtracted from U0i, it purges the equation from the covariance
between Di and U0i. The idea is that the purged disturbance term [U0i−h0(X)β0] is
orthogonal to all variables on the right-hand side of the equation. If the assumptions
hold, the control function accounts for a possible self-selection bias.10
9The structure of illustration follows Wooldridge (2002), chapter 18.
10This is a special case of a control function that does not rely on instruments. For a discussion
on the control function approach involving instruments refer, for example, to Heckman and Robb
(1985) or Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2003). In contrast to the instrument approach that rests
upon the exclusion restriction, identification in the approach used in this study is achieved through
a functional form restriction.
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The previous specification rests upon the assumption that there are on average
no person-specific gains conditional on X, E(U1i − U0i|X) = 0. Relaxing this as-
sumption implies that ATE and ATT are no longer identical. However, a regression
specification can still be used:
E(Yi|Di, X) = µ0 + αDi + g0(X) +Di[g1(X)− g0(X)] (4.12)
where α = ATE, g0(X) ≡ E(U0i|X) and g1(X) ≡ E(U1i|X). g0(X) and g1(x)
are both operationalized by replacing them with a parametric function of X. The
intuition is analogous to the approach in equation (4.11).
Assuming that these functions are both linear inX, equation (4.12) can be written
as
E(Yi|Di, X) = γ0 + αDi +Xβ0 +Di[X − E(X)]δ (4.13)
where β0 and δ are unknown parameters (the intermediate steps are shown in the
appendix to this chapter). As can be seen, the control function then involves both the
level effect of X and the interactions of X (which have been previously demeaned
by E(X), approximated with the sample averages) with the treatment indicator.
Based on the ˆATE, the ATT is estimated using11
ˆATT = αˆ+ (
N∑
i=1
Di)
−1(
N∑
i=1
Di(X − X¯)δˆ). (4.14)
I take account of the fact that the demeaned variables are generated regressors
by applying a bootstrap method to construct the standard errors of the estimated
coefficients. All bootstrap results are based on 100 resamples.
4.2.2.2 Propensity Score Matching
The CIA assumption, introduced in Section 4.2.2, is the basis of the matching tech-
nique. The traditional matching approach estimates the expected non-treatment
outcome for an IT user i with observable characteristics X by the fitted value of a
nonparametric regression in the sample of IT non-users with identical X. This can
be represented in the following formula:
11A method to estimate the ATT directly would be to demean the X using the averages of the
“treated” sample instead of the averages of the “whole” sample.
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ATT =
1
N1
∑
iDi=1
{Yi1 −
∑
iDi=0
wN0Yi0}, (4.15)
where N1 is the number of IT users and N0 is the number of IT non-users. wN0
is a weight function that weights the observations of an IT non-user according to
its similarity with respect to X to IT user i. The literature discusses different
matching estimators, which differ with respect to the weight function. I will discuss
the estimators used in this study at the end of this section. Beforehand, I shortly
refer to the so-called “curse-of-dimensionality” problem that arises when the vector
of observable characteristicsX is high-dimensional (as it is the case in this study). As
the dimension of the data increases and, hence, the information content increases,
the complexity of the estimation problem increases exponentially. The “curse-of-
dimensionality” arises because in high-dimensional settings, the data requirements
needed to find counterfactuals that are similar along every dimension of X increase
exponentially in the dimension of X.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduced the propensity score as a means to
overcome the dimensionality problem that arises when the set of conditioning vari-
ables X is large. They showed that when outcomes Y0 are independent of the
treatment conditional on variables X (CIA assumption), then outcomes Y0 are also
independent of the treatment conditional on the propensity score p(X), defined as
P (Di = 1|X), with 0 < P (Di = 1|X) < 1. As can be seen from this formula, the
propensity score is the probability of treatment given the covariates X. In condi-
tional independence notation, this is (Y1i, Y0i) ⊥ Di|pi(X). This property allows
it to use the one-dimensional propensity score P (Di = 1|X) instead of the high-
dimensional vector X in the matching approach. P (Di = 1|X) instead of X now
determines the similarity of treated and non-treated employees. Dehejia and Wahba
(1999, 2002), among others, have drawn attention to this class of estimators because
their analyses suggest that propensity score matching is a powerful tool to resolve
the selection bias problem inherent in non-experimental data.12
To implement this estimator, one first needs an estimate for the propensity score.
I choose a flexible probit model that includes various covariates (described below),
12Others also investigated the properties of matching methods in different settings (see, for
example, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, 1998a). However, Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002)
explicitly make the case for matching on the propensity score in order to overcome LaLonde’s
criticism of non-experimental estimators (LaLonde, 1986). Criticism of Dehejia and Wahba (1999,
2002) comes from Smith and Todd (2004).
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their quadratics and interactions. However, logit models as proposed by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) or non-parametric models may also be used (Powell, 1994, Heck-
man, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). I take account of the sampling variability in the
estimated propensity scores by applying a bootstrap method to estimate the stan-
dard errors of the estimated treatment effects. The bootstrap results are based on
100 resamples.
Matching estimators differ with respect to the weights they attach to members of
the non-treated group. The traditional pairwise matching method, nearest neighbor
matching, weights the nearest non-treated employee with 1 and all others with 0,
that is, only the closest member of the comparison group is used as the comparison
level for the treated employee i. In order to guarantee that the “closest” neighbor
is not too far away in terms of the propensity score, one usually sets a caliper. In
the nearest neighbor matching estimations in this study the caliper is set to 0.001.
Extensions to this method are, for example, kernel or local linear matching es-
timators (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997 and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and
Todd, 1998), which have the advantage of reducing the asymptotic mean squared
error. In this study, I present results using an Epanechnikov kernel.
4.2.3 Discussion of Methods
In this paper, I present two different approaches for estimating the ATE and ATT .
They both rely on the CIA, but each of them uses different additional assumptions
to overcome the omitted variable problem associated with the counterfactual frame-
work. This has implications for the economic interpretation of estimated coefficients.
Both methods are, however, similar with respect to the fact that they impute the
missing potential outcomes. The data set is particularly suited for these approaches
because it includes a large number of potential controls.
None of the approaches considers an instrument variable Z as a source of exoge-
nous variation to approximate random assignment to IT usage. This is the case
because I did not find convincing candidates that are correlated with IT usage but
do not simultaneously determine wages. Therefore, selection models, which are oth-
erwise powerful tools, cannot be applied in this study (see Heckman, 1979, and
Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986).13 However, having an instrument at hand would
have been helpful only in the case of homogeneous treatment effects (see, for exam-
13In contrast to matching and control function approaches, which are considered “selection on
observables,” selection models additionally account for selection on unobservables.
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ple, Heckman and Robb, 1985, Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, or Blundell, Dearden
and Sianesi, 2003).14 Assuming a homogeneous impact of treatment is always re-
strictive, but seems to be particularly cumbersome for the question of interest in
this study, as previous research suggests that the effects of IT usage do vary across
individuals (see, for example, Entorf and Kramarz, 1997, 1998, Dolton and Make-
peace, 2004). The fact that the productivity of IT depends on the occupational
circumstances favors the argument that the effects of IT usage are heterogenous
across individuals. Employers select those employees into IT usage from which they
expect the largest increases in profitability. These expectations rely on workplace
characteristics, individual characteristics and company characteristics. Employees
share in the gains of IT usage in terms of higher wages.
In the case of heterogeneous treatment effects, the composite error term is given
by Ui + Di(αi − α¯). To see this consider the outcome equation 4.1 (for t > s):
Yi = β + Diαi + Ui (abstracting from other regressors), where αi is the treatment
impact of individual i. Define α¯ as the population mean impact (E(αi) = α¯ = ATE),
i as worker i’s deviation from the population impact, and then αi = α¯ + i. The
outcome equation may then be written as: Yi = β +Diα¯+ [Ui +Dii] = β +Diα¯+
[Ui + Di(αi − α¯)]. Therefore, Ui + Di(αi − α¯) is the composite error term. Even
if the instrument Z is uncorrelated with Ui, it is, by assumption, not uncorrelated
with Ui +Di(αi − α¯).
Regression assumes a functional form that is linear in parameters. It imputes the
missing potential outcome using the estimated regression function. For example, if
Di = 1, then Y1i is observed and Y0i is missing. The regression approach imputes
Y0i with a consistent estimator µˆ0(X) for the conditional expectation. Simple OLS
hinges crucially on the assumption E(U1i − U0i|X) = 0 (see equation 4.9). The
resulting estimate will not in general recover the ATT . The additional regression
specification used in this study, which includes interactions between the observable
variables X and the treatment dummy recovers the ATT . In addition, the inter-
action terms provide evidence of the presence and extent of heterogeneous effects,
firstly, through the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients and, secondly,
through the quantitative magnitude of effects for various subgroups that might be
of particular interest.
Matching, on the other hand, does not assume that the functional form is linear
14An exception is the local average treatment effect interpretation of instrument estimates in
the heterogeneous treatment effect case (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
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in parameters. It is a non-parametric approach in which a comparison group among
the non-treated is chosen, such that the selected group is as similar as possible to
the treated group in terms of their observable characteristics. It is a very attractive
approach in this study because the main interest lies on the average treatment effect
for the treated (ATT)15 and the data set has properties that have been identified
as being favorable in the context of the evaluation of active labor market programs
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). Matching estimators impute the potential
outcome using only the outcome of the nearest neighbor of the opposite treatment
group. However, various studies point to the importance of the choice of the match-
ing variables (for example, Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, 2003).
Both matching and OLS produce weighted averages of the treatment effects
E(Y1i − Y0i|X). Matching recovers the ATT by weighting the heterogeneous effects
according to the proportion of treated at each value of X (that is, proportionally
to the propensity score at X). OLS, in contrast, weights the heterogeneous effects
proportionally to the variance of treatment status at X (Angrist, 1998).
One issue is whether the support of the observable variables overlaps for the
treated and the non-treated group (bias B1 in equation 4.5). This problem is partic-
ularly evident for matching. If there are regions where the support does not overlap,
it is not possible to find a sufficiently comparable observation in the other group.
Then matching is often performed only over the common support region.16 The es-
timated effect must then be redefined as the mean treatment effect for those treated
falling within the common support region, which, in the heterogeneous treatment
case, might be quite different from the average treatment effect on the treated. This
problem is less severe in the regression approach, because the parametric model
can in general be used to predict the expected outcome even in regions outside the
common support. However, the reliability of the estimated coefficients then hinges
crucially on the ability of the model to predict outside its common support. Re-
gression is not a transparent tool in this respect. Researchers are often not aware
of the fact that the observables do not overlap much. The advantage of matching is
that it quickly reveals the extent to which treated and non-treated groups overlap
in terms of pre-treatment variables.
15 It is also possible to recover the ATE with the matching approach. This requires the estimation
of the average treatment effect for the non-treated in addition to the average treatment effect on
the treated. The ATE can then be calculated as a weighted average of the effect on the treated
and the effect on the non-treated.
16For a detailed discussion of this problem see Lechner (2000).
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Neither approach overcomes the potential bias due to unobservables (B3 in equa-
tion 4.5). If IT usage and wages are still positively correlated with some unobserved
individual traits, such as ability, both ATT and ATE are upward biased. This situ-
ation is equivalent to arguing that the CIA does not hold in the present estimation
problem. Given the large set of controls that are taken into account in the analysis,
it is hard to imagine exactly what the remaining unobservables might be. For ex-
ample, the specifications control for individual education, which takes into account
that high ability persons choose higher levels of education. I therefore argue that
the informational richness of the data set justifies the CIA.
4.3 Data and Empirical Framework
The analysis is based on the “Qualification and Career Survey”, which is a survey
of employees carried out by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training
(Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Research Institute of the Federal
Employment Service (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). I use
the most recent cross-section, launched in 1998/99, in this study. It covers more
than 30,000 individuals (men and women).17
In addition to the main variable of interest, IT usage, three types of variables are
considered in the analyses: individual characteristics, company characteristics and
workplace characteristics. I include variables reflecting individual characteristics in
order to account for the fact that employees may systematically differ with respect
to characteristics that may affect both computer use and wages. As more highly
educated workers are more likely to use computers at work and earn higher wages,
I control for the level of formal education of employees, work experience and tenure
with the current employer. As wages of civil servants are determined in a process
that differs from the process for wages of employees in private companies, a dummy
variable for civil servants is also included in the regressions.
One drawback of most estimates on individual-level data is that they generally do
not provide information on the employers. Employer information may however be
important if it determines systematic effects on wages and IT usage. The data set
17I restrict the sample to West German residents with German nationality: in other words, East
German residents and non-German employees are excluded from the sample. Moreover, the sample
does not include self-employed, employees with agricultural occupations and employees working
in the agricultural sector. Persons younger than 18 or older than 65 are also excluded from the
sample.
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allows me to take various company characteristics into account such as company size,
industry affiliation, innovation strategy and company performance. This ability is a
substantial improvement over other studies in this area. Based on previous empirical
research, I expect, for example, that larger companies and innovative companies pay
higher wages and that they are more likely to use IT intensively.
Another feature that distinguishes this data set from others is that it includes
information on the task composition of occupations.18 These tasks describe the
occupational context in which IT is introduced. In addition, this information on oc-
cupational skill requirements allows me to further reduce unobserved heterogeneity.
The variables used in the estimates are constructed as follows (Summary statistics
can be found in Table 4.1):
Hourly Wages: The survey contains information on monthly earnings, according
to 18 categories. A midpoint is assigned for each category. These midpoints are then
divided by the number of hours an individual usually spends at work.19 Compared
to other data sets that are usually used in comparable analyses such as the CPS for
the U.S. or the IAB-S for Germany, this data set has the advantage that earnings
of highly paid workers are not censored from above. In all estimates, the logarithm
of wages is used as dependent variable. On average, employees in West Germany
earned about 27 German Marks in 1998/99 (Table 4.1).
IT equipment: The data set includes detailed information on the tools and ma-
chines used by the employees in the workplace. The “IT use” variable is a dummy
that takes the value 1 if the employee uses a computer, terminal or electronic data
processing device on the job. As shown in Table 4.1, 57 percent of employees have
used one or more of the above devices on the job in West Germany in 1998/99.
Individual characteristics: I distinguish three levels of formal education attained
by employees. Employees with a low level of education are those with no vocational
training. Employees with medium levels of education have a vocational qualification
either from an apprenticeship or they have graduated from a vocational college.
Employees holding a degree from a university or a technical college are classified as
having a high level of education. As shown in Table 4.1, the majority of the survey
participants, 70 percent, has a medium qualification level, whereas 17 percent are
18For a detailed analysis of how the task composition of occupations changed in West Germany
since 1979 see Spitz (2004).
19Comparable procedures are often used in literature, for example, by DiNardo and Pischke
(1997) and by Entorf and Kramarz (1997).
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highly qualified and only 12 percent have a low education level.
The survey participants also indicate their first year of work. Based on these
answers, I calculate the years of (potential) work experience (1999 - first year of
work). In addition, employees indicate the year when they started to work for the
current employer. This information is used to calculate tenure (1999 - first year with
current employer).
The data set includes information about previous unemployment spells (dummy
variable: “Have you ever been unemployed before?”), marital status, gender and
whether survey participants were born in East Germany. It also contains information
about whether an employee is working as a civil servant. In addition, I constructed
a dummy variable indicating whether employees live in a city (place of residence is
larger than 100,000 inhabitants).
Workplace Characteristics: The analyses by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)
and Spitz (2004) document how IT has changed the content of work towards analyt-
ical and interactive activities and away from manual and cognitive routine activities.
The data set at hand is a cross-section, thus changes in the task composition of occu-
pations cannot be taken into account. However, the data set allows me to consider
task levels, capturing the content of jobs, and therefore, it gives a description of
the context in which IT is used. Survey participants are asked what kind of activ-
ities they perform at the workplace. Based on these activities five categories are
constructed, which classify the occupational skill requirements: analytic tasks, in-
teractive tasks, repetitive cognitive tasks, repetitive manual tasks and non-repetitive
manual tasks. Table 4.2 shows the list of activities that employees were asked for
in the questionnaire and how the activities are classified in the five task categories.
On the individual-level i, the task measures (Taskik) are defined as:
Taskik =
number of activities in category k performed by i in 1998/99
total number of activities in category k in 1998/99
∗ 100
(4.16)
where
k =

1 : non-routine analytic tasks
2 : non-routine interactive tasks
3 : routine cognitive tasks
4 : routine manual tasks
5 : non-routine manual tasks.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. Observations
IT 0.57 0.50 0 1 21816
Pencil 0.92 0.27 0 1 18775
(hourly) wages (in DM) 27.19 11.82 3.13 98.68 18561
Qualification
high education level 0.17 0.37 0 1 21816
medium education level 0.71 0.46 0 1 21816
low education level 0.12 0.33 0 1 21816
experience 20.76 11.58 0 47 21816
tenure 11.75 9.84 0 47 21816
Workplace Characteristics:
analytic task measure 14.01 23.80 0 100 18041
interactive task measure 30.26 28.18 0 100 21754
repetitive cognitive task measure 21.73 41.24 0 100 21813
repetitive manual task measure 17.43 30.83 0 100 21768
non-repetitive manual task measure 24.32 24.99 0 50 12319
Company Characteristics
product innovation 0.37 0.48 0 1 20802
process innovation 0.51 0.50 0 1 20857
very good company performance 0.18 0.39 0 1 14450
good company performance 0.65 0.48 0 1 14450
rather bad company performance 0.14 0.35 0 1 14450
bad company performance 0.03 0.17 0 1 14450
Other Controls
ever unemployed 0.30 0.46 0 1 22545
married 0.69 0.46 0 1 22677
civil servants 0.11 0.31 0 1 22677
born in East Germany 0.04 0.19 0 1 22677
woman 0.44 0.50 0 1 22677
lives in city 0.38 0.48 0 1 22677
For example, if the analytical task category includes 4 activities and employee i
performs 2 of them, the analytical task measure for employee i is 50.
The data set also contains information about the current occupation of the em-
ployees. Occupations are grouped according to the (2-digit) classification of occupa-
tional titles by the Federal Employment Bureau in 1999, leading to 78 occupational
groups.
Company characteristics: Company size has been identified as an important com-
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Table 4.2: Assignment of Activities
Classification Tasks
non-routine analytic researching, evaluating and planning,
making plans, constructing, designing, sketching
working out rules/regulations
using and interpreting rules
non-routine interactive negotiating, lobbying, coordinating, organizing
teaching or training
selling, buying, advising customers, advertising
entertaining or presenting
employing or managing personnel
routine cognitive calculating, bookkeeping
correcting of texts/data
measuring of length/weight/temperature
routine manual operating or controlling machines
setting up machines
non-routine manual repairing or renovation houses/apartments/machines/vehicles
restoring art/monuments
serving or accomodating
ponent of wage determination in previous studies, finding that larger companies pay
higher wages to employees with similar characteristics (see, for example, Brown and
Medoff, 1989, Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991). In addition, IT usage increases in
company size (see Table 4.3). Company size measured as the number of employees
is captured by 7 size classes. Companies with one to four employees are classified
to belong to the first size bracket and companies with more than 1,000 employees
to the last one. Based on these size classes, 7 dummy variables are formed. Most
of the survey participants, 28 percent, belong to companies with a size class from
10 up to 49 employees, followed by the size class from 100 up to 499 employees.
Companies with more than 1000 employees are represented by 12 percent of the
survey participants. About 20 percent of the interviewed employees belong to small
companies with less than ten employees.
The data set also includes information about the performance of companies. The
survey participants were asked whether the company was doing very good, good,
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Table 4.3: IT usage by Company Size Distribution
No. of employees Freq. Percent IT usage
(in percent)
1 to 4 1,707 7.8 42.9
5 to 9 2,716 12.3 45.3
10 to 49 6,186 28.1 50.1
50 to 99 2,790 12.7 57.1
100 to 499 4,457 20.2 63.8
500 to 999 1,447 6.6 68.3
1000 and more 2,721 12.4 72.1
Total 22,024
rather bad or bad. For each of these categories, I constructed a dummy variable.
Table 4.1 shows that 18 percent of employees report to work in companies that are
doing very well and 65 percent work in companies that are doing well. 17 percent
of employees work in companies that are either doing rather bad or bad.
Companies are classified according to 48 detailed industry codes. Based on these
codes we group companies into three sectors: manufacturing, trade, and services.20
The inclusion of these variables accounts for inter-industry wage differentials that
are not already captured by the observed individual and company characteristics
(see, for example, Krueger and Summers, 1987, Dickens and Katz, 1987, Gibbons
and Katz, 1992 and Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999).
4.4 Empirical Results
Table 4.4 displays the estimation results of the wage regressions. Unreported results
show that the raw log wage differential for IT use in Germany is 0.275 (about 31
percent) in 1998/99. This figure is slightly lower than the raw log wage differential
of 0.288 that DiNardo and Pischke (1997) report for Germany based on the 1991/92
cross-section of the BIBB/IAB data. Thus, in contrast to the period between 1979
and 1991/92, when the raw log wage differentials for computer use increased steadily
(although at a declining pace), as shown in the paper by DiNardo and Pischke, this
20I also ran regressions that included more detailed industry dummies. The results reported in
Section 4.4 are robust to this change in specification.
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differential remained stable or even declined slightly in the 1990s.
Columns (1)-(5) show the results of specifications that are successively extended
with additional controls. Including individual characteristics such as the level of
formal education, work experience, tenure, gender, marital status or residence in a
city reduces the coefficient of IT usage by more than 30 percent (column 1). The
coefficients of the controls have the expected sign, therefore I will not discuss them
in detail. In column (2), workplace characteristics are included in the specification.
The higher the measure for non-routine cognitive activities, both analytical and
interactive, the higher the wages. By contrast, wages decrease in the measure for
non-routine manual activities. Including the workplace characteristics additionally
reduces the IT coefficient by 30 percent (compared to the coefficient in column 1).
In column (3), company characteristics such as company size and information about
the innovation strategy of the company are included in order to control, for exam-
ple, for company size effects in remuneration. Industry dummies are also included to
account for cross-sectoral differences in pay. In addition, dummies indicating com-
pany performance are included. Most interestingly, the inclusion of the company
characteristics hardly affect the IT coefficient. By contrast, the returns to educa-
tion decrease and the dummy for employees born in East Germany as well as the
dummy for employees living in the city now are insignificant. Column (4) includes
10 dummies for West German states that control for cross-state differences in wage
levels owing to, for example, differing economic conditions. However, these variables
neither affect the IT coefficient nor the coefficients of the other controls. The spec-
ification in column (5) includes 77 two-digit occupation dummies. The occupation
dummies have a large impact on the estimated IT wage differential. From column
(1) to column (5), the IT coefficient drops by more than 70 percent, indicating that
the largest part of the raw logarithm wage differential for IT users has been due to
observable differences that would have resulted in employees earning different wages
even in the absence of IT. The results indicate that observable workplace charac-
teristics such as workplace tasks and occupational affiliation account for the largest
proportion of the bias in the raw logarithm wage differential. However, conditional
on all the controls, the results still suggest that employees who use IT on the job
earn around 8 percent higher wages.
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Table 4.4: OLS Regressions for the Effect of IT on Wages
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IT 0.182∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.024)
Individual Characteristics
high educ. level 0.437∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.089
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.068)
medium educ. level 0.126∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.026)
experience 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
experience2 *(1/100) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tenure 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
woman -0.092∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.036)
married 0.105∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020)
woman*married -0.120∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.034)
ever unemployed -0.022∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018)
born in East Germany -0.045∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.021 -0.019 -0.015 0.004
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.038)
civil servant -0.064∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗ -0.094∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.103)
lives in city 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.008 0.005 0.002 -0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020)
<Table continues on next page>
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Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Company Characteristics
product innovation 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)
process innovation 0.036∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.018
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018)
very good company performance 0.044∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.045∗∗ -0.017
(0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.048)
good company performance 0.007 0.003 0.010 -0.025
(0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.044)
rather bad company performance -0.012 -0.016 -0.011 -0.027
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.046)
Workplace Characteristics: Measure of...
non-routine analytic tasks 0.087∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.052)
non-routine interactive tasks 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.179
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.038)
routine cognitive tasks 0.031∗∗∗ 0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.002
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.028)
routine manual tasks -0.006 -0.040∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.043
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.038)
non-routine manual tasks -0.119∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.041
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.034)
77 occupation dummies No No No No Yes Yes
7 company size dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies for manufacturing & trade No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
10 dummies for West German states No No No Yes Yes Yes
IT ∗ [x− E(x)] No No No No No Yes
R2 0.348 0.340 0.399 0.401 0.443 0.455
Number of observations 18547 15266 8936 8936 8897 8897
Employees with low levels of education working in large companies in the services sector are
the base category. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses in column
(1)-(5). Column (6): IT ∗ [x − E(x)] means that the specification includes interaction terms
between IT usage and all the level variablesX, where all theX had previously been demeaned by
the sample averages. Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 resamples. ***, **, *-indicate
significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Ideal control variables are only those that are attributes of the assignment to
IT usage and the earnings process but are unaffected by the treatment itself (for
example, time-invariant individual characteristics such as gender and place of birth).
However, some of the controls used in this study such as work experience or the
incidence of previous periods of unemployment might be affected by the treatment
itself. IT users are, for example, less likely to become unemployed. Therefore, the
treatment effect estimated here does not capture the indirect effects of IT usage on
wages (for example, through productivity).
Up to now, the coefficient of IT usage has been constrained to be homogeneous
on average conditional on the observable variables. I now extend the specification
by adding a control function that includes interactions between all covariates X
(previously demeaned using sample averages) and the IT use dummy Di. Although
the above specifications already include a large number of controls, the remaining 8
percent wage markup for IT users may still be due to characteristics that are not ob-
servable in the data set at hand if these unobservables are positively correlated with
both IT usage and wages. The aim of control functions is to purge the specification
from the remaining covariance between unobservables and IT usage (see Section
4.2.2.1). The results in column (6) show that including the control function in the
specification reduces the estimated coefficient of IT usage to 6 percent (= ATE).21
The interaction terms are jointly significant (F(112,8666) = 8.34, p−value = 0.0000)
and therefore provide evidence of the presence of heterogeneous effects. Table 4.5
shows the results for selected interaction terms. The empirical evidence suggests,
for example, that IT user with a university degree benefit particularly in terms of
wages. Differences in gender, work experience or workplace tasks, by contrast, do
not have a significant effect on the gains from computer use.
The estimated ATT is 0.083 with a standard error of 0.024. The ATT is esti-
mated using Formula (4.14), the standard error is bootsrapped using 1000 resamples
(see Footnote 21 for details). The ATT is significantly different to the ATE. There-
fore, on average, treatment effect heterogeneity seems to be important. The result
that the ATT is higher than the ATE suggests that there has been selection into
treatment based on expected returns. If IT non-user had started to use IT instead
21 The standard errors in column (6) are estimated using a design-matrix bootstrap approach in
order to account for the generated regressors in the specification. Because of the large number of
dummy variables in the specification the resamples are chosen to be twice as large as the sample
in order to guarantee that all coefficients can be estimated. The estimated covariance matrix then
is doubled in accordance with the rate of convergence of the estimator.
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of those who actually did, they would have enjoyed a substantial lower benefit than
the group of actual IT users.
Table 4.5: Selected Interaction Terms
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
high educ. level * IT 0.160∗∗∗ (0.077)
medium educ. level * IT 0.023 (0.035)
woman * IT 0.040 (0.040)
non-routine analytic tasks * IT 0.035 (0.062)
non-routine interactive tasks * IT -0.030 (0.048)
routine cognitive tasks * IT 0.007 (0.044)
routine manual tasks * IT 0.021 (0.064)
non-routine manual tasks * IT -0.059 (0.046)
experience * IT 0.005 (0.004)
experience2 * IT -0.000 (0.000)
civil servant * IT -0.154 (0.108)
tenure * IT -0.000 (0.002)
born in East Germany * IT -0.026 (0.052)
married * IT 0.007 (0.026)
very good company performance * IT 0.091 (0.084)
good company performance * IT 0.053 (0.088)
rather bad company performance * IT 0.021 (0.080)
Results of selected interaction terms from Table 4.4, column
(6). Bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 resamples in
parentheses. ***, **, *-indicate significance at the 1, 5,
10 percent level.
One of the most powerful criticisms of the “returns on computer use” literature
comes from DiNardo and Pischke (1997) who show that there is also a considerable
wage effect of the use of pencils (and other “white-collar” tools) in their cross-section
estimates. They convincingly argue that if we don’t believe that pencils changed the
wage structure, why should we believe that computers did. Hence, they attribute
the estimated wage differentials for IT usage to unobserved skills.
One part of their analysis deserves special attention. Table 4.6 reports parts of
their Table III. Panel A reports the coefficients for computer use when separate
regressions are performed for each workplace tool. Panel B shows the results when
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all tools are included together in the specification. Controlling for the different
workplace tools attenuates the coefficient for computer use in each period, but the
effect declines over time. Including the tools reduces the estimated coefficient on
computer use by around 40 percent in 1979, by around 33 percent in 1985/86 and by
26 percent in 1991/92. In 1991/92, the coefficient of computer use has a magnitude
of 13 percent even after controlling for all the tools. I reproduced their estimates
for the most recent wave of the data set (last column). Relative to the result in
Panel A, the estimated coefficient for computer use decreases by around 30 percent
due to the inclusion of the dummies for the different workplace tools (Panel B). The
coefficient of computer use still has a magnitude of around 15 percent. In contrast
to the previous years, in which the different tools have always had a significant
positive impact on wages, only the coefficients for the use of calculators and working
while sitting remained significantly positive in 1998/99. The coefficient for using a
telephone at work is now even significantly negative.
These results suggest that the changes in computer technology over time has also
altered its role in the workplace. Computer technology has decreased the costs of ac-
cessing and processing information in the 1980s and early 1990s, whereas in the late
1990s it additionally reduced the costs of communication. The convergence of infor-
mation technology and communication technology, once two distinct technological
areas, has been the central feature of technological change in the 1990s.
I take up the DiNardo and Pischke (1997) idea and estimate regressions that in-
clude dummies indicating the use of various workplace tools instead of the computer
dummy. The results are shown exemplarily for pencils in Table 4.7. Unreported
results show that the first-order relationship between pencil use and wages is 5.7
percent (significant at the 1-percent level). Similar to the specifications in Table
4.4, I successively augment the specifications with additional controls. In contrast
to the IT effect, the estimated pencil effect disappears as soon as controls for in-
dividual and workplace characteristics are included in the specification (column 2).
The variables that have had only attenuating effects on the coefficient of IT usage,
now result in the pencil effect to disappear. Column (2) shows the results of the
regression specification that includes the minimum number of controls that are nec-
essary to eliminate the wage effect of pencil use. It is interesting to notice that the
coefficient in the comparable IT equation (Table 4.4, column 2) still is about 12
percent. This result also suggests that changes in computer technology over time
altered its function in the workplace.
Table 4.8 displays the results of the matching estimations. Column (1) shows that,
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Table 4.6: OLS Regressions For The Effect Of Different Tools on Pay
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
Germany Germany Germany Germany
1979 1985–86 1991–92 1998–99
A. Tools entered separately
Computer 0.112 0.157 0.171 0.204
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
B. Tools entered together
Computer 0.066 0.105 0.126 0.146
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Calculator 0.017 0.053 0.044 0.051
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Telephone 0.072 0.043 0.045 -0.019
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Pen/Pencil 0.062 0.031 0.035 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Work while sitting 0.058 0.050 – 0.065
(0.007) (0.007) – (0.006)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Source of columns 1-3: Di-
Nardo and Pischke (1997, p. 299, Table III, 2nd part). Column
4: own regressions. Similar to the specification in DiNardo and
Pischke education, experience, experience squared, dummies for
part-time, city, female, married, female*married, and for civil ser-
vants are included in the regressions.
using nearest neighbor matching, the average wage effect of IT usage for employees
who use IT is 7.8 percent. The coefficient is significant on the 1-percent level. In
the matching, 3,461 controls are used to estimate the potential missing outcome of
IT users had they not adopted computer technology.22 Owing to the restriction that
only observations within the region of common support are used, there are 400 IT
users who are not considered in the analysis. Column (2) shows the results when an
Epanechnikov kernel is used in the matching process. This change in the weighting
scheme barely alters the result.
22Owing to missing values in the matching variables, the sample reduces to 9,240 individuals
(5,779 IT user and 3,461 IT non-user) in the matching specification.
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Table 4.7: OLS Regressions for the Effect of Pencil Use on Wages
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pencil 0.033∗∗∗ 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Individual Characteristics
high educ. level 0.495∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
medium educ. level 0.151∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
experience 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
experience2 *(1/100) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tenure 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
woman -0.079∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
married 0.120∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
woman*married -0.119∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
ever unemployed -0.036∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
born in East Germany -0.056∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.024 -0.023 -0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
civil servant -0.065∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045)
lives in city 0.023∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.011 0.007 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
<Table continues on next page>
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Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Company Characteristics
product innovation 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
process innovation 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
very good company performance 0.053∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
good company performance 0.008 0.004 0.013
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
rather bad company performance -0.012 -0.016 -0.009
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Workplace Characteristics: Measure of...
analytic tasks 0.110∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
interactive tasks 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
routine cognitive tasks 0.047∗∗∗ 0.023 0.022 0.008
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
routine manual tasks -0.032∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.038∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
non-routine manual tasks -0.171∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
77 occupation dummies No No No No Yes
7 company size dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
dummies for manufacturing & trade No No Yes Yes Yes
10 dummies for West German states No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.300 0.323 0.383 0.385 0.437
Number of observations 15951 13986 8037 8037 8001
Employees with low levels of education working in large companies in the services
sector are the base category. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, *-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Table 4.8: Results of the Propensity Score Matching - ATT
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IT 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.022)
Number of Treated 5,379 5,379 5,076 5,076
Number of Controls 3,461 3,461 3,461 3,461
(1) shows the ATT of IT usage using nearest neighbor matching (random draw
version, bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 replications). (2) shows the
ATT using kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel, bootstrapped standard er-
rors using 1000 replications). (3) shows the ATT of IT usage using nearest
neighbor matching (random draw version, bootstrapped standard errors us-
ing 1000 replications) with the additional restriction that treated and controls
have the same level of education. (4) shows the ATT using kernel matching
(Epanechnikov kernel, bootstrapped standard errors using 200 replications)
with the additional restriction that treated and controls have the same level
of education. For details on the bootstrap methods see Footnote (21). Only
observations that are on the common support are used. The caliper is set
to 0.001. The propensity score is estimated using the level of formal educa-
tion, age, age2, work experience, work experience2, interaction between work
experience and education, workplace tasks, born in East Germany, ever un-
employed, living in a city, woman, married, married woman, 8 company size
dummies, 39 industry dummies, 3 dummies reflecting company performance,
79 occupation dummies, 10 dummies for West German states and a constant
as regressors.
Table 4.9, last column, shows the means of the main individual characteristics of
the IT non-users that are used as controls in the matching approach. It is evident
that, although there is a convergence between treated and controls with respect
to most of the observable characteristics, the difference in educational level is still
significant. Therefore, columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.8 show estimates that, in
addition to having close propensity scores, restrict matches to be within groups of
employees with equal levels of education. This extension increases the number of IT
users that are off the common support to 703. The estimate of the nearest neighbor
matching declines to 6.2 percent, whereas the coefficient of the estimate that uses
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Table 4.9: Mean Comparison for IT Users and IT Non-Users
IT user IT non-user selected
prior to matching controls§
high education level 0.25 0.07∗ 0.17∗
medium education level 0.69 0.72∗ 0.74∗
low education level 0.06 0.21∗ 0.09∗
age 39.99 40.29∗ 40.20
experience 20.04 21.52∗ 21.22∗
tenure 12.37 10.82∗ 12.33
ever unemployed 0.26 0.34∗ 0.29
married 0.70 0.65∗ 0.70
woman 0.44 0.44 0.44
civil servants 0.15 0.05∗ 0.13
born in East Germany 0.03 0.05∗ 0.04
* indicates that the means differ with statistical significance of 5 percent
in a two-tailed t-test between IT user and either IT non-user prior to
matching (column 3) or the selected IT non-user (last column).
§ IT non-users who are selected by the matching procedure.
an Epanechnikov kernel increases to 8.2 percent. Both estimates are significant,
although the coefficient of the nearest neighbor matching loses precision.
I also estimate the ATE using the matching technique (see Footnote 15). Table
4.10 shows the results. The structure of the table follows Table 4.8. The ATE of IT
usage using nearest neighbor matching is 6.8 percent (column 1). This result hardly
changes when an Epanechnikov kernel is used as the weighting scheme (column 2).
Column (3) and (4) show the results when the matches are additionally restricted
to be within groups of employees with equal levels of education. This additional
restriction results in the coefficient to decline in the nearest neighbor matching,
whereas it is hardly changed in the Epanechnikov kernel matching.
Comparing the ATT and ATE of the matching estimations reveals that the ATT
is larger than the ATE, which was already the finding in the RBM estimates. Thus,
the matching results corroborate the notion that there is treatment heterogeneity.
In addition, the matching results also suggest that there has been selection into
treatment based on expected returns.
As for the ATT and ATE, the estimates using RBM are very close to those
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Table 4.10: Results of the Propensity Score Matching - ATE
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IT 0.068∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.018)
Number of Treated 5,379 5,379 5,076 5,076
Number of Controls 3,461 3,461 3,461 3,461
(1) shows the ATE of IT usage using nearest neighbor matching (random draw
version, bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 replications). (2) shows the
ATE using kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel, bootstrapped standard er-
rors using 1000 replications). (3) shows the ATE of IT usage using nearest
neighbor matching (random draw version, bootstrapped standard errors us-
ing 1000 replications) with the additional restriction that treated and controls
have the same level of education. (4) shows the ATE using kernel matching
(Epanechnikov kernel, bootstrapped standard errors using 200 replications)
with the additional restriction that treated and controls have the same level
of education. For details on the bootstrap methods see Footnote (21). Only
observations that are on the common support are used. The caliper is set
to 0.001. The propensity score is estimated using the level of formal educa-
tion, age, age2, work experience, work experience2, interaction between work
experience and education, workplace tasks, born in East Germany, ever un-
employed, living in a city, woman, married, married woman, 8 company size
dummies, 39 industry dummies, 3 dummies reflecting company performance,
79 occupation dummies, 10 dummies for West German states and a constant
as regressors.
estimated by the propensity score matching procedure. This finding may occur
because (i) there is no common support problem, (ii) there is little heterogeneity in
treatment effects or all the propensity scores are small, and (iii) there is no serious
mis-specification in the no-treatment outcome (see Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi,
2003).
Figure 4.1 shows the kernel density estimates of the distribution of propensity
scores for IT users and IT non-users. The two distributions greatly overlap. How-
ever, the results of the matching procedure reveal that 400 (703) of the 5,779 IT
users are outside the region of common support. In this application imputing the
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values that are outside the common support by relying on a functional form as-
sumption (RBM) or discarding the IT users without similar counterfactuals from
the analysis (matching) does not lead to different results.
The difference in the ATE and ATT in both approaches suggest that heteroge-
nous treatment effects are important. This notion is also supported be the joint
significance of the interaction terms in the RBM specification, although selected
interaction terms only point to weak effects.
The propensity scores in the analysis assume values between 0 and 1. The mean
is 0.64 and the median is 0.73. This information does not suggest that propensity
scores are particularly clustered at certain points in the distribution.
Figure 4.1: Kernel Density Estimations of Propensity Scores for IT
Users and IT Non-Users
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4.5 Conclusions
This paper deals with the question of whether IT users earn higher wages than
employees who do not use IT on the job. In addition to the average treatment
effect of IT usage, which was the focus of previous studies, I estimate the average
treatment effect for the treated. The ATT is more interesting than the ATE for
the question of IT wage differentials because the implementation of IT cannot be
analyzed without considering the occupational context. Employers choose employees
to use IT on the basis of expected profitability increases owing to the implementation
of IT, which depends on occupational characteristics, individual characteristics and
company characteristics. The prevailing circumstances greatly influence the impact
of IT on productivity and thus individual wages.
The analysis rests upon the advantage of the data set that includes a large number
of controls that have been identified as important determinants of the IT use-wage
relationship in previous studies. This feature of the data set allows me to use
methods that assume that, conditional on the controls, the differences in wages of
IT users and IT non-users are attributable to the use of IT.
I find a robust average treatment effect for the treated of around 8 percent. This
indicates that IT users would be worse off had they not started to use IT in the
workplace. I also find evidence for the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects.
A comparison of the ATE and ATT reveals that IT non-user would have witnessed
lower benefits in terms of wages had they started to use IT instead of those who
actually have. However, the difference in ATT and ATE is only about 2 percentage
points.
A 8 percent wage markup appears to be small, in particular in comparison with
the 10-15 percent that have typically been found in cross-section analyses in the
1990s. The size of the effect is rather similar to results previously found in panel
analyses. The data set does not include unemployed. I therefore argue that the 8
percent wage markup for IT users represents a lower bound. Analyses of Entorf et
al. (1999), for example, suggest that people who do not use computers have a higher
probability of becoming unemployed. Therefore, the IT non-users observed in my
data set are probably already a positive selection.
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4.6 Appendix
Intermediate steps between equation 4.12 and 4.13:
E(Yi|Di, X) = µ0 + αDi + g0(X) +Di[g1(X)− g0(X)]
g0(X) = η0 +Xβ0 Eg0(X) = 0
g1(X) = η1 +Xβ1 Eg1(X) = 0
E(Yi|Di, X) = µ0 + αDi + η0 +Xβ0 +Di[η1 +Xβ1 − η0 −Xβ0]
= µ0 + η0 + αDi +Xβ0 +Di[η1 − η0 +X(β1 − β0)]
= µ0 + η0︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ0
+αDi +Xβ0 +Di[
η1 − η0
β1 − β0 +X] (β1 − β0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ
To be shown:
η1 − η0
β1 − β0 = −E(X)
η1 − η0
β1 − β0 =
1
β1 − β0 (g1(X)−Xβ1 − g0(X) +Xβ0)
η1 − η0 = g1(X)− g0(X) +X(β0 − β1)
X =
1
β1 − β0 (g1(X)− g0(X)− η1 + η0)
E(X) =
1
β1 − β0 (Eg1(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−Eg0(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−η1 + η0)
= − η1 − η0
β1 − β0
Chapter 5
IT, Organizational Change and
Wages§
5.1 Introduction
The effects of information technology (IT) on skills and wages are an extensively dis-
cussed topic in the labor market literature, with the skill-bias technological change
(SBTC) hypothesis being one of the most prominent themes.1 However, recent stud-
ies on the company-level emphasize that, in order to result in efficiency gains, the
use of IT should be accompanied by appropriate organizational changes, so-called
high-performance-workplace-organizations (HPWO), with favorably decentralizing
character such as teamwork, flat hierarchies, job rotation or quality circles.2 The
use of IT and organizational changes (OC) are increasingly viewed as strategic com-
plements. In addition, the hypothesis that organizational change itself is skill-biased
emerged.3
§This chapter is a strongly revised version of Bertschek and Spitz (2003b).
1See, for example, the comprehensive reviews by Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu (2002),
Card and DiNardo (2002), or by Chennells and van Reenen (2002).
2Microeconometric evidence for this hypothesis is given, for example, by Bresnahan, Brynjolfs-
son and Hitt (2002) and by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000). Evidence on the quantitative importance
of organizational changes can be found in Osterman (1994, 2000).
3See Caroli and van Reenen (2001). Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borego (2001) present evidence
suggesting that the reorganization of workplaces may even have a larger impact on the occupa-
tional structure of companies than technical capital. Goldin and Katz (1998) discuss the skill
upgrading in a historical context. They show that the substitution of unskilled labor by skilled
labor and capital began early in the twentieth century. They view this skill upgrading as a result
of organizational changes, driven by technological changes. A growing literature emphasizes the
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The empirical evidence so far relied heavily on company-level data sets, with most
studies focusing on the impact of IT and OC on company productivity, whereas stud-
ies that investigate the impact on wages are rare. To the best of our knowledge,
Cappelli and Carter (2000) is the only study that analyzes the joint effects of IT
and OC on wages. They use data on about 3,300 U.S. establishments of the manu-
facturing industry and the service sector. They find that employees benefit from IT
use and OC in terms of higher wages, however, their results suggest that the effect
of OC is limited to the manufacturing sector.
Our study contributes to the discussion about the joint effects of IT and OC
on wages. In contrast to the analysis by Cappelli and Carter (2000), we are in
the favorable position to have individual-level data to investigate this question.
Assuming that IT and OC - as complementary measures - have positive impacts
on a company’s productivity, we analyze whether employees share in the gains that
companies obtain from using IT and from changing their organizational structure.
The analyses are based on a large, representative cross-section of West German
employees, which were surveyed in 1998 and 1999.
The use of individual-level data has several advantages compared to company-
level data sets: We do not have to fall back upon aggregate information on employees.
In particular, we know whether or not an employee uses IT on the job. A special
feature of the data is that it includes detailed information about the company the
interviewed employees work at. In particular, the employees were asked whether or
not they work in companies that reorganized their organizational structure within
the last two years. Three forms of organizational changes are considered: restructur-
ing of departments, changes in the management structure and outsourcing of parts
of the production process. In addition, there is a question that informs us about
whether the employee has been personally affected by the organizational change in
the company. This dual information, presence of organizational changes in compa-
nies and personal affectedness of employees, allows us to infer the potential reasons
for wage differentials.
Our results suggest that even when controlling for a wide range of individual
characteristics, workplace characteristics and company characteristics, IT users still
earn around 6 percent higher wages than their peers. In addition, we find that
impact of organizational changes upon rising wage inequality, see, for example, Kremer and Maskin
(1996), Acemoglu (1999), and Lindbeck and Snower (1996). Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa
(1999) suggest that the impact of organizational changes on wage inequality depends crucially on
a companies’ choices with respect to its management of human resources.
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employees working in companies that have changed their organizational structure
earn higher wages independent of the fact whether their workplace situation had
been directly affected by the organizational change. This result points to wage
differentials across companies rather than within companies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 reviews previous empirical and
theoretical results. Section 5.3 describes the data and the empirical framework.
Estimation results are presented and discussed in section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical Background and Previous Empir-
ical Results
The recent literature about organizational change is closely related to the histor-
ical debate about the division of labor and the gains from specialization.4 Gains
from specialization, that is, from the repetition of the same tasks, are due to an
increased dexterity of an individual in specific tasks (in the sense of learning-by-
doing), time-savings otherwise lost for switching from one activity to another, and
increased potential for mechanization. There are, however, also limiting factors such
as transaction costs (Yang and Borland, 1991), the extent and characteristics of the
market (Piore and Sabel, 1984, Aoki, 1986, and Thesmar and Thoenig, 2000), co-
ordinaton costs or the amount of knowledge possessed by specialists (Becker and
Murphy, 1992). Whereas the division of labor, for example, increased enormously
during industrialization, which was characterized by mass production, standardized
products and a rather stable product mix, there is now vast empirical evidence that
job roles have expanded both horizontally, through increased integration of tasks,
and vertically, through the introduction of flat hierarchies and autonomous work
teams.
In recent decades, empirical studies extolling the productivity effects of workplace
innovations emerged, for example, by Black and Lynch (2000, 2001), Caroli and van
Reenen (2001), Eriksson (2003) and Huselid (1995). Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi
(1997) analyze complementarities between human resource management practices.
Huselid and Becker (1996) and Wolf and Zwick (2002) concentrate on methodolog-
ical issues. All of these studies deal with so-called high-performance workplace or-
ganizations (HPWO) or innovative human resource management (HRM) practices,
meaning work practices with decentralizing character that allocate more decision-
4Adam Smith (1776) already described how the division of labor increases economic growth.
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making rights as well as responsibility to employees.
Several studies relate these changes in the organization of work to the introduction
of IT at the workplace. IT influences both the gains from specialization and the
traditional limiting factors. Milgrom and Roberts (1990), for example, emphasize
the role of IT embedded in machine tools making them a “programmable, multitask
production equipment”, which can be cheaply switched from one task to the other
and, hence, allow the company to efficiently produce a variety of outputs in very
small batches. Lindbeck and Snower (2000) emphasize overall changes in the nature
of work, for which advances in IT is one important driving force. In addition to
the characteristics of IT to allow machines to become flexible and versatile, they
accentuate the greater access to information and the reduced communication time
owing to the introduction of IT at the workplace, which facilitates decentralization
of decision-making and enables employees to become more involved in each others
tasks (“multitasking”). However, Lindbeck and Snower also stress the importance
of the growth of human capital per worker, generated by education systems, which
has ensured that workers have become more versatile as well, and that workers have
become to prefer jobs that allow them to exercise a variety of skills.
There are, in general, two arguments for the joint technological and organiza-
tional changes. On the one hand, IT itself calls for a reorganization of work through
its differing impact on different tasks employees have to perform on the job (see, for
example, Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003, and Spitz, 2004). On the other hand, IT
enables organizational changes. For example, the flattening of a company’s hierar-
chical layers (accompanied with a wider control span at each layer) is encouraged
by the improved monitoring technology owing to the increased access to informa-
tion and lower costs of communication. The implication of both arguments is that
companies have to adapt their organizational structures when implementing IT in
order to use these technologies efficiently.
Empirical company-level evidence for the hypothesis of IT as an enabling tech-
nology is given by Bresnahan et al. (2002) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) on the
basis of different U.S. company data sets. Bertschek and Kaiser (2004) take into
account the simultaneity between productivity and OC and provide evidence for
companies belonging to the German business-related services sector.
The effect of OC on employees is much less studied. Cappelli and Neumark (2001)
find that HPWO are associated with higher labor costs suggesting that the higher
productivity of companies that introduced HPWO is to some extent offset by the
higher costs. In an extreme scenario, this offsetting relationship may even result
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in a decline in profitability owing to OC. Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg and Kalleberg
(2000) consider five worker outcome dimensions in their study: the extent to which
workers trust their managers, the degree to which workers perceive their jobs to be
intrinsically rewarding, a worker’s commitment to the organization, job satisfaction
and work-related stress. They find, for example, that the opportunity to participate
substantially in the company’s decision-making process is positively related to trust
and intrinsic rewards. Their analyses focus on nonmonetary benefits that employees
derive from performing their tasks. However, there are few studies investigating the
effect of OC on worker’s wages.5
From the point of view of the company, there are some arguments why employers
should share parts of the gains with their employees. Foremost, employees may get
more productive owing to the OC. But there are also a variety of additional argu-
ments, not related to productivity considerations, as pointed out by Black and Lynch
(2000): Firstly, companies may have to pay a wage premium in order to attenuate
resistance to workplace changes of employees and to ensure that employees actively
collaborate with respect to the implementation of OC. Secondly, employers may also
have to pay a wage premium in order to indemnify employees for the increased job
insecurity that may be associated with the workplace reorganizations. And thirdly,
employees may acquire additional skills owing to the workplace restructuring that
are valuable to outside companies, such as problem solving or interpersonal skills.
Hence, employers may have an incentive to pay a wage markup in order to ensure
that employees stay with their company. Appelbaum et al. (2000) provide addi-
tional theoretical arguments, why one would expect companies that change their
organization to pay higher wages. The greater discretionary effort that is required
from workers in more participatory work settings speaks in favor of a positive link
between OC and wages. Higher wages give employees an incentive to exert such
discretionary effort.
Reviewing the above arguments reveals that they generally fall either within the
framework of efficiency wage models or in the context of compensating wage dif-
ferential models. Efficiency wage models, on the one hand, provide rationales why
employers pay wages (to all their employees) that are above market-clearing level.6
5There is now a growing literature that investigates the impact of organizational changes on
wage inequality (see Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999, for a review). The major argument
is that organizational changes increase the productivity gap between individuals with different skill
levels.
6See Yellen (1984) for a review of efficiency wage models. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) provide a
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Efficiency wages are part of an employer’s compensation policy. They are particu-
larly important in work environments that involve unforeseeable contingencies and
discretionary power by employees, which make the writing of explicit contracts very
costly, if not impossible. Efficiency wages are one measure that provides incentives
for employees to maximize their productivity and to remain attached to a company
for long periods of time.7 Employees are willing to exert effort (and stop shirking)
because their wages are in excess of what they could earn elsewhere. In addition, a
company’s high pay strategy attracts a large pool of applicants, allowing the com-
pany to hire only the best applicants and, hence, to build up and maintain a high
quality work force.
Compensating wage differentials, on the other hand, are wage markups that com-
panies have to pay in order to compensate workers for undesirable working condi-
tions. Typical examples for such undesirable working conditions are dirt, heat,
danger or noise. However, in the context of this study, one might also think about
increased job insecurity and aversion of workers to changes in job content as “un-
pleasant” features. The compensating wage differentials aim at giving the worker an
incentive to adapt to the new working environment. Companies thus compensate
employees who accept the new paradigm by paying them more than comparable
employees in jobs that do not have these particular characteristics.
As the organizational changes of recent years focus on increased employee in-
volvement and greater discretion for employees with respect to the organization of
work, both efficiency wage and compensating wage arguments may be particularly
important.
The first type of questions with respect to organizational changes in the survey
on which this analysis is based asks for whether or not the survey participants
work in companies that implemented organizational changes. Thus, wage differences
found for this group of employees apply independent of whether or not the survey
participant has been personally affected by organizational changes. This question
allows it to investigate whether companies that implemented organizational changes
pay systematically different wages to all members of their work force, that is, it hints
to wage differentials across companies.
The second type of question asks for whether survey participants have been per-
collection of the classical studies in this body of literature.
7Another instrument of an employer’s compensation policy is incentive pay, which relates em-
ployee’s wages directly to some measure of output. However, monitoring and the measurement of
output on which remuneration might be based is often costly.
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sonally affected by OC, subject to the fact that their companies implemented or-
ganizational changes. This question allows us to analyze whether companies pay
systematically different wages only to that part of their workforce that witnessed
a particular change in their job content in recent years owing to OC. Thus, the
question hints at wage differentials within companies.
The few empirical studies that investigate the relationship between HPWO and
wages find contradictory results. Bauer and Bender (2001) find that HPWO are
associated with higher wages and higher wage dispersion in Germany. The results
of Black and Lynch (2000) and Appelbaum et al. (2000) suggest that companies
that introduced HPWO have higher company performance and are paying higher
wages. Cappelli and Neumark (2001) find that HPWO are associated with higher
labor cost, which are very likely to result from increased employee compensation.
Osterman (2000), in contrast, does not find that employees are profiting from the
introduction of HPWO in terms of greater wage increases or increased job security.
None of these studies investigates the effects on wages when IT and OC are
introduced jointly. As already mentioned in the Introduction, Cappelli and Carter
(2000) is the only analysis studying the question of joint effects at the company-level.
By contrast, our study analyzes this question at the individual-level.
5.3 Data and Empirical Framework
The analysis is based on the “Qualification and Career Survey”, which is a survey
of employees carried out by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training
(Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Research Institute of the Federal
Employment Service (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). It is
a rich source of information on the qualification and occupational career trends of
German employees. We use the most recent cross-section, which was launched in
1998-1999, because it is the only one that contains information on both the diffusion
of IT at the workplace and organizational changes in companies.
The complete sample contains more than 34,000 observations. For the purpose
of the analysis at hand, we restrict the sample to male employees with residence in
West Germany and German nationality. Self-employed were also withdrawn from
the sample. These restrictions reduce the sample to around 12,300 individuals. The
persons in the sample are between 18 and 65 years old. The companies employing
these employees cover a wide range of industries both manufacturing and services,
however, companies in the agricultural sector are excluded.
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Our basic framework closely follows Krueger (1993) who estimates extended in-
come functions originating from Mincer (1974) by ordinary least squares (OLS). In
addition to the main variables of interest, IT and OC, three types of variables are
considered in the analyses: individual characteristics, company characteristics and
workplace characteristics. We include variables reflecting individual characteristics
in order to account for the fact that employees systematically differ with respect
to characteristics that may affect both computer usage and wages. As more highly
skilled workers are more likely to use computers at work and earn higher wages, we
control for the level of formal education of employees, work experience and tenure
with the current employer. As wages of civil servants are determined in another
process than wages of employees in private companies, we also include a dummy
variable for civil servants into the regressions.
One drawback of most estimations on individual-level data is that they generally
do not have much information on employers. Employer information may, however,
be important for the analysis if they determine systematic effects on wages, IT usage
and OC. Our data set allows us to take various company characteristics into account
such as company size, industry affiliation, innovation strategy, IT intensity of the
sector and company performance. Based on previous empirical research, we expect,
for example, that larger companies pay higher wages and that they are more likely
to introduce OC than smaller companies. Furthermore, we expect “IT-intensive”
companies to pay higher wages and that they are more likely to introduce OC than
companies with less IT-intensive production processes (Osterman, 1994).
Another feature that distinguishes our data set from others is that it includes
information on the task composition of occupations.8 These tasks describe the
occupational context in which IT is introduced and organizational changes are made.
In addition, this information on occupational skill requirements allows us to further
reduce unobserved heterogeneity.
The variables used in the estimations are constructed as follows (Summary statis-
tics are in Table 5.1):
Hourly Wages: The survey contains information on monthly earnings, according
to 18 categories. To each category midpoints are assigned. These midpoints are then
divided by the number of hours an individual usually spends at work.9 Compared
8For a detailed analysis of how the task composition of occupations changed in West Germany
since 1979 see Spitz (2004).
9Comparable procedures are often used in literature, for example, by DiNardo and Pischke
(1997) and by Entorf and Kramarz (1997).
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistic
Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. Observations
Information Technology
IT 0.57 0.50 0 1 12334
Organizational Change
restructuring of departments 0.42 0.49 0 1 11751
change in management structure 0.32 0.47 0 1 11785
outsourcing 0.19 0.40 0 1 11575
being directly affected by...
...restructuring of departm. 0.19 0.39 0 1 11751
...change in management struct. 0.21 0.41 0 1 11785
...outsourcing 0.06 0.24 0 1 11575
Qualification
high education level 0.19 0.39 0 1 12340
medium education level 0.70 0.46 0 1 12340
low education level 0.10 0.30 0 1 12340
experience 21.42 11.65 0 47 12340
tenure 12.98 1 0.49 0 47 12340
(hourly) wages (in DM) 29.72 12.24 3.19 98.68 10506
Workplace Characteristics:
analytic task measure 15.95 25.07 0 100 12319
interactive task measure 0.74 29.52 0 100 12319
repetitive cognitive task measure 0.28 45.95 0 100 12319
repetitive manual task measure 24.03 34.51 0 100 12319
non-repetitive manual task measure 24.32 24.99 0 50 12319
Company Characteristics
IT intensive industry 0.56 0.50 0 1 12340
product innovation 0.42 0.49 0 1 11803
very good company performance 0.19 0.39 0 1 8331
good company performance 0.63 0.48 0 1 8331
rather bad company performance 0.15 0.35 0 1 8331
bad company performance 0.03 0.17 0 1 8331
to other data sets that are usually used in comparable analyses such as CPS for
the U.S. or the IAB-S for Germany, this data set has the advantage that earnings
of highly paid workers are not censored from above. The summary statistics show
that employees earned on average around 30 German Marks in 1998/99. Minimum
wages were only slightly larger than 3 German Marks, whereas maximum wages
approached nearly 100 German Marks. In all estimations, the logarithm of wages is
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used as dependent variable.
IT equipment: The survey participants indicate whether or not they use one or
more of the following devices: personal computers, laptops, other kinds of comput-
ers, scanners or computerized control devices such as computer numerical control
machines. Based on these questions an IT-dummy is formed that indicates whether
an employee uses one or more of the above devices on the job. Table 5.1 shows
that around 60 percent of employees used one of the IT devices at the workplace in
1998/99.
Organizational Changes (OC): The data set contains information about three
measures of organizational changes. Employees are asked whether the company for
which they work had introduced one or more of the following three different kinds
of measures of organizational change in the previous two years: reorganization of
departments (RD), changes in the management structure (MS), and outsourcing
(OUT) of a part or parts of the production process. These different measures are
used in the analysis as dummy variables that indicate whether or not the respective
measure had been implemented. In addition, we construct a dummy variable “or-
ganizational change” that takes the value one if companies had introduced at least
one of the above measures. The use of this variable in the estimation attempts to
take account of potential collinearity between the OC variables.10
According to the summary statistics in Table 5.1, 42 percent of the employees
belong to companies that restructured departments. Management structures had
been changed in the case of 32 percent of survey participants and 19 percent in-
dicate to belong to companies in which parts of the production process had been
outsourced. Table 5.2 indicates that the frequencies of all three types of OC increase
with company size.
One drawback of this data set is that the variables capturing OC are less detailed
and less precise than measures used in previous research, for example, Ichniowski
et al. (1997) or Osterman (1994). Therefore, in the following paragraphs we will
relate our measures to those previously used. As Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson
and Strauss (1996) emphasize, the term “innovative work practice” has no settled
meaning. As a result, there is a large variety of measures used in literature. They all
have in common that they characterize a shift away from traditional forms of work
organization, which was associated with “...tightly defined jobs with associated rates
10The correlation between the restructuring of departments and outsourcing (changes in the
management structure) is 0.359 (0.464). The correlation between changes in the management
structure and outsourcing is 0.309.
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Table 5.2: Company Size Distribution
Perc. share of companies with
Number of employees Freq. Percent RD MS OUT
1 to 4 581 4.79 14.95 10.42 8.16
5 to 9 1088 8.97 15.24 12.64 5.94
10 to 49 3266 26.93 25.29 20.86 10.24
50 to 99 1609 13.27 36.29 28.68 13.38
100 to 499 2697 22.24 54.44 39.88 24.83
500 to 999 963 7.72 62.74 48.04 29.15
1000 and more 1950 16.08 71.13 56.05 39.94
Total 12127 100.00
of pay, clear lines of demarcation separating the duties and rights of workers and
supervisors, decision-making powers retained by management...”, toward workplaces
with “...greater degree of flexibility in work organization, cooperation between labor
and management, and worker participation in decisions and financial well-being of
the company (Ichniowski et al., 1996, p.300)”. This widely observed shift is the
basis for our interpretation of the variables measuring OC in the data set.
Restructuring of departments (RD):11 The most common organizational change
that affected the structure of departments during the 1990s was the introduction of
self-managed teams and employee problem-solving groups, instruments that largely
decentralized decision-making and increased employee involvement. While it is true
that the survey question is an imprecise measure of the implementation of teamwork,
we argue that, since the restructuring of department has taken place between 1997
and 1999, it is justified to consider this measure as an organizational change with
decentralizing character. This notion is supported by the respondent’s answers to
questions of how their work had changed between 1997 and 1999. For example, 30
percent of employees that work in companies that reorganized their departments be-
tween 1997 and 1999 report that they have greater discretionary power with respect
to the planning and performing of their own work in 1999 than in 1997, whereas
only 16 percent of employees that work in companies that did not reorganize their
departments report so (see Table 5.3).12 For 39 (62) percent of employees, who
11The exact wording of the question is: “In the last two years, has there been a restructuring or
reorganization of departments in your company?”
12The exact wording of the question is: “In the last two years, did your discretionary power of
planning and executing your work increase, stayed the same or decreased?”
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report that their companies reorganized their departments, the variety of tasks (the
amount of specialist knowledge) they have to perform increased between 1997 and
1999, whereas this is the case for only 22 (39) percent of employees who work in
companies that did not reorganize their departments. Interestingly, for the ques-
tion of whether control by supervisors increased, employees who work in companies
that reorganized their department have higher fraction in the “increased” and “de-
creased” category than those in companies that did not change the structure of their
departments. This pattern may reflect the better monitoring technologies that are
now available owing to IT, which are, most probably, implemented and used to a
greater extent by companies that changed their organization. Overall, the answers
to these four questions are, however, in line with the characteristics that are usually
attributed to a more decentralized organization of work.
Changes in the management structure (MS):13 Given the time period (1997-1999),
we assume that this measure reflects the flattening of a company’s hierarchy. This
may have an inverse effect on managers who loose power and potentially their job
owing to the abolishment of hierarchy levels. However, a flattening of a company’s
hierarchical layer is usually accompanied with an increased control span at each
layer. In addition, this measure enhances the decision-making authority of the in-
dividual employee and enriches the range of tasks as employees often rotate across
jobs. This theoretical thinking is supported by the survey results. Table 5.4 shows
how work has changed between 1997 and 1999 depending on whether or not com-
panies had changed their management structure. The results are similar to those in
Table 5.3. The fraction of employees who report that they had more discretionary
power over their work (had more versatile and interesting work) in 1999 than in 1997
is larger in companies that changed their management structure. The amount of
specialist knowledge required to perform the work increased also for a larger fraction
of workers. Similar to the above result, a larger proportion of employees that work
in companies that changed the management structure report an increase of control
by supervisors and a decrease of control by supervisors. Our conclusion from the
answers to these four questions is again that they are in line with the characteristics
of flatter hierarchies. The results by Appelbaum et al. (2000) suggest that this
feature of flatter organizational structures has a positive impact on an employee’s
motivation and is beneficial to an employee’s identification with his company.
13The exact wording is: “In the last two years, has there been a change in the structure of
management in your company?”
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Table 5.3: Changes in Work between 1997 and 1999 for Employees in
Companies that Reorganized their Departments
A. Did your discretionary power over your work...
RD=0 RD=1
increased 16.51 30.57
stayed the same 70.49 58.25
decreased 6.20 8.18
B. Has the versatility and interest of your work...
RD=0 RD=1
increased 22.33 38.97
stayed the same 71.50 54.37
decreased 4.40 5.80
C. Has the extent of supervision...
RD=0 RD=1
increased 9.52 16.80
stayed the same 72.78 62.73
decreased 10.60 14.38
D. Has the amount of specialist knowledge required to perform your job...
RD=0 RD=1
increased 39.37 62.09
stayed the same 57.26 35.48
decreased 2.04 1.88
The figures refer to the percentage of employees who report that the respec-
tive scenario applied to their work. The figures in each category do not sum
up to 100 percent because the questionnaire also included the possibility for
respondents to indicate that the type of question does not apply to their work.
Outsourcing (OUT):14 During the 1990s, companies have increasingly external-
ized certain tasks that were previously performed by their employees. They then
buy these products and services from companies that are specialized in those tasks.
Outsourcing allows the companies to concentrate on their core competencies, to
replace fixed costs by variable costs, and to increase flexibility.
Being directly affected by organizational changes: The data set includes infor-
mation on whether the survey participant has been directly affected by an organi-
zational change. Thus, analogously, we construct dummy variables for whether or
not employees have been directly affected by these measures. Six percent of survey
14The exact wording is: “In the last two years, has your company increasingly outsourced parts
of the production process or bought more intermediate products from other companies?”
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Table 5.4: Changes in Work between 1997 and 1999 for Employees in
Companies that Changed their Management Structure
A. Did your discretionary power over your work...
MS=0 MS=1
increased 18.26 30.67
stayed the same 69.41 57.05
decreased 6.16 8.83
B. Has the versatility and interest of your work...
MS=0 MS=1
increased 24.90 38.30
stayed the same 69.05 54.65
decreased 4.41 6.18
C. Has the extent of supervision...
MS=0 MS=1
increased 9.50 18.89
stayed the same 72.23 61.05
decreased 10.72 15.19
D. Has the amount of specialist knowledge required to perform your job...
MS=0 MS=1
increased 42.50 61.98
stayed the same 54.14 35.83
decreased 2.05 1.80
The figures refer to the percentage of employees who report that the respec-
tive scenario applied to their work. The figures in each category do not sum
up to 100 percent because the questionnaire also included the possibility for
respondents to indicate that the type of question does not apply to their work.
participants indicate that they have been directly affected by outsourcing activities
of their company (see Table 5.1). 19 percent report that their workplace has been
directly affected by a restructuring of departments. Changes in the management
structure directly affected 21 percent of employees. Focusing attention to only those
employees who report that they work in companies that changed their organization
also reveals interesting patterns: 44 percent of employees who report that their com-
panies restructured departments have been directly affected by this measure, and 64
percent of employees who work in companies that changed the structure of manage-
ment have been directly affected, whereas the majority (94 percent) of employees
who report that their companies outsourced part of the production process has not
been directly affected.
115
Table 5.5: Summary Statistics for IT users and IT non-users
Sample Means by IT-use
IT user IT non-user
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
restructuring of departments 0.54 0.50 0.26 0.44
change in management structure 0.41 0.49 0.21 0.41
outsourcing 0.23 0.42 0.15 0.36
being directly affected by...
...restructuring of departm. 0.25 0.44 0.09 0.29
...change in management struct. 0.25 0.43 0.15 0.36
...outsourcing 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.19
high education level 0.30 0.46 0.05 0.22
medium education level 0.65 0.48 0.77 0.42
low education level 0.05 0.22 0.17 0.38
experience 20.85 11.38 22.18 11.95
tenure 13.82 10.59 11.87 10.26
wage 33.41 12.85 25.01 9.54
IT and OC are often viewed as strategic complements. As Table 5.5 shows,
IT users are more likely to work in companies that reorganized their production
processes. The higher incidence holds for all three practices. However, the difference
is most pronounced for the restructuring of departments. 54 percent of the IT users
reported to work in companies that restructured their department compared to 26
percent for IT non-users. In addition, IT users are also more likely to be directly
affected by organizational changes. For example, 25 percent of IT users report to
be directly affected by a restructuring of departments compared to 9 percent of IT
non-users.
Table 5.5 also demonstrates major differences with respect to the educational
attainment of IT users and IT non-users and their wage outcome indicating that IT
users have a higher educational attainment and earn higher wages.
Workplace Characteristics: The analyses by Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz (2004)
document how IT has changed the content of work towards analytical and interac-
tive activities and away from manual and cognitive routine activities. The data set
at hand is a cross-section, thus changes in the task composition of occupations can-
not be taken into account. However, the data set allows us to consider task levels,
capturing the content of jobs, and therefore, it gives a description of the context
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in which IT is used and organizational changes have been made. Survey partici-
pants are asked what kind of activities they perform at the workplace. Based on
these activities five categories are constructed, which classify the occupational skill
requirements: analytic tasks, interactive tasks, repetitive cognitive tasks, repetitive
manual tasks and non-repetitive manual tasks. Table 5.6 shows the list of activities
that employees were asked for in the questionnaire and how the activities are classi-
fied in the five task categories. On the individual-level i, the task measures (Taskij)
are defined as:
Taskij =
number of activities in category j performed by i
total number of activities in category j
∗ 100 (5.1)
where
j =

1 : analytic tasks
2 : interactive tasks
3 : routine cognitive tasks
4 : routine manual tasks
5 : non-routine manual tasks.
For example, if the analytical task category includes 4 activities and employee i
indicates that she performs 2 of them, her analytical task measure is 50. Spitz
(2004) includes further details on the concept of skill requirements of occupations.
On average, employees perform, for example, 16 percent of analytical activities,
whereas they perform 30 percent of repetitive cognitive activities (Table 5.1).
The data set also contains information about the current occupation of employ-
ees. Occupations are grouped according to the (2-digit-level) classification of occu-
pational titles by the Federal Employment Bureau, 1999, leading to 78 occupational
groups.
Individual characteristics: We distinguish three levels of formal educational at-
tainment of employees. Employees with a low level of education are those with
no further vocational training. Employees with medium levels of education have a
vocational qualification either from an apprenticeship or they are graduated from
a vocational college. Employees holding a degree from a university or a technical
college are classified as having a high level of educational attainment. This cate-
gorization corresponds closely to the institutional setting of the German education
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Table 5.6: Assignment of Activities
Classification Tasks
analytic researching, evaluating and planning,
making plans, constructing, designing, sketching
working out rules/regulations
using and interpreting rules
interactive negotiating, lobbying, coordinating, organizing
teaching or training
selling, buying, advising customers, advertising
entertaining or presenting
employing or managing personnel
routine cognitive calculating, bookkeeping
correcting of texts/data
measuring of length/weight/temperature
routine manual operating or controlling machines
setting up machines
non-routine manual repairing or renovation houses/apartments/machines/vehicles
restoring art/monuments
serving or accomodating
system and is often used in literature, see, for example, Bellmann, Reinberg and
Tessaring (1994) or Fitzenberger (1999). In contrast, U.S. studies usually use the
number of schooling years as a measure of education (see Card, 1999, for further
discussions). As shown in Table 5.1, the largest part of the survey participants, 70
percent, has a medium qualification level, whereas 19 percent are highly qualified
and only 10 percent have a low education level.
Survey participants also indicate their first year of work. Based on these answers,
we calculate (potential) work experience (1999-first year of work). In addition,
employees indicate the year in which they started to work with the current employer.
This information is used to calculate company tenure (1999-first year with current
employer).
Company characteristics: Company size has been identified as an important com-
ponent of wage determination in previous studies, finding that larger companies pay
higher wages to employees with similar characteristics (see, for example, Brown and
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Medoff, 1989, Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991). A recent contribution disentan-
gling the sources for these firm-size wage differentials using employer-employee data
is Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). In our analysis, company size measured as
the number of employees is captured by 7 size classes. Companies with one to four
employees are classified to belong to the first size bracket and companies with more
than 1,000 employees to the last one. Based on these size classes, 7 dummy vari-
ables are formed. Most of the survey participants, 27 percent, belong to companies
with a size class from 10 up to 49 employees, followed by the size class from 100 up
to 499 employees (see Table 5.2). Companies with more than 1000 employees are
represented by 16 percent of the survey participants. Less than 14 percent of the
interviewed employees belong to small companies with less than ten employees.
The data set also includes information about the performance of companies. The
survey participants were asked whether the company was doing very good, good,
rather bad or bad. For each of these categories, we constructed a dummy vari-
able. The results of Wolf and Zwick (2002), for example, suggest that company
performance and the implementation of organizational changes are correlated. In
addition, we expect a company’s pay to its IT users to be related to its performance.
Table 5.1 shows that 19 percent of employees report to work in companies that are
doing very well and 63 percent work in companies that are doing well. 18 percent
of employees work in companies that are either doing rather bad or bad.
Companies are classified according to 48 detailed industry codes. Based on these
codes we group companies into three sectors: manufacturing, trade, and services.15
The inclusion of these variables accounts for inter-industry wage differentials that
are not already captured by the observed individual and company characteristics
(see, for example, Krueger and Summers, 1987, Dickens and Katz, 1987, Gibbons
and Katz, 1992 and Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999).
In order to identify companies operating in “IT-intensive” industries, we construct
a dummy variable that takes the value one if the IT intensity of the industry is
higher than the average IT intensity of the sector to which it belongs. In addition,
the survey participants were asked whether or not their company introduced new
products or services to the market within the last two years. Based on these answers
a dummy variable for “product innovation” was constructed. We expect companies
in technology intensive industries as well as innovative companies to pay higher
wages and to have a higher likelihood to implement organizational changes.
15We also ran regressions that included more detailed industry dummies. The results that we
report in Section 5.4 are robust to this change in specification.
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5.4 Empirical Results
Table 5.7 displays the estimation results of the basic wage regressions. Each row
represents a separate OLS regression. The result in the first row (Panel A) shows
that the raw log wage differential for IT use in West Germany is 0.282 (about 32
percent) in 1998/99.16 The regressions in Panel B show that employees who work in
companies that restructured their departments, changed their management struc-
ture or outsourced parts of their production earn significantly higher wages. The
coefficient in the bivariate regression that includes the dummy for “organizational
change”, which takes the value one if companies had introduced at least one of
the measure of organizational changes, is also positive and highly significant. In
addition, employees that have been directly affected (Panel C) by a restructuring
of departments, changes in the management structure or a company’s outsourc-
ing activities earn significantly higher wages. The information in Panel A about
an individual’s usage of IT is the type of information that is usually available in
individual-level data sets that in general do not provide information about company
characteristics such as organizational changes. The information about organiza-
tional changes (Panel B) are usually available in company-level data sets that then
include only aggregate information about wages and IT usage such as average wages
of employees or the proportion of employees using IT. The advantage of this data set
is that it includes information on both IT on the individual-level and organizational
changes on the company-level. In addition, it includes individual information about
whether employees had been personally affected by these organizational changes.
This advantage will be taken into account in the analyses that follow.
These bivariate regressions suffer from some of the most prominent drawbacks of
previous research. Estimates based on individual-level data, that is, the majority of
studies analyzing the relationship between IT usage and wages, cannot adequately
tell whether employers differ systematically in a way that affects wages (such as
differences in work organization). Estimates based on company-level data, that is,
the majority of studies on high-performance workplace practices, are not able to take
into account individual differences that affect wages (such as IT usage on the job).
For example, the positive relationships between IT usage and wages shown in Panel
16This figure is slightly smaller than the raw log wage differential of 0.288 that DiNardo and
Pischke (1997) report for Germany based on the 1991-1992 cross-section of the BIBB/IAB data.
Thus, in contrast to the period between 1979 and 1991-1992, where the raw log wage differentials
for computer use increased steadily (although at a declining pace), as shown in the paper by
DiNardo and Pischke, it remained stable or even slightly declined in the 90s.
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Table 5.7: Bivariate OLS Regressions for the Effect of IT and Orga-
nizational Changes on Wages
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
Coeff. R2
(Std. Error) No. of Observations
A.
IT 0.282∗∗∗ 0.120
(0.007) 10501
B.
restructuring of departments 0.182∗∗∗ 0.052
(0.008) 10034
chg. in management structure 0.168∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.008) 10067
outsourcing 0.144∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.009) 9879
organizational change 0.204∗∗∗ 0.066
(0.008) 10506
C.
being directly affected by...
...restructuring of departments 0.138∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.010) 10034
...chg. in management structure 0.120∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.009) 10067
...outsourcing 0.140∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.015) 9879
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, *-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
A might reflect that IT users are more likely to work in companies that restructured
their organization, which often pay higher wages, whereas the positive relationship
between organizational changes and wages (Panel B) might reflect that companies
that restructured their organization have a larger fraction of IT users, who generally
earn higher wages. That is, owing to the covariation in the introduction of IT
and the implementation of organizational changes, one might end up by incorrectly
attributing the positive wage effect of one factor to the other.
The first extension, thus, is to estimate regressions that include both information
about IT usage and about organizational changes simultaneously in the specifica-
tion. The results are shown in Table 5.8, each column represents a separate OLS
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regression. Columns (1)-(3) show that the coefficient of IT use and the dummies
for the different organizational changes decline compared to the bivariate results in
Table 5.7. For example, conditional on the “restructuring of department” variable,
the coefficient of IT use drops by 12 percent. However, IT users still earn around
28 percent higher wages than IT non-users. Conditioning on “changes in the man-
agement structure” reduces the IT-coefficient by 20 percent, whereas conditioning
on “outsourcing” reduces the IT-coefficient only by 5 percent. The coefficients of
the variables for the different measures of organizational changes decline even to a
larger extent owing to the inclusion of the IT use variable. The coefficient of the
“restructuring of departments” variable declines by 38 percent (column 1), the re-
sult in column 2 shows that the wage markup for employees that work in companies
who changed their management decreased by 35 percent and the coefficient of the
“outsourcing” variable drops by 22 percent.
The result is similar when the dummy for “organizational changes” is included
in the regression instead of the separate measures (column 4) and also, when all
variables reflecting organizational changes are included jointly in the specification
(column 5). Column 5 shows that including the different measures for organizational
changes jointly reduces the respective coefficients by around 60 percent, however,
each of them still remains positive and highly significant. In addition, the coefficient
for IT usage changes hardly.
Although these specifications only focus on the main variables of interest of this
study, they already indicate that it is important to consider both individual and
company information. The reduction in coefficients owing to the joint inclusion of
variables of IT usage and organizational changes indicate that studies that are not
able to account for the covariation in IT usage and the implementation of organiza-
tional changes overestimate the respective coefficients.
Unreported results in which the information about whether employees had been
directly affected by the organizational changes are included in the specification in-
stead of the “broad” information of organizational changes as in Table 5.8 show
similar patterns, although the coefficients are generally smaller. The coefficient of
IT use has always a magnitude of around 16 percent, whereas the coefficients for the
different measures of “direct” organizational changes decline to around 7-10 percent.
All coefficients remain highly significant.
As outlined in Section 5.2, IT and organizational changes are often viewed as
strategic complements. Therefore, IT users might be particularly involved in the
introduction of organizational changes by supporting the successful implementation
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Table 5.8: OLS Regressions for the Effect of IT and Organizational
Change on Wages
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IT 0.248∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Organizational Changes
restructuring of dept. 0.112∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009)
chg. in management structure 0.110∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
outsourcing 0.113∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
organizational change 0.136∗∗∗
(0.008)
R2 0.141 0.137 0.132 0.151 0.149
Number of observations 10030 10063 9876 10501 9633
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, *-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
from a technical point of view. Moreover, the productivity effects of OC might
be more pronounced for IT users than for IT non-users. Therefore, IT users in
companies that changed organization may be particularly rewarded.
The regressions in Table 5.9 include interactions between the IT use variable and
the dummies for organizational changes in order to account for potential comple-
mentarities. The interaction term of the “restructuring of departments” variable
and IT is positive but insignificant, whereas the interaction terms for the two other
measures of organizational changes are negative. IT users working in companies
that changed their management structure earn significantly (10 percent level) lower
wages than their peers. In terms of wages, the results do not suggest that there is
a complementary relationship between IT use and organizational changes.
However, IT and organizational changes may still be strategic complements in
production as suggested by company-level studies (for example, Bresnahan et al.,
2002). The weak evidence for interaction effects in the wage regressions may be in-
formative about the type of computing that is important for companies that change
their organizational structure. Bresnahan (1999) distinguishes between three main
categories: organizational computing such as corporate accounting systems, supply
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chain management systems, customer relationship management systems or trans-
action processing systems, scientific or technical computing in factories and labora-
tories, and individual productivity computing such as word-processing or computer-
aided design. The measure of IT equipment in this study reflects individual produc-
tivity computing and, partly, scientific or technical computing, but does not capture
organizational computing. However, in the process of restructuring of departments,
changes in the management structure or outsourcing, organizational computing is
likely to be more important than individual computing or technical computing.
Table 5.9: Complementarities between IT and Organizational Change
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3)
IT 0.247∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Organizational Changes
restructuring of dept. 0.111∗∗∗
(0.012)
restructuring of dept. * IT 0.001
(0.016)
chg. in management structure 0.129∗∗∗
(0.013)
chg. in management structure * IT -0.028∗
(0.016)
outsourcing 0.129∗∗∗
(0.014)
outsourcing * IT -0.025
(0.018)
R2 0.141 0.137 0.132
Number of observations 10030 10063 9876
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, *-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
Up to now, the analysis focused on the “broad” variables of organizational change
and neglected the information about whether employees have been personally af-
fected. The specification in Table 5.10 includes both types of variables for orga-
nizational changes. As before, each column represents a separate OLS regression.
Column (1) shows that the positive relationship between a restructuring of depart-
ments and wages does not depend on whether or not employees have been directly
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affected by this measure. The two other measures of OC convey a different picture.
Column (2) shows that employees who have been directly affected by a change in
management structure earn significantly lower wages than employees who have not
been directly effected. This suggests that employees rather lose than gain competen-
cies owing to the reduction in hierarchical layers. The joint effect, that is, the sum of
coefficients of the variable for the change in management structure and the variable
for “being personally affect”, is positive, however. The result in column (3) shows
that employees who have been directly affected by outsourcing activities of compa-
nies earn significantly higher wages than their peers, suggesting that compensating
wage differentials might play a role in the corresponding companies. However, the
wage markup for being personally affected is rather small in size compared to the ef-
fect that accrues to all employees in companies that engaged in outsourcing. As will
be seen in analyses that follow, the coefficients of the measures of OC for employees
that had been directly affected become insignificant as soon as the specification ac-
counts for additional observable differences. The coefficients of the measures for the
direct affectedness by OC become insignificant owing to the controls, whereas the
broad measures of OC remain (mostly) significant. It is interesting to note that in
Table 5.10 the IT wage differential is hardly affected by the inclusion of the variables
that measure the personal affectedness by OC.
The previous specifications are scarce in the sense that they focus solely on the
relationships between the main variables of interest. They omit, however, a large
number of factors that may be correlated with both IT usage and organizational
changes. Results from previous empirical studies suggest, for example, that employ-
ees with high levels of education earn higher wages and are more likely to use IT
at the workplace and that companies that implement organizational changes have
a higher fraction of highly educated employees. Previous research also finds that
larger companies and more innovative companies use more IT, are more likely to
change their organizational structure and pay higher wages. In addition, previous
analyses point to the fact that IT is complementary to analytical and interactive
tasks, for which employees with high levels of education (who earn higher wages)
have a comparative advantage, whereas IT substitutes for cognitive and manual
routine activities, which are usually performed by employees with lower levels of
education. In sum, previous analyses emphasize that there is a large number of
observable and (for the researcher) unobservable factors that may influence IT use,
organizational changes and wages.
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Table 5.10: Wage Differentials across and within Firms
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3)
IT 0.248∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Organizational Changes
restructuring of dept. 0.114∗∗∗
(0.009)
chg. in management structure 0.131∗∗∗
(0.011)
outsourcing 0.112∗∗∗
(0.010)
Being Directly Affected By...
restructuring of dept. -0.005
(0.011)
chg. in management structure -0.031∗∗∗
(0.012)
outsourcing 0.002∗∗∗
(0.017)
R2 0.141 0.138 0.132
Number of observations 10030 10063 9876
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, *-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
Having only a cross-section at hand, we are not able to control for (time-constant)
unobserved heterogeneity by taking individual-specific fixed effects into account.
However, this caveat is to some extent outweighed by the fact that the data set
includes many variables that are potentially correlated with IT use, organizational
changes and hourly wages. These variables fall within three broad categories: in-
dividual characteristics, company characteristics and workplace characteristics (for
a detailed description see Section 5.3). In order to assess the importance of dif-
ferent factors, we are going to augment the specification step-by-step. First by
individual characteristics, then by workplace characteristics, and last by company
characteristics. Individual characteristics are: level of formal education, work expe-
rience, tenure with the current employer and a dummy for civil servants. Company
characteristics are: company size, sector affiliation, innovative strategy, IT inten-
sive industries and company performance. Workplace characteristics are: five task
categories (analytic, interactive, routine cognitive, routine manual and non-routine
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manual) and occupational affiliation.
Table 5.11 shows the results of the specification that includes individual charac-
teristics. The IT wage differential and the wage markup for organizational changes
drops by around 30 percent (compared to Table 5.9) owing to the covariates. In
addition, the coefficients of the variables that capture whether employees have been
directly affected are now insignificant in all three specifications. The coefficients of
the covariates are highly significant and convey the typical picture: wages increase
in educational attainment, wages increase (with a decreasing pace) in years of work
experience and tenure with the current employer tends also to increase wages.
The insignificant coefficients of variables capturing the affectedness reflect one
important difference between traditional work systems, often termed Fordist or Tay-
loristic, and modern work systems. Modern measures of work organization are not
directed to individual employees, their goal is to increase organizational efficiency.
Maximizing organizational productivity dominates the maximization of individual
productivity, which was the goal of work organization in the past. Therefore, it
seems reasonable for employers to pay higher wages to all their employees instead
of only rewarding a particular group of employees.
In the following regressions, we do not report the results for the variables that
capture whether employees have been directly affected anymore. The coefficients
are always insignificant and the inclusion of these variables in the specification does
not alter the results for the other variables.
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Table 5.11: OLS Regressions for the Effect of IT and Organizational
Change on Wages: Individual Characteristics Only
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3)
IT 0.172∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Organizational Changes
restructuring of dept. 0.077∗∗∗
(0.007)
chg. in management structure 0.079∗∗∗
(0.007)
outsourcing 0.085∗∗∗
(0.008)
Being Directly Affected By...
restructuring of dept. -0.010
(0.011)
chg. in management structure -0.015
(0.011)
outsourcing -0.002
(0.015)
Individual Characteristics
high educ. level 0.435∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
medium educ. level 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
experience 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
experience2 *(1/100) -0.034∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
tenure 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32
Number of observations 10030 10063 9876
Control variable is a dummy variable for civil servants. Em-
ployees with low levels of education are the base category.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, *-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Table 5.12 shows the results when workplace characteristics and 77 occupation
dummies are additionally included in the specification. Again, the coefficients for
the IT use variables as well as the different measures of organizational changes drop
considerably. Comparing the results from Tables 5.9, 5.11 and 5.12 shows that the
inclusion of the workplace characteristics has a larger quantitative impact on the size
of the IT use variable than the inclusion of the individual characteristics, suggest-
ing that it is important to analyze the implementation of IT with the occupational
context in mind. The results of the five task categories show that wages are pos-
itively related to the extent of non-routine cognitive activities both analytical and
interactive, whereas they are negatively related to non-routine manual activities.17
The coefficients of the individual characteristics decline owing to the inclusion of
the workplace characteristics in the specification, but the functional form of the
relationship remains unchanged.
The results of the richest specification additionally including company charac-
teristics are shown in Table 5.13, which reports only the coefficients of the most
interesting variables. The control variables are listed at the bottom of Table 5.13.18
As expected, both the IT use wage differential and the wage markup for organi-
zational changes drop again owing to the inclusion of the company characteristics.
The IT use wage differential is reduced to 6 percent, which is only 20 percent of the
bivariate result of 0.282. It is robust across the different specifications in columns
(1)-(5). Also, the coefficients of the different measures of organizational changes
decline. The results now suggest that employees that work in companies that re-
structured their departments do not earn significantly higher wages (column 1).
However, the coefficients for employees working in companies that changed their
management structure (column 2) or outsourced part of their production (column
3) are still significant and positive, although they are quantitatively small.
The results show that companies operating in IT intensive industries pay sig-
nificantly higher wages. However, we do not find significant effects for product
innovators. The dummy variables for company performance indicate that wages are
increasing in performance. Unreported results that did not include the information
about company performance show that the IT coefficient as well as the coefficients
17We additional investigated potential complementary or substitutive relationships between
workplace tasks and IT usage by including interaction terms in the specification (see Spitz, 2004).
In terms of wages, the results do not hint to complementary or substitutive effects.
18The control variables convey the usual picture. For example, that manufacturing is the highest
paying sector and that wages increase in company size.
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for the different measures of OC are higher when company performance is included
in the specification (everything else equal to specification in Table 5.13). This result
suggests that companies with performance problems are more likely to introduce
organizational changes and that they pay their IT users lower wages.19
Owing to the company controls, the negative relationship between routine manual
tasks and wages now turns out to be significant. The negative relationship between
non-routine manual tasks remains significantly negative, but the size of the effect
declines. The results for the individual characteristics remain relatively unchanged
by the company controls.
Overall, one might conclude that we find positive wage effects of both IT use and
organizational changes, in particular changes in management structure and out-
sourcing activities. The size of the IT wage differential is in the order of magnitude
of coefficients typically reported in studies using panel methods.20 The richness of
the data set thus seems to be equally successful in reducing unobserved heterogene-
ity as methods that remove time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. However, in
line with findings of Entorf and Kramarz (1998), we do not interpret this result
as causal in the sense that the introduction of IT at the workplace immediately
increases individual productivity and thus wages. We rather argue that employees
get more productive through the experience they gain with using IT. Our results do
not hint to a complementary relationship between IT and OC in terms of wages.
The interpretation of our results might be encumbered with an important caveat:
although the coefficients for the different OCs are small or even insignificant, they
might be upward biased because those employees that have been mostly affected
by the OCs have been dismissed. The survey on which our analyses are based,
however, only includes employees, but not unemployed persons. Thus, we are not
able to take account of persons who are affected by organizational changes in the
sense that they lose their jobs. Using matched employer-employee data Jacobson,
LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), for example, find that high-tenure workers that are
displaced and then rehired end up with considerable wage losses. Rationalizing
production processes in order to save costs might be involved with the dismissal of
employees – an effect that cannot be captured by our data base.
This argument applies in particular to the case of outsourcing when companies
19Wolf and Zwick (2002) also find that companies with productivity problems tend to introduce
organizational changes.
20Bell (1996), for example, report a coefficient of 0.047 in fixed-effects regressions using data for
U.K.
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not only source out certain tasks but whole workplaces. The fact that 94 percent
of employees in our sample who report that their company outsourced part of the
production has not been directly affected supports this conjecture.
According to a survey by the ZEW (Centre for European Economic Research)
among more than 4,000 companies in the year 2000, the most important reasons
for outsourcing of IT-related tasks have been the higher competency and quality of
specialized companies, the possibility to save costs and the lack of time to do certain
IT-tasks internally. In these company-level data, no significant correlation between
outsourcing and the expected development of employment can be found.
Several studies name the concentration on core competencies, cost reductions and
lack of qualified personnel as the most important reasons for outsourcing decisions,
see, for example, Henkel and Kaiser (2002, p.13) for the case of IT-outsourcing.
The results by Falk and Koebel (2002) suggest that rather output growth than
input substitution drives the increasing use of imported materials and purchased
services. There seems to be no significant relationship between outsourcing and
labor demand. The study by Heshmati (2003) gives a comprehensive overview on
the effects of general outsourcing. The decision to source out might differ across
company size. For instance, large companies might source out whole departments,
which will lead to dismissals if the corresponding tasks are not done within the
company anymore. On the other hand, the employees working in the outsourced
department might continue their work within a new enterprise as it is, for example,
the case for the Deutsche Bank that outsourced its IT-department to IBM, thus,
about 900 former Deutsche Bank employees are now working for IBM (Lamberti,
2003). Small companies, in contrast, will probably outsource single tasks rather than
whole departments. In our data set, the percentage share of employees working in
companies with organizational changes increases with company size for all three
types of OC considered as shown in Table 5.2.
This caveat of neglecting dismissals seems to be less severe for “changes in the
management structure” and “restructuring of departments”. For example, 64 (44)
percent of employees who report that their companies changed the structure of the
management (restructured departments) have been directly affected. These types
of organizational changes supposed to increase the degree of employee involvement
in decision-making or increase the degree of flexibility in work organization, thereby
increasing employees’ motivation. Appelbaum et al. (2000), for example, report on
a survey that investigates workers’ attitudes and experience with modern forms of
work organization. They report that participation in decisions has a strong and
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positive effect on employees’ perception of the intrinsic rewards of jobs, that is they
find the jobs more meaningful and challenging. In addition, Appelbaum et al. (2000)
find that more participatory work systems enhances employees’ trust in managers.
It is very unlikely that employees would have these perceptions if the organizational
changes had involved large scale dismissals.
The data set in this study includes information about employees’ work satisfac-
tion. Survey participants indicate their satisfaction with the career opportunity in
the company, the working atmosphere, the task they have to perform and the pres-
sure exerted on them. Descriptive statistics (not reported) show that, on average,
employees who work in companies that changed their organization are more satisfied
with their work, although the differences in means are often not significant.
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Table 5.12: OLS Regressions for the Effect of IT and Organizational
Change on Wages: Individual and Workplace Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IT 0.066∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Organizational Changes
restructuring of dept. 0.052∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
chg. in management structure 0.060∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
outsourcing 0.053∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
organizational change 0.065∗∗∗
(0.008)
Workplace Characteristics
analytical tasks 0.040∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
interactive tasks 0.134∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
routine cognitive tasks 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
routine manual tasks -0.019 -0.018 -0.013 -0.018 -0.017
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
non-routine manual tasks -0.106∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Individual Characteristics
high educ. level 0.231∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.2369∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
medium educ. level 0.069∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
experience 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
experience2 *(1/100) -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
tenure 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38
Number of observations 8602 8609 8476 8910 8296
Control variables are: Dummy variable for civil servants and 77 occupation
dummies. Employees with low levels of education are the base category.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,
*-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Table 5.13: OLS Regressions for the Effect of IT and Organizational
Change on Wages: Individual, Workplace and Company Characteris-
tics
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IT 0.060∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Organizational Changes
restructuring of dept. 0.006 -0.009
(0.010) (0.011)
chg. in management structure 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
outsourcing 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
organizational change 0.027∗∗∗
(0.010)
Workplace Characteristics
analytical tasks 0.064∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
interactive tasks 0.155∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
routine cognitive tasks 0.014 0.018 0.013 0.016 0.012
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
routine manual tasks -0.045∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.044∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
non-routine manual tasks -0.091∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Individual Characteristics
high educ. level 0.188∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
medium educ. level 0.041∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
experience 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
experience2 *(1/100) -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
tenure 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
<Table continues on next page>
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<Continued from previous page>
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Company Characteristics
IT intensive industry 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
product innovation 0.017∗ 0.013 0.015∗ 0.012 0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
very good company performance 0.072∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
good company performance 0.046∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
rather bad company performance 0.036 0.044∗ 0.038 0.036 0.046∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
R2 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42
Number of observations 5495 5482 5395 5600 5305
Control variables are: Dummy variable for civil servants, sector dummies, dummies
for 6 company size categories, 77 occupation dummies. Employees with low levels
of education working in large companies in the services sector are the base cate-
gory. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,
*-indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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5.5 Conclusions
In this study we analyze whether the use of IT at the workplace and organizational
changes are positively related to individual wages taking possible complementarities
between IT and OC into account. In addition, the data set allows us to investigate
whether wage markups for employees that work in companies that have changed their
organization accrue only to those that have been directly affected or to all employees.
We use a large individual-level data set that includes information about individual
characteristics, workplace characteristics and company characteristics referring to
West Germany in 1998-1999.
Our findings suggest that IT users earn about 6 percent higher wages than ob-
servably similar IT non-users. We interpret this positive wage effect of IT use not
as causal in the sense that only the implementation and use of IT at the workplace
increases individual productivity and thus wages. In line with previous research,
we rather believe that employees get more productive through their experience they
gain with using IT.
Employees working in companies that have changed their management structure
or have outsourced part of their production process earn significantly higher wages.
Interestingly, this positive wage markup is not related to the fact of whether or
not employees had been personally affected by these organizational changes. By
contrast, companies that have implemented organizational changes seem to pay
higher wages to all of their employees — a result that speaks in favor of wage
differentials across rather than within companies. In addition, in terms of wages, we
do not find evidence for a complementary relationship between IT and organizational
changes.
One might argue that the quantitative importance of the wage effects, about
6 percent for IT usage and 3 percent for organizational changes, are small. In
particular, as most studies on IT wage differentials conclude that there are no wage
effects of IT usage if they find comparable figures. However, in the light of the
fact that unions and employer associations in Germany typically bargain for wage
increases of about 4 percent, the sizes of the estimated coefficients should not be
disparaged in its importance for employees.
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Chapter 6
Managerial Ownership and
Company Performance in German
Small and Medium-Sized Private
Enterprises§
6.1 Introduction
The separation of ownership of a firm from its control has been of interest since the
seminal contribution by Berle and Means (1932). This separation is supposed to
create agency costs because owners (principals) and managers (agents) have differ-
ent objectives. The emphasis of much of the literature is large, publicly held US
corporations.
We address the problem of separation of ownership and control empirically for a
sample of small and medium-sized private companies with limited liability (GmbHs)
in the German business-related service sector.1 Although listed firms play a large
role in the United States and in the UK, their importance for other countries is much
smaller. Private companies with limited liability are important in many economies.
In Germany, for example, GmbHs accounted for more than 33 percent of total
§The major part of this chapter corresponds to the paper “Managerial Ownership and Com-
pany Performance in German Small and Medium-Sized Private Enterprises”, jointly written with
Elisabeth Mu¨ller and forthcoming in the German Economic Review.
1The counterparts of German GmbHs are limited companies (Ltd) in the UK and closely-held
corporations in the USA.
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turnover in 2000 and their overall importance has increased steadily in the last
thirty years.2
Economic theory identifies two opposing effects of managerial ownership – the
incentive and the entrenchment effect. On the one hand, managerial ownership
aligns the objectives of owners and managers. From this incentive effect we expect a
positive relationship between managerial ownership and company performance. On
the other hand, managers with large ownership shares have the ability to “entrench”
themselves. Their large ownership share makes them immune to control by outside
owners. If the entrenchment effect is larger than the incentive effect, performance
decreases in managerial ownership.
GmbHs have one or more owners who enjoy limited liability. In contrast to pub-
lic companies, their shares cannot be listed on a stock market. GmbHs are run by
managers who can hold a stake in the firm as well. Compared to large publicly held
companies, the ownership share of managers is usually relatively large. Managers
with a very large ownership share have good incentives to maximize company value
because they bear a large proportion of the costs of their actions themselves.3 In
general, a high managerial ownership share makes it difficult for other shareholders
to control the management and gives the owner-managers the power to potentially
disregard the interests of small shareholders. However, non-managing owners of
private companies usually also have a high ownership share which makes it likely
that they are well informed. Therefore, the possibility for managers to “entrench”
themselves is restricted, even if they hold substantial ownership shares. This dif-
ferentiates private from public companies. In public companies, ownership is often
so dispersed that, for example, an ownership share of 5 percent can be enough for
managerial entrenchment. At such low levels of ownership shares, managers have
not full incentives to maximize company value.
For our analysis we combine information from a business survey with company
data from Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency. This gives us an
2See Table A1 in the appendix to this chapter for more details. For a detailed discussion of
the institutional aspects of a company’s legal status and the relative importance of legal forms in
Germany see, for example, Harhoff and Stahl (1995) and Harhoff, Stahl and Woywode (1998).
3Our considerations always refer to relative ownership share because this is the information
included in our data set. The absolute amount, however, may also be important with respect to
the incentive effects. A 10 percent share of a Euro 50,000 company, for example, may have different
incentive effects than 10 percent in a Euro 5 million company. This difference also depends on the
private wealth of the owner-manager. Incentives increase if a higher share of personal net worth is
invested in the company (see Mueller, 2004).
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unbalanced panel of about 350 companies from 1997-2000. The survey covers the
business-related service sector and is conducted by the Centre for European Eco-
nomic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. The companies are asked on a
quarterly basis whether their profits have increased, stayed the same or decreased
in the last three months. On the basis of these quarterly answers, we construct an
annual performance measure. The credit rating agency provides us with information
about managerial ownership share defined as the sum of the ownership share of all
managers.
Our empirical specification explains company performance by managerial owner-
ship share up to the third power. Additional variables are the number of managers
who hold ownership shares, the number of outside owners, the number of a com-
pany’s bank relationships, the size and age of the company. We find a positive
relationship between managerial ownership share and company performance up to
a maximum of around 40 percent of ownership.
In the context of our analysis we need to be concerned with problems of endo-
geneity. It is possible that managerial ownership itself is influenced by company
performance. Since we use panel data, we are able to control for unobserved firm
heterogeneity, for example, managerial ability. This controls for endogeneity due to
time-invariant effects. Additionally, endogeneity due to time-variant effects is dealt
with by lagged regressors and by using instruments.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature is the study of the rela-
tionship of managerial ownership and performance for private companies. Up to
now this relationship has mainly been studied for listed companies.4 In general it is
difficult to observe the performance of private companies because data from balance
sheets and profit and loss accounts is rarely available. Our findings suggest that
there are important differences between public and private companies. For public
companies it is mostly found that very high values of managerial ownership have a
negative influence on performance due to managerial entrenchment. In contrast, we
do not find an entrenchment effect for private companies.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) distinguish between insiders, who manage the firm,
and outsiders, who supply funds to the firm. Inside managers adopt investment
4See, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Kaplan (1994) for the US, Ko¨ke (2000)
and Januszewski, Ko¨ke and Winter (2002) for Germany. Examples of the rare studies for small
companies are Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Bennedsen, Fosgerau and Wolfenzon (2000) and Harhoff
and Stahl (1995). Hellmann and Puri (2002) provide evidence on venture capital financing of small
and medium-sized companies.
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strategies that benefit them but reduce the payment to outside suppliers of funds.
This behaviour is constrained by higher managerial ownership because this increases
the costs that managers have to bear (incentive effect). On the other hand, for a
given ownership distribution, the higher the level of managerial ownership, the more
difficult it is for outsiders to control the management. This gives the management
the possibility to “entrench” themselves. Taking the incentive hypothesis and the
entrenchment hypothesis into account, the relationship between management’s own-
ership share and company performance can be non-linear. At low levels of ownership
the incentive effect can be dominant, that is, there is a positive effect. However, at
very high levels of ownership the entrenchment effect might be more important and
the effect of ownership could be negative.5
This theoretical view is supported by empirical results of Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1988) who investigate the relationship between managerial ownership of the
firm’s equity and Tobin’s Q for large publicly held companies in the US. They find
that Tobin’s Q rises as managerial ownership increases from 0 percent to 5 percent,
as ownership share increases further up to 25 percent it falls, and then continues to
rise again as ownership share exceeds 25 percent. Other empirical studies support
their results qualitatively, although they do not agree on the exact functional form
of the relationship (for example, McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Kole,
1995. In addition, the relationship between managerial ownership and company
performance has been found to become insignificant after including fixed effects
(Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999). This may be due to the trade-off between
utility maximization of managers and their profit orientation pointed out by Demsetz
(1983). In a competitive environment managers have to pay for their on-the-job
consumption by a reduction in their pecuniary managerial compensation. As a
consequence, managers will not consume while on the job unless the cost of doing
so is less than if they consumed at home. However, with a greater ownership share
and loose market discipline the owner manager has the power to enjoy both on-
the-job consumption and a high salary. In equilibrium, the structure of ownership
that emerges is an endogenous result depending on monitoring costs and incentives.
This theoretical view is supported by the empirical analysis by Demsetz and Lehn
(1985), who find no significant linear relationship between ownership concentration
and company performance, measured as the accounting profit rate.
The previously mentioned empirical studies are all concerned with large publicly
5See Sheifer and Vishny (1997) for a comprehensive review of the corporate governance literature
discussing the relationship between ownership structure and performance.
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held corporations. In contrast, Ang et al. (2000) study the relationship between a
firm’s ownership structure and its agency costs for a sample of small US companies.
Two efficiency measures serve as proxy for agency costs: the ratio of operating
expenses to annual sales and the ratio of annual sales to total assets. They find
that companies with an owner-manager have lower agency costs, that agency costs
decrease with the managerial ownership share, and that agency costs increase with
the number of outside shareholders.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 6.2 describes the data, Section 6.3
presents the estimation results, and Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Data Description
6.2.1 Data Set
The data that are the basis for the estimation is derived from a business survey
in the German business-related service sector carried out since 1994 by the ZEW
and Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency. The industries as well as
their industrial classification codes are displayed in Table A2 in the appendix.
The survey is carried out quarterly. A single page questionnaire is sent to about
4000 firms, achieving a response rate of approximately 25 percent. In 1994, when
the survey was launched, a stratified sample covering all companies included in the
Creditreform database was taken. The stratification was done according to company
size, region and sector affiliation. A sample refreshment takes place annually.6
The questionnaire is divided into two parts. The first part contains questions
on the business development of the firms in the current quarter with respect to
the previous quarter and on their expectations for the next quarter. The second
part is devoted to questions of current economic or political interest. The survey is
conducted as a panel.
The data derived from the survey is merged with company information from
the Creditreform database. This database includes detailed information on the
ownership structure of private firms with limited liability. It states the ownership
6The sample is stratified with respect to the ten sectors listed in Table A2 in the appendix,
five size classes (two for East and three for West Germany), as well as with respect to regional
affiliation (East/West Germany). The annual sample refreshment replaces companies that have
not answered the survey for two years. For more details of the sample design and the data set see
Kaiser, Kreuter and Niggemann (2000).
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share of managers and gives the identity of outside owners. Furthermore, the number
of bank relationships a firm has is displayed. Other information is the number of
employees and the age of a company. These variables have been gathered on a
yearly basis since 1997. This gives us an unbalanced panel data set that includes
observations from 1997 to 2000. The participation pattern is as follows: 20 percent
of the companies participated in all 4 years, 14 percent participated in 3 years, and
24 percent of the companies are observed twice. The empirical results are based on
918 observations referring to 356 firms. The number of observations and firms per
sector is displayed in Table A3 in the appendix.
Is our data set representative for private companies in the German business-
related service sector? There are several possibilities for how biases could be intro-
duced. As mentioned, the population for the questionnaire is all companies covered
by Creditreform. Since Creditreform aims to include all registered companies in its
database, this should not pose a problem. A second source of bias is the response
pattern of the companies to the questionnaire. If the non-responses are related to
the topic we want to investigate – the relationship between ownership structure and
company performance – then our results will be biased. We investigate the non-
response pattern exemplarily for the last wave of the year 2000. For managerial
ownership share below or equal to 50 percent, we find that 35.5 percent of the con-
tacted companies answered to the questionnaire. For managerial ownership share
between 51 and 99 percent, the response rate is 34.5 percent and for managerial
ownership of 100 percent, 31.4 percent of the companies answered. This response
pattern suggests that there is no relationship between the willingness to answer and
the ownership structure. A survivorship bias is present in our sample since we can
only observe profitability for companies that still exist. In an annual sample refresh-
ment all companies that have not responded in the six preceding waves are deleted.
The last source of bias is the frequency with which Creditreform updates company
information. Companies for which there are more inquiries are updated more often.
Again, if the updating frequency is not related to our analysis, we face no problem.
6.2.2 Definition of Variables
The performance measure is based on the responses to the business survey. Par-
ticipating companies are asked about the development of their profits, sales, prices,
demand, and number of employees. They indicate whether these variables have de-
creased, stayed the same, or increased in the current quarter compared to the pre-
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vious quarter. For the purpose of the current research the variable of most interest
is the assessment of the company’s profits.7 The performance variable (Perfor-
mance) is measured as the difference between the number of times a company has
responded that its profits have increased and the number of times a company has
reported that its profits have decreased. The exact formula is:
Performance:
# of ‘increases’ per company per year−# of ‘decreases’ per company per year
The definitions of the variables determining performance are as follows (descriptive
statistics are shown in Table 6.1):
 Ownership share of managers (Share) is the sum of ownership shares held
by the management of the firm. It is measured between 0 and 1. Previous
studies on large, public companies typically find a non-linear relationship be-
tween managerial ownership and company performance due to an incentive
and entrenchment effect. Owing to the more concentrated ownership struc-
ture, however, it is not clear whether one should also expect a similar functional
form for private companies.
The share of companies that are totally owned by managers varies according
to sector between 32 percent and 61 percent. The average in the whole sample
is 45 percent. Excluding companies that are totally owned by managers the
distribution of ownership share is approximately normal, centered around 55
percent and with relatively more observations above the mean. This distribu-
tion does not vary substantially across sectors.
 Owner Manager denotes the number of managers who hold ownership shares.
We expect a negative sign since it is more difficult for more managers to come
to an agreement. Furthermore, the incentive for a single manager is diminished
since the ownership is divided between several managers.
 Outside Owner denotes the number of outsiders holding equity. The own-
ership share of each outside owner is ceteris paribus smaller, the higher the
number outside owners. Because larger outside owners have a bigger incentive
to monitor we expect a negative sign on this variable.
7The exact question is: in comparison to the last three months, have your profits increased,
stayed the same or decreased?
144
 Bank is the number of a firm’s bank relationships. Theory does not give an
unambiguous prediction about the sign of this variable. On the one hand, a
negative influence on performance is to be expected. If a company has more
bank relationships, each bank will ceteris paribus have a smaller loan volume
to the company and therefore less incentives to monitor. On the other hand, a
positive influence on performance is also possible because firms with few bank
relationships may have the problem that the banks try to hold them up. The
ex-post information monopoly provides banks with a substantial bargaining
power (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1994). Banks, therefore, may be able to charge
above-market loan rates.
 Ln Employment denotes the natural log of number of employees. The com-
panies in our sample are relatively small. 78 percent of the companies have
fewer than 50 employees, 14 percent have between 50 and 100 employees and
only 9 percent have more than 100 employees. The direction of the relationship
between profitability and size is not clear.
 Ln Age is the natural log of the age of the company in years. This is mainly
a control variable.
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Performance -0.293 0 1.739 -4 4
Share 0.726 0.850 0.309 0.010 1
Owner manager 1.664 1 0.965 0 10
Outside owner 1.269 1 1.805 0 16
Bank 1.397 1 0.709 1 6
Employment 44.72 24 65.82 1 800
Age 14.98 10 12.95 2 115
West 0.602 1 0.489 0 1
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6.3 Estimation Results
In this section, we present the estimation results on the relationship between com-
pany performance and ownership share of managers. Our regression equation ex-
plains company performance by managerial ownership share up to the third power,
the number of managers who hold ownership shares, the number of outside owners,
the number of bank relationships, the size and the age of the company. In this spec-
ification we need to be concerned about the endogeneity of managerial ownership
share. Economic theory is not clear regarding the direction of causality between
company performance and the size of the ownership share a manager is willing to
take. It is possible that the size of the ownership shares of managers not only in-
fluences company performance but also that company performance has an influence
on the size of the ownership share that managers are willing to take. Managers tend
to be very well informed about the potential of a company before they decide on
the share. This could lead to higher ownership share in well performing companies
and lower ownership share in badly performing companies, depending on the price
of the share.
The data set at hand allows us the use of several approaches to cope with en-
dogeneity. Due to the panel structure of the data set, we are able to control for
unobserved firm-specific effects, for example, managerial ability, by estimating fixed-
effects models. The use of fixed-effects specifications helps to control for endogeneity
as long as the effect is time-invariant, because in this case it will be captured by the
fixed effect.8 In a first approach shown in Table 6.2, we use the lag of the managerial
ownership share to account for the time-variant endogeneity. If the major concern
of the endogeneity issue is market timing, for example, then using lags will help. It
is conceivable that managers increase their ownership share on private information
that company performance will improve.
In a second approach shown in Table 6.3, we use instrumental variables (Two-
Stage-Least-Squares: 2SLS) estimation. The instrumental variable approach also
controls for endogeneity due to the time-variant component of the error term.
8We also estimated random-effects models. In a comparison with the fixed-effects method, the
random-effects method is rejected by the Hausman test. The test is on the null hypothesis that
the firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. For example, the Hausman test of
the lagged specification in Table 6.2, column (2), has a p-value of 0.012.
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Controlling for Endogeneity using Lags
Table 6.2 shows the estimation results for the lagged specifications. This strategy of
temporal ordering helps if the major source for the endogeneity problem is reverse
causality.
In the lagged specification, we need to be concerned about autocorrelation in the
disturbance terms. Consider the model:
Yit = α+ xi,t−1β + it (6.1)
with i = 1, ..., N indicating company dimension and t = 1, ..., T time dimension.
For the ease of exposition, this model abstracts from any contemporaneous right-
hand side variables. This specification leads to inconsistent results in the presence
of a first-order autoregressive scheme: it = ρi,t−1+ηit; |ρ| < 1 since xi,t−1 and i,t−1
would be correlated. We tested the hypothesis that serial correlation is absent in our
panel using the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p. 282f.). This hypothesis
is not rejected, the test statistic is highly insignificant (p-value=0.95).
Column (1) in Table 6.2 shows the results of the most parsimonious specification
that does not include any fixed effects. This basic specification indicates a cubic rela-
tionship between company performance and managerial ownership share.9 In order
to take time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity into account, we extent this speci-
fication by including various fixed effects. Column (2) shows the results when firm
fixed effects are included, column (3) additionally takes year fixed effects into account
and column (4) also includes year/industry interaction dummies. By including firm
fixed effects, we control for any permanent differences across companies in unmea-
sured determinants of company performance. Within this framework the coefficients
on the covariates share (lag), share squared (lag) and share cubed (lag) capture the
partial relationship between deviations of these variables from company means and
deviations of performance from company means. The year dummies control for the
effects of changes over time in unmeasured determinants which are common to all
companies, and the year/industry interaction dummies consider differences across
industries in the effect of changes over time in unmeasured determinants in company
performance.
9Because it is a priori not clear what functional form is appropriate for managerial ownership,
we started with a polynomial including share up to the fourth power. Since the fourth power was
not significant, we used a polynomial up to the third power. Here we found the third power to be
significant and therefore stayed with this functional form.
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Table 6.2: Managerial Ownership and Company Performance – Lagged
Specifications
Dep. Variable: Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share (lag) 5.45∗∗ 15.13∗∗∗ 15.74∗∗∗ 16.66∗∗∗ 26.53∗∗∗
(2.49) (5.20) (5.24) (5.67) (8.19)
Share squared (lag) -10.42∗∗ -22.56∗∗ -23.57∗∗ -25.53∗∗ -48.04∗∗∗
(5.31) (10.99) (10.92) (11.49) (16.31)
Share cubed (lag) 5.60∗ 10.98 11.51∗ 12.74∗ 26.31∗∗∗
(3.18) (6.75) (6.67) (6.93) (9.61)
Owner manager (lag) 0.09 -0.60∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -0.44∗
(0.07) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.26)
Outside owner -0.01 0.19∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.04
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Bank -0.06 -0.16 -0.25∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Ln employment 0.08 -0.34 -0.30 -0.16 -0.41
(0.06) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.33)
Ln age 0.05 -0.95 -2.45∗ -3.29∗∗ -1.68
(0.10) (0.64) (1.39) (1.47) (1.31)
Performance (lag) 0.14∗∗
(0.06)
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Year industry interaction No No No Yes Yes
No. of obs. (companies): 918 (356) 918 (356) 918 (356) 918 (356) 580 (361)
R2 0.01 0.64 0.64 0.66
Sargan (p-value) 0.23
Errors (p-value)
AR(1) 0.00
AR(2) n.a.
Note: ***, **, *-indicates significance on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Column (1) shows the results of an OLS estimation, in column (2)-(4) various
fixed effects are successively included into the specification. Column (5) shows Arellano-Bond
GMM estimation results.
The inclusion of the fixed effects does not change the qualitative results of the
relationship between company performance and managerial ownership but the pre-
cision of the coefficients improves considerably owing to the inclusion of additional
controls.
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The functional form of the relationship between managerial ownership share and
company performance is very similar for specifications (1) to (4). The functional
form plotted in Figure 6.1 is based on the results of the specification including the
most controls, shown in column (4). The positive incentive effect for low values of
managerial ownership share is quite pronounced, whereas there is no clear evidence
for a negative entrenchment effect for high values of managerial ownership share. We
further investigate the relationship by plotting the slope of the function (Figure 6.2).
From the confidence intervals it can be seen for which areas of managerial ownership
share the marginal effect is significantly different from zero. The incentive effect has
a significant impact on performance up to 40 percent, whereas the marginal effect
is never significant for the range of values where the performance function has a
negative slope. We therefore conclude that there is no entrenchment effect for our
sample of private companies. Ownership in private companies is much more concen-
trated than in public companies. Ownership shares that would allow entrenchment
are often so high that managers already have good incentives to maximize company
value.
Companies perform better when fewer managers with ownership stakes are in-
volved. If there are several managers it becomes more difficult to agree on the
company strategy and, furthermore, the incentive provided by the managerial own-
ership share is smaller for each single manager.
With regard to the effect of outside owners we find that performance is increasing
in the number of outside owners. This finding is consistent with the absence of a sig-
nificant entrenchment effect, however, it is in contrast to some part of the corporate
governance literature. This literature indicates the importance of monitoring activ-
ities, best performed by concentrated ownership. In contrast, widespread ownership
leads to the free rider problem since there are only weak incentives for individual
investors to seek information about the managers’ work. We, in turn, do not find
that owners with a large share would be more effective in monitoring. For the in-
terpretation of this result it is also important to consider that family ownership
is widespread in small and medium-sized companies. It is very likely that family
members who are not part of the management are not so well informed about the
business. If those family members have a high ownership share, they can easily
influence business decisions, which may be harmful.10
Monitoring by banks has a positive effect. The more bank relationships a com-
10This rather pessimistic view about the business acumen of family members is supported by
other empirical analyses, see, for example, Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (2000).
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pany has, the worse its performance. This is compatible with the argument that
banks with a high loan volume to one company will spend more resources on mon-
itoring than banks with a small loan volume. But it also confirms the view that
companies with a poor performance need to seek loans from several banks because
no bank wants to make a big commitment. It is not possible to differentiate between
these two arguments.11
Firm size in terms of the natural logarithm of the number of employees does not
have a significant effect on company performance. Younger companies do, however,
show a better performance than older companies.
Although we regress the change in profits on the level of managerial ownership
share our results do not imply that better companies will grow faster than weaker
companies for ever. Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997) find that competitive
pressure has a positive influence on productivity growth. Companies that grow
faster build up market share over time, but then they often lose their power to
innovate and hence their productivity declines.
We also investigate the dynamic structure of the specification applying an Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator. The results are shown in the last column of Table 6.2. We
used the one-step method because it is generally recommended for inference (see,
for example, Blundell and Bond, 1998). The two-step model is more efficient, but
the standard errors tend to be downward biased in small samples. The Sargan test
statistic, shown at the bottom of column (5), is insignificant indicating that the
instruments are valid. The Arellano-Bond test for first-order serial correlation in
disturbances is highly significant, which was to be expected since the variables are
used in first differences. The Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation
can not be calculated in our panel because the number of years is too small.
Lagged company performance has a positive significant influence on current per-
formance, indicating persistence. However, with a value of 0.14 the coefficient is
relatively small. This additional specification does not alter our previous findings
regarding company performance and managerial ownership, but the significance of
the additional controls declines.
11This result is in line with previous empirical findings by Petersen and Rajan (1994), who find
that firms that borrow from multiple banks are charged a significantly higher interest rate. In
addition, concentrating on few bank relationships has a positive effect on the availability of loans.
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Figure 6.1: The Influence of Managerial Ownership Share on Perfor-
mance
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Note: 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated. This graph is
based on specification (4) shown in Table 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Slope of the Performance Function
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Note: 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated. This graph is
based on specification (4) shown in Table 6.2.
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Controlling for Endogeneity Using Instrumental Variables
In this subsection, we use instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of
managerial ownership share. Instrumental variables (IV) estimation is a general so-
lution to the problem of an endogenous variable. The previous proceeding focused
on one particular aspect of endogeneity – reverse causality, that is that higher prof-
itability may lead to more ownership. But the problem is much more general. The
concern is that some unobserved factor may lead to increases in both ownership
and performance. An example of such unobserved factors is changes in corporate
governance, including more pressure from outsiders or the arrival of a new manager.
The purpose of the IV approach is to account for this general problem. In addi-
tion, in contrast to the fixed-effects method, which takes account of time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, the IV methods also helps if the unobserved component
is time-varying. We use the contemporaneous value of share in the regression, but
instrument it with its lag.12 The first lag of managerial ownership share up to the
fifth power is used as instruments. The regression results are shown in Table 6.3.
The specifications include all controls described above.
Analogously to Table 6.2, the first column shows the parsimonious specification
without any fixed effects. Column (2)-(4) add consecutively firm fixed effects, year
fixed effects, and year/industry interaction dummies.
The results of the specification in column (1) are in line with the previous findings
concerning managerial ownership share, but the other controls are not significant
anymore. Once we include the various fixed effects, we do not find a significant
relationship between managerial ownership share and company performance. Figure
6.3 shows the profile of the estimation. The plot is based on the the specification
including the most controls (column 4), as in Figure 6.1. The confidence intervals are
wide, indicating that share, share squared and share cubed are jointly insignificant.
In addition, the marginal effects are always insignificant (Figure 6.4).
The imprecise measurement of the effects could be due to a weak correlation be-
tween the endogenous regressor and the instruments. In order to judge instrument
quality, we calculated Shea’s partial R squared (Shea, 1997). It is a measure for
instrument relevance for regressions with several endogenous regressors. Its values
are quite low for the share variables. They are in the order of 0.02 to 0.03. We
12This proceeding is only valid in the absence of autocorrelation in residuals. The absence of
autocorrelation is not rejected by a test of serial correlation, as outlined in the previous part of
this section.
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interpret these values as an indication of weak instruments. Under these circum-
stances, the IV method does not allow us to reliably identify the relevant effects.
In addition, the bias of IV estimates can be higher than the bias of OLS estimates,
when instruments are weak. We therefore prefer our lagged specification.
The signs of the other regressors remain the same in the instrumental variables
regression, but are less precisely measured.
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Table 6.3: Managerial Ownership and Company Performance – Specifi-
cations Using Instrumental Variables
Dep. Variable: Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share 6.16∗∗ 46.13 43.95 42.15
(2.86) (68.46) (68.39) (56.20)
Share squared -11.75∗∗ -96.95 -93.25 -90.36
(6.09) (132.82) (132.55) (111.52)
Share cubed 6.32∗ 55.18 53.30 52.18
(3.65) (73.44) (73.23) (62.48)
Owner manager 0.09 -0.73∗ -0.73∗ -0.80∗∗
(0.07) (0.43) (0.42) (0.40)
Outside owner -0.003 0.25 0.24 0.22
(0.04) (0.34) (-0.34) (0.29)
Bank -0.06 -0.20 -0.21∗ -0.22∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Ln employment 0.09 -0.52∗ -0.52∗ -0.49∗∗
(0.06) (0.27) (0.13) (0.24)
Ln age 0.05 -0.62 -1.06 -1.29
(0.10) (0.80) (1.02) (0.93)
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Year industry interaction No No No Yes
No. of obs. (companies): 918 (356) 918 (356) 918 (356) 918 (356)
R2 0.01 0.59 0.60 0.61
Shea Partial R2
Share 0.79 0.019 0.019 0.024
Share squared 0.78 0.019 0.019 0.024
Share cubed 0.78 0.021 0.021 0.026
Owner manager 0.89 0.186 0.187 0.204
Note: ***, **, *-indicates significance on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Column (1) shows the results of a 2SLS estimation without
fixed effects, in column (2)-(4) various fixed effects are successively included into the
specification.
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Figure 6.3: The Influence of Managerial Ownership Share on Perfor-
mance - IV Specification
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Note: 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated. This graph is
based on specification (4) shown in Table 6.3.
Figure 6.4: Slope of the Performance Function - IV Specification
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Note: 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated. This graph is
based on specification (4) shown in Table 6.3.
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6.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the ownership share of man-
agers and company performance for small and medium-sized private companies. Up
to now, most studies on managerial ownership have concentrated on companies that
are listed on the stock market. However, the distortions caused by the separation
of ownership and control may also affect private companies with limited liability.
Since this company type is the most important legal form in Germany, it is crucial to
have a good understanding of the basic corporate governance mechanisms for these
companies as well.
We use an unbalanced panel data set of private companies with limited liability in
the German business-related service sector. The main conclusion from our analysis
is that ownership does influence company performance. We find that managerial
ownership up to around 40 percent has a positive effect on company performance
owing to the incentive effect. However, we do not find a significant entrenchment
effect. This result is in contrast to previous findings for public companies that found
evidence for the entrenchment effect. The discrepancy in results can be interpreted in
terms of structural differences between private and public companies. The ownership
share of managers in private companies is generally quite high. At levels at which
they could become entrenched with respect to outside owners, they already bear
a large proportion of the costs. The incentive to maximize firm value therefore
dominates entrenchment considerations.
156
6.5 Appendix
Table A1:Turnover Accounted for by Companies With Different Legal Form
(in percent of overall turnover)
Type of legal form 1972 1986 1990 1998 2000
Sole proprietor 23.8 15.4 14.9 13.3 12.3
OHG - 6.8 6.8 6.1 6.1
KG - 24.0 23.9 22.4 22.5
GmbH 17.1 25.5 29.1 32.0 33.6
AG 19.1 21.2 20.2 21.5 20.3
Other 7.9 7.2 5.1 4.7 5.3
Note: A sole proprietor is a single entrepreneur with unlimited liability. The OHG is a private
company that has several owners with unlimited liability. The KG has at least one owner with
unlimited liability and at least one owner with limited liability. GmbH’s have one or more owners
with limited liability. AG’s are companies that are allowed to issue shares. They may or may
not be listed on a stock market. Other includes state-owned enterprises and cooperatives. This
information is taken from Statistisches Bundesamt, 1972 to 2000.
Table A2:The Business-Related Service Sector
Sector WZ 93
Computer Services 72100, 72201-02, 72301-04, 72601-02, 72400
Tax Consultancy & Accounting 74123, 74127, 74121-22
Management Consultancy 74131-32, 74141-42
Architecture 74201-04
Technical Advice & Planning 74205-09, 74301-04
Advertising 74844, 74401-02
Vehicle Rental 71100, 71210
Machine Rental 45500, 71320, 71330
Cargo Handling & Storage 63121, 63403, 63401
Waste and Sewage Disposal 90001-07
Note: The WZ93 industrial classification code is a classification system developed by the German
Federal Statistical Office in accordance with the European NACE Rev. 1 standard that classifies
economic units according to their sector of concentration.
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Table A3:Distribution of Observations and Number of Companies
Sector No. of Observations No. of Companies
Computer Services 111 44
Tax Consultancy & Accounting 76 29
Management Consultancy 81 31
Architecture 133 52
Technical Advice & Planning 186 69
Advertising 61 27
Vehicle Rental 73 29
Machine Rental 66 25
Cargo Handling & Storage 66 25
Waste and Sewage Disposal 65 25
Total 918 356
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